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ABSTRACT
This research created the Mission Assurance Resilience Matrix, a decision 
framework that integrates existing infrastructure assessment methods with emerging 
resilience research to model resilience under uncertainty as part of a detailed 
infrastructure management system. This framework enables military decision makers to 
easily visualize deficiencies in infrastructure resilience and assess where to most 
efficiently allocate resources. This research further extends results by including modules 
on training and education as a component of the scope of work.
There are three significant contributions of this research. The first identifies the 
gaps of how and where modeling under uncertainty, infrastructure systems management, 
and resilient systems are integrated into the standard undergraduate and graduate 
engineering management curriculum. The second is the development of the Mission 
Assurance Resilience Matrix (MARM), a quantitative visual tool to communicate the 
impact of project selection decisions to enhance resilience of military infrastructure 
systems and assist decision makers in understanding how a singular project may 
influence the resilience of multiple systems using the tradespace analysis. The third is the 
verification of the MARM model as a computer-based, decision-support tool.
While the implementation of this research is specific to military installations, the 
framework developed is broadly applicable and can be expanded to incorporate the entire 
MAA framework as well as extended to support assessment of the resilience of public 
and private non-military infrastructure systems.
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1. INTRODUCTION
With the increasing frequency and severity of natural and man-made disasters 
around the world, the challenge of building tools that assess, quantify, and clearly 
articulate the resilience of an infrastructure system is a growing topic of discussion 
amongst infrastructure system managers and researchers. Multiple efforts have been 
made to develop indices to quantify resilience using metrics (Cardoso et al. 2015; Kerner 
and Thomas 2014; Wood et al. 2019). An evaluation of several different metrics 
concluded that one of the challenges is to validate measures of performance for these 
metrics when the events considered are infrequent and where specific community and 
disaster conditions are never exactly the same and highlight that there is little utility in 
these metrics unless they can be confidently used to inform decisionmakers (Bakkensen 
et al. 2017).
While much effort has been put into the collection and reporting of various 
infrastructure assessment data, there is a significant gap in the ability to translate the 
existing Department of Defense’s (DoD) Mission Assurance Assessment (MAA) into a 
framework that uses resilience to drive infrastructure investment decisions. It is critical to 
improve the resilience of military installations and their complex infrastructure systems 
to strengthen response to the uncertainty and threat driven by the increasing frequency 
and severity of natural and man-made disasters.
This research contributes to closing the gap in several unique and novel aspects. 
This research created a decision framework, the Mission Assurance Resilience Matrix 
(MARM), that can model resilience under uncertainty as part of a detailed infrastructure
management system. The framework models military installations as complex 
infrastructure systems and directly addresses the DoD’s mandate to incorporate resilience 
along with risk and life cycle cost into assessment, planning, and resourcing of its critical 
infrastructure (Department of Defense 2019; NAVFAC 2017). This research further 
extends results by including modules for the training and education of engineering 
managers, who are uniquely postured to lead the management of complex and multi­
disciplinary infrastructure systems.
1.1. RESILIENCE AND INFRASTRUCTURE TERMINOLOGY
Resilience is a term widely used in various industries and settings with different 
connotations depending on how the term is defined. Prior to undertaking the integration 
of resilience into military decision-making frameworks, a clear definition of resilience to 
be used in this research must be established.
1.1.1. Definition of Resilience. An integrative literature review of resilience 
definitions in recent technical literature concluded that, “resilience is an ability to prepare 
for, withstand, and/or recover from adversity, emergencies or failures in a timely manner 
and still be able to function at least nominally while minimizing potential losses in the 
system” (Wilt et al. 2016). Furthermore, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) 
defines disaster resilience as “the ability to plan and prepare for, absorb, recover from, 
and adapt to adverse events” (Committee on Increasing National Resilience to Hazards 
and Disasters 2012). This definition not only connotates the system’s capacity to return to 
previous levels of operation, but also the ability to adapt and improve to offer even better 
levels of service and operation.
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Additionally, military infrastructure resilience as a property should be viewed in 
terms of interconnected functions and systems, not simply individual features (Aven and 
Thekdi 2018; Linkov et al. 2018) which necessitates that an installation’s resilience be 
considered broader than simply its ability to resume combat related operations following 
a shock. Thus, the framework for restoration of operations needs to scale across the 
interconnected functions and various types of disasters with minimal modification 
(Ramachandran et al. 2015).
Resilience is defined within the DoD MAA framework as the ability to support 
the functions necessary for mission success with high probability, short periods of 
reduced capability, and across a wide range of scenarios, conditions, and threats, despite 
hostile action or adverse conditions and may leverage cross-domain or alternative 
government, commercial, or international capabilities (Department of Defense 2016a).
1.1.2. Military Infrastructure. Military infrastructure comprises a broad 
portfolio covering a wide range of facilities and systems that vary from “home station” 
installations based in the United States to permanent and expeditionary installations 
forward based around the world (Lostumbo et al. 2013). The formal definition of a 
military installation is “a base, camp, post, station, yard, center, or other activity under 
the jurisdiction of the Secretary of a military department or, in the case of an activity in a 
foreign country, under the operational control of the Secretary of a military department or 
the Secretary of Defense, without regard to the duration of operations control” 
(Congressional Research Service 2019).
Military infrastructure systems possess several characteristics that make them 
unique compared to infrastructure systems in the civilian sector. They require
3
consideration of operational vulnerability to an intelligent adversary, not just nature or a 
targeted act of violence, as the enemy can have an impact in a powerful and sustained 
way (Hagen et al. 2017). The requirements they must fulfill are impacted by changes to 
unit structures, deployable systems, command and control focus/emphasis, and politics. 
Additionally, the design, construction, and approval of projects to improve military 
infrastructure is impacted by the availability and limitations of different “pots” of money 
that can be appropriated by Congress for these projects such as Operations and 
Maintenance, Facilities Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization, Civil Works, and 
Military Construction. The rules for each type of appropriation prohibit the mixing or 
combination of funds from various sources, often limiting efficient use of resources and 
minimizing impact of the projects (Congressional Research Service 2019). The 
combination of these unique characteristics makes it imperative that infrastructure 
resilience decision support tools are tailored for utilization within military applications.
1.2. ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT RESILIENCE EDUCATION
The shortfalls in the DoD’s approach to resilience highlights a greater gap in 
engineering management education and instruction that does not substantially address or 
incorporate infrastructure resilience. Findings from a review of current literature are that 
there is a significant gap in addressing infrastructure resilience in both the formal 
engineering management body of knowledge and engineering management educational 
research perspectives. A search of the discipline’s foundational documents, the 
Engineering Management Body of Knowledge and associated Engineering Management 
Handbook, yields no results for infrastructure resilience. In Domain 3, Strategic Planning,
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sustainability is listed, but not resilience (Farr et al. 2016; Shah and Nowocin 2015), 
which is significant given recent emphasis on resilience.
This infrastructure resilience education gap has been identified in additional 
literature. Ramirez and Rioux conducted a survey of select Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) personnel to identify potential courses and topics to be included in 
Homeland Security programs to help inform those involved in curriculum development, 
and their assessment indicates that there is a significant gap and a strong need to include 
courses into curricula that address response to and mitigation of disasters (Ramirez 
2012). The White House Educators Commitment on Resilient Design, signed in 2016, 
calls for a focus on resilient design across all disciplines. The intent of this commitment 
is for institutions to commit to teach students who can lead the various activities (such as 
planning, design, engineering, and construction) to build resilient infrastructure (Pope
2016). This commitment is in line with the goals of this research to identify where and 
how infrastructure resilience is being taught at institutions of higher education.
Due to the complexity of these infrastructure systems and the various engineering 
and other disciplines involved with the design and operation of a complex infrastructure 
system, solutions to improve infrastructure resilience require a multidisciplinary 
approach, which involves several disciplines that each provide a different perspective on 
a problem or issues. The student is required to integrate the often-diverse ideas (Stember 
1991). It has been argued that engineering management programs provide the leaders 
needed to manage these complex and interdisciplinary efforts (Perry et al. 2017).
Evaluation of engineering management programs for infrastructure resilience 
topics and multidisciplinary approaches follow a mixed method research approach
5
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following previous methodology used to assess how engineering leadership programs bin 
together along various dimensions -  end goal, application of leadership learning, scale of 
leadership action, leadership emphasis, participant selection, compulsoriness, and 
integration (Klassen et al. 2016). Qualitative evaluation of educational programs to 
identify key dimensions and develop a conceptual framework from which to categorize 
programs can employ a modified version of analytical induction (Patton 2014).
1.3. MISSION ASSURANCE ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK AND SHORTFALLS
Prior to incorporating techniques to improve resilience in military decision­
making tools the current infrastructure assessment framework and its shortfalls must be 
understood.
1.3.1. Mission Assurance Assessment Framework. The DoD made 
infrastructure resilience a focal point of its installation management strategy implemented 
in the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) due to the increasing frequency 
and severity of disasters, both natural and manmade, as well as a mandate from Congress 
to integrate installation resilience in master plans that incorporate disaster-related and 
environmental conditions and the measures to mitigate these risks (116th Congress 2019). 
This risk management program confirms the availability of resources deemed essential to 
successful completion of DoD missions and includes assets that are essential to planning, 
mobilizing, deploying, executing, and sustaining U.S. military operations worldwide. The 
goal of the DCIP is to reduce or eliminate unacceptable risk to Defense Critical Assets, 
thus enabling the successful execution of DoD missions, regardless of the threat or hazard 
(Department of Defense 2018a). The DoD also highlighted infrastructure resilience as a
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key component of its National Defense Strategy by specifying that there will be a priority 
to transition to smaller, dispersed, resilient, and adaptive basing (Department of Defense 
2018b).
To establish a comprehensive and integrative infrastructure assessment 
framework, the DoD implemented the Mission Assurance Strategy and defined mission 
assurance as a process to protect or ensure the continued function and resilience of 
capabilities and assets critical to the performance of DoD Mission-Essential Functions in 
any operating environment or condition (Department of Defense 2017). The intent is for 
implementation of this framework to assist the DoD to prioritize infrastructure 
investments and provide input into the DoD’s existing planning, budgeting, requirements, 
and acquisition process as decisions are made on increasing resilience capacity.
The Department of Defense (DoD) uses the Mission Assurance Assessment 
(MAA) benchmarks for the basis of assessing its installations to meet its mandate to 
incorporate resilience measurement and quantification into its existing and decision­
making framework (Department of Defense 2018c). The MAA framework divides the 
assessment into twenty-three distinct functions, such as antiterrorism, physical security, 
and emergency management, with each area containing multiple categories to be 
assessed, for a total of over 200 benchmark categories. Responsibilities for assessing the 
functions are assigned to members of the assessment team depending on their expertise. 
The specific benchmark metrics from the DoD Mission Assurance Benchmarks dated 28 
March 2018 are unclassified but designated as For Official Use Only (FOUO) 
(Department of Defense 2018c). Therefore, they cannot be published in this dissertation
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in full, but the broad categories and representative identification numbers are summarized 
and identified in this research to allow for easier connection back to the base document.
Assessment teams submit completed MAA reports to the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense to apprise Combatant Commanders and other military leaders of the status of 
military installation infrastructure. These reports are an important input for these leaders 
to understand risk, inform the development of specific requirements for future 
infrastructure projects, and assist in making decisions about which ones to fund.
1.3.2. Mission Assurance Assessment Framework Shortfalls. Several shortfalls 
have been identified in the MAA framework. It stipulates that resilience be incorporated 
along with risk and life cycle cost (Department of Defense 2018a), but the current 
framework lacks integration of all these aspects (Department of Defense 2019; NAVFAC
2017). There is also a shortfall in the ability to identify strategic protection and resilience 
risks or critical interdependencies within its infrastructure systems and, therefore, the 
ability to make sound policy and investment decisions. Additionally, the visibility on 
emerging protection and resilience best practices and performance metrics is limited and 
the connection between the data collection process conducted by installation 
infrastructure assessment teams and installation risk management decision making 
procedures is broken. Mission assurance seeks to address these shortfalls and support 
DoD’s existing resource allocation and Defense Acquisition System processes 
(Department of Defense 2017).
The military places the responsibility and provides the resources to execute 
resilience assessment and improvement at the Geographic Combatant Commands, such 
as the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), which is further delegated to the
subordinate Service components, such as the United States Army Africa Command 
(USARAF) (Department of Defense 2019). This presents a challenge in that each service 
approaches the MAA through its own lens, which results in an inefficient and ineffective 
single-service approach to resilience. This issue was highlighted in the DoD report to 
Congress in 2019 on the vulnerabilities of 79 of its most important bases. The results 
reported “fell short of congressional intent by omitting most overseas bases, and it did not 
include any attempt at an infrastructure risk mitigation plan or 
calculating associated funding for such a plan” (Berger 2019).
A final shortfall is that the DoD’s current concept of resiliency is not 
comprehensive. The current guidance connects resilience solely to climate change and 
neglects the impacts of other hazards (Department of Defense 2016b). Additionally, the 
DoD’s current infrastructure decision-making framework stipulates the incorporation of 
risk and life cycle cost and includes a mandate to incorporate resiliency, but there is a 
lack of integration of all these aspects into the current assessment framework 
(Department of Defense 2019; NAVFAC 2017) and does not incorporate uncertainty to 
these critical military infrastructure systems.
1.4. RESILIENCE MATRIX METHODOLOGY
Labaka et al. developed a matrix to relate resilience policies to three stages of 
resilience (prevention, absorption, and recovery) (Labaka et al. 2015), but this matrix was 
developed at the strategic level and does not translate well down to the individual 
installation assessment level. It also does not address adapting to improve resilience 
based on what was learned from a shock to the system. Subsequent research developed a
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Resilience Matrix (RM) that supports a transparent connection between resilience 
policies and potential outcomes and provides a framework for cross-compatibility of 
metrics from different disciplines for cyber resilience. This RM methodology was based 
on the National Academy of Sciences definition of resilience as a framework to assess the 
performance of integrated complex systems (Linkov et al. 2013a) and extended to assess 
the performance of integrated complex systems (Fox-Lent et al. 2015; Wood et al. 2019). 
The RM integrates assessment of resilience at the functional and system levels, so that 
the evaluation is not just based on the features of the infrastructure. This is highly 
applicable to military infrastructure assessments, due to the unique, complex, and highly 
integrated nature of military infrastructure as a system of systems.
The RM is a 4x4 matrix such that the four columns describe the four stages of 
disaster management (plan/prepare, absorb/withstand, recover, adapt). The rows describe 
the four general management domains of a complex system, (physical, information, 
cognitive, and social), as described in the US Army’s Network-Centric Warfare doctrine 
(Alberts and Hayes 2005). The RM integrates assessment of resilience at the functional 
and system levels, so that the evaluation is not just based on the features of the 
infrastructure and helps decision makers answer the question “ How is the system’s 
ability to [plan/prepare for, absorb, recover from, adapt to] a cyber disruption 
implemented in the [physical, information, cognitive, social] domain? ” (Linkov et al. 
2013b).
Finally, this RM methodology defines a system’s overall resilience as the 
aggregate of the sixteen metrics that could result from multi-criteria decision analysis 
methods (Heinimann and Hatfield 2017). A system with robust safeguards where all
elements of the resultant matrix have been addressed can be considered to be highly 
resilient. In contrast, a lack of attention to one or more elements in the RM would 
indicate a point of vulnerability, which may be used to direct attention to improve the 
security of the system as a whole (Zussblatt et al. 2017).
The RM has been applied to assess many types of infrastructure systems such as 
cyber (Linkov et al. 2013b), energy (Roege et al. 2014), coastal communities (Fox-Lent 
et al. 2015), urban planning and assessment (Fox-lent and Linkov 2018), and reservoirs 
(Mustajoki and Marttunen 2019). This dissertation is the first work to apply the RM 
framework to the DoD Mission Assurance Assessment construct by developing the 
Mission Assurance Assessment Resilience Matrix (MARM). The RM framework is 
highly applicable to the assessment of resilience in the DoD MAA due to three 
characteristics. It is flexible and does not define specific metrics, but provides a 
framework to identify the relevant metrics to assess performance from a wider system 
perspective, which also lend to its ability to be generalizable to many types of 
infrastructure systems. It provides a baseline performance score on which the resilience 
improvement potential of proposed system changes can be evaluated (Fox-Lent et al. 
2015).
1.5. TRADESPACE ANALYSIS
The Department of Defense (DoD) Engineered Resilience Systems (ERS) 
tradespace analysis methodology is used to incorporate resilience into deployable military 
systems, such as helicopters and tanks. ERS tradespace analysis is currently used to 
create an integrated capability for systems engineers, engineer managers, and acquisition
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personnel to increase the quality of acquisition decision-making for deployable systems. 
ERS improves informed decision-making early in the DoD Acquisition process, prior to 
the Milestone A decision point, when there is both significant uncertainty in the project, 
but also substantial impact on overall project costs based on these early decisions (Sitterle 
et al. 2015). This allows engineers to efficiently allocate resources through tradespace 
analysis, which identifies which projects to pursue to improve resilience by relating the 
cost of the projects to the potential resilience improvement (Bostick et al. 2018).
There are important shared resilience attributes between deployable military 
systems and the installation infrastructure which enables them, making the extension of 
ERS methods desirable (Ewing et al. 2006). An analogy can be drawn between 
deployable weapon systems and fixed site infrastructure, which project combat power 
from power projection platforms (military installations) to assist design engineers, facility 
operators and managers, and infrastructure decision makers to see the impacts of project 
selection on resilience.
1.6. MODEL VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION METHODOLOGY
A decision support tool is most useful when the impact of underlying uncertainty 
inherent in the model is understood and the tool has been verified and validated for its 
utility and appropriateness. Verification is the process of determining if you are building 
the model right and validation is answering the question are you building the right model 
(Andradhttir et al. 1997; Kleijnen 1997; Sargent 2013). Ling and Mahadevan elaborate on 
this concept by decsribing model validation as the process of determining the degree to 
which a model is an accurate representation of the real world from the perspective of the
intended use of the model and that statistics-based quantitative methods are needed to 
supplement subjective judgments and to systematically account for errors and uncertainty 
in both model prediction and experimental observation (Ling and Mahadevan 2013).
The incorporation of uncertainty has not been applied to the assessment 
framework for critical military infrastructure systems but is a goal of the DoD Mission 
Assurance Strategy to improve allocation of constrained resources during selection of 
projects that improve resilience of military projection platforms (Department of Defense 
2018a).
1.6.1. Sources of Uncertainty. Uncertainty in the model due to measurement 
error, imprecise and/or insufficient data, natural variability, and model uncertainty (Ling 
and Mahadevan 2013) must be investigated to complete the model verification and 
validation process. This is especially important since the MAA framework relies on the 
aggregation of the judgements from subject matter experts with varying levels of 
experience with the assessment framework and familiarity with the infrastructure 
systems, which can introduce uncertainty due to conflicting opinions and judgments or 
judgments are expressed with a measure of uncertainty (Yaniv 1997).
One potential source of uncertainty is due to differences in how individual 
assessors assess the condition of infrastructure based on benchmark category metrics and 
weight the importance of a benchmark based on its description. Yaniv suggests that 
decisionmakers will need to reconcile inconsistencies among judgmental estimates and 
determine their influence on the overall aggregate judgement by weighting input 
judgements by the confidence expressed by the judges and/or trimming of outlying 
(extreme relative to the other opinions in the sample) judgements to increase accuracy
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(Yaniv 1997). Particular attention needs to be paid to uncertainty in the starting 
conditions in order to improve the decision making process by identifying the critical 
criteria and then reevaluating more accurately the weights of these criteria due to 
subjectivity causing difficulty in accurately representing the importance of these criteria 
(Triantaphyllou and Sanchez 1997). This information will be useful in decision making 
since it explains synthetically how much the assessment is biased by the assessor 
judgements (Zavadskas et al. 2007)
1.6.2. Modified Delphi Method. The Delphi Method was developed by the 
Research and Development (RAND) Corporation in the 1960’s in Santa Monica 
California for the “systemic solicitation and collation of judgements on a particular topic 
through a set of sequential questionnaires interspersed with summarized information and 
feedback of opinions derived from earlier responses”. The Delphi method is based on 
structural surveys and makes use of the information provided by experts 
(Balasubramanian and Agarwal 2012). The Delphi method is useful when evidence is 
lacking or limited: it relies on “collective intelligence” of group members to jointly 
produce better results than anyone in the group could produce on his or her own, resulting 
in increased content validity (Miller et al. 2020).
The Delphi Method is appropriate for this research for several reasons. The first is 
that the information available for this research was limited due to DoD MAA security and 
information classification concerns. Second, it works well with a group of subject matter 
experts (SME), which was appropriate given the limited number of subject matter experts 
available to provide input on the MARM. The DoD Mission Assurance Assessment 
community is quite small and the assessments process can be both functionally and
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installation specific. To ensure that the subject matter experts used in this study would 
have the requisite familiarity with the MAA in general and the specific benchmarks and 
metrics from the case study data set, the set of experts was limited to the US Army Africa 
Deputy Chief of Staff Engineer (DCSENG) staff.
The evaluation of the objectives identified in each round of the Modified Delphi 
Method were used to verify the MARM as a decision support tool and provide insight as 
to potential sources of uncertainty in the model that may have an impact on the overall 
assessment of the resilience of the infrastructure systems for an installation.
1.6.3. Sensitivity Analysis. The benefits of sensitivity analysis on the MARM 
are to gain basic insight on the system, to indicate whether the model operates as 
intended, to identify the key components of the model that require further calibration 
and/or study, and to assess the relative importance of input variables for guidance in data 
collection and model calibration (Manache and Melching 2008). To achieve this, a 
global, all-at-a-time sensitivity analysis for decision-making (Pianosi et al. 2016) was 
used to analyze the impact of uncertainty arising from an assessment team’s selection of 
the benchmark category weights and criteria within the model to verify the consistency of 
the MARM with expected real-world behavior. Sensitivity analysis explores the 
relationships between the output and the inputs of a modeling application and is crucial to 
the validation and calibration of numerical models. It can be used to check the robustness 
of the final outcome against slight changes in the input data and can help reduce 
uncertainty in multi-criteria decision-making and the stability of its outputs by illustrating 
the impact of introducing small changes to specific input parameters on evaluation 
outcomes (Chen et al. 2010). The MARM, constructed as a quantitative conversion of the
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qualitative assessment priority and ratings into a singular score, is a good candidate for 
sensitivity analysis to determine relations between parameters and outputs of a simulation 
model (Norton 2015).
In typical optimization applications, uncertainty is considered a potentially 
harmful factor and the aim of analysis is to explore and discover the degree of sensitivity 
of the optimal solution to changes in key factors. An insensitive solution is considered 
advantageous (Munoz et al. 2016). Since the MARM is not an optimization tool, but 
rather an assessment tool, it is intended to be sensitive to allow the initial conditions to 
determine which cell in the matrix is the furthest from ideal and needs the most attention 
to conduct projects to bring it to the ideal state. Sensitivity analysis was utilized to 
determine how the model as originally constructed responds to the uncertainty in 
assessment of benchmark category priority weights and ratings as well as assess the 
difference between the summation versus average of benchmark category cells in each 
resilience matrix cell.
1.6.4. Monte Carlo Simulation. Based on the construction of the MARM and its 
design to be a decision-support tool, the exploration of the sensitivity of the cells within 
the MARM due to uncertainty of the assessments is very suitable for Monte Carlo 
simulation (Van Hoey et al. 2014). This is similar to the approach that Nguyen et. al took 
with development of resilience indices for Multi Echelon Assembly Supply Chains 
(MEASC), though that research sought to optimize the supply chain network. Both the 
supply chain resilience indices and the MARM can help decision makers make the trade­
off between resilience and cost (Nguyen et al. 2020).
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1.6.5. System Usability Scale. A final aspect of model verification regards the 
usability of a tool as an information collection and processing system through the use of 
the System Usability Scale (SUS) developed by John Brooke at Digital Equipment 
Corporation. The SUS is used to take a quick measurement of how people perceived the 
usability of computer systems on which they are working. Raw scores ranging from 0 
(poorest rating) to 4 (best rating) are converted to get the standard SUS score, which is on 
a scale of 0 to 100 (Lewis 2018). The score can then be given a grade based on the 
overall usability of the system identified as it compares to other computer based systems 
(Lewis and Sauro 2018).
1.7. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND CONTRIBUTIONS
The goal of this research was to close the gap between the existing DoD Mission 
Assurance Assessment processes and the mandate the DoD has to incorporate resilience 
into their assessment process. There is a significant lack of ability to take qualitative 
assessment information and convert it to actionable information that can be used to 
support military decision making on project selection to improve installation resilience.
1.7.1. Publication 1. Proper training and education are key components to 
addressing this issue, but it is unclear how and where modeling under uncertainty, 
infrastructure systems management, and resilient systems are integrated into the standard 
undergraduate and graduate engineering management curriculum. This research used a 
mixed method to determine whether and at what level engineering managers receive 
instruction regarding the implementation of tools and techniques to improve 
infrastructure resilience. The results of the study extend academic literature on
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infrastructure resilience education by identifying five dimensions to quantitatively assess 
engineering management programs to detect gaps, trends, and best practices in current 
infrastructure resilience education.
1.7.2. Publication 2. This research addressed a considerable gap in the existing 
Department of Defense (DoD) Mission Assurance Framework between the infrastructure 
assessment process and resilience considerations through the integration of a resilience 
matrix to develop the Mission Assurance Resilience Matrix (MARM). The MARM 
converts qualitative assessment data into a quantifiable and interactive resilience decision 
support tool. The integration of the resilience matrix was used to develop a quantitative 
visual tool to communicate the impact of decisions made using the tradespace analysis. 
This methodology provided a framework to improve the selection of projects that 
enhance resilience of military infrastructure systems and assist decision makers in 
understanding how a singular project may influence the resilience of multiple systems.
1.7.3. Publication 3. The goal of this study was to verify the MARM as an 
infrastructure resilience decision support tool. This was accomplished by utilizing the 
Modified Delphi Method to examine the amount of potential uncertainty in the MARM 
due to subject matter expert assessment of benchmark category priority weights and 
ratings as well as validating the hypothesis that the MARM does perform differently from 
the SME project selection heuristics, though more research needs to be conducted to 
quantify the amount of that impact. The study also incorporated a System Usability Scale 
to establish the level of usability of the MARM as an information technology tool. The 
results of this study verify the MARM’s potential as a beneficial decision support tool.
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1.7.4. Publication 4. The goal of this study was to investigate the behavior of the 
MARM due to uncertainty by using a Monte Carlo simulation to conduct a sensitivity 
analysis of the prioritization and ratings of the benchmark categories imbedded into the 
cells of the matrix. The results of this analysis demonstrated the ability to use sensitivity 
analysis to investigate uncertainty in the MARM, highlight the challenges of 
incorporating the MARM into the existing DoD Mission Assurance Construct to assess 
infrastructure resilience, and identify opportunities to improve the integration and use of 
the MARM for extension and expansion to the broader infrastructure resilience 
community.
The results of this dissertation, which are built for a specific installation, are 
broadly applicable and can support engineers in the design and/or management of 
infrastructure systems to improve resilience in an efficient manner.
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ABSTRACT
As the frequency and severity of natural and man-made disasters increases, the 
importance of improving the resilience of complex infrastructure systems in an uncertain 
environment is increasingly critical. Proper training and education are key components to 
addressing this issue, but it is unclear how and where modeling under uncertainty, 
infrastructure systems management, and resilient systems are integrated into the standard 
undergraduate and graduate engineering management curriculum. This research uses a 
mixed method to determine whether and at what level engineering managers receive 
instruction regarding the implementation of tools and techniques to improve 
infrastructure resilience. A review of current courses and content informs a systems- 
thinking approach to resilience and investigates how the topic of infrastructure resilience 
is being taught. The results of the study identify gaps in existing engineering management 
curriculum with respect to the topic of resilience. The findings from these results can be 
used to by the engineering management educator to provide coursework and training that
can be used to lead teams that design, build, analyze the resiliency of current 
infrastructure systems, or restore damaged infrastructure systems to their original state. 
Keywords: Infrastructure, resilience, education
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1. INTRODUCTION
Critical infrastructure systems such as hospitals, transportation networks, and 
utility systems, are becoming increasing more complex and interdependent while at the 
same time there has been a significant increase in operational uncertainty of these 
systems due to either natural or man-made disasters. Infrastructure resilience is the 
concept that addresses this uncertainty though it has been defined in many ways by a host 
of experts across a vast cross-section of disciplines. This research utilized its previous 
work on an integrative literature review to define resiliency as “an ability to prepare for, 
withstand, and/or recover from adversity, emergencies or failures in a timely manner and 
still be able to function at least nominally while minimizing potential losses in the 
system” (Wilt, Long, & Shoberg, 2016).
Due to the complexity of these infrastructure systems and the various engineering 
and other disciplines involved with the design and operation of a complex infrastructure 
system, solutions to improve infrastructure resilience require a multidisciplinary approach 
and makes the application of operational concepts of engineering management towards 
understanding and improving infrastructure resilience more important to maintaining, 
restoring, and adapting critical infrastructure to deal with disasters. It has been argued 
that engineering management programs provide the leaders needed to manage these
complex and interdisciplinary efforts (Perry, Hunter, Currall, & Frauenheim, 2017), so 
proper training and education of engineering managers in infrastructure resilience is 
critical to enable them to successfully lead infrastructure resilience programs and 
projects. However, at this time, it is unclear how and where modeling under uncertainty, 
infrastructure systems management, and resilient systems are integrated into the standard 
engineering curriculum.
This research uses a mixed method approach to determine whether and at what 
level engineering managers receive instruction regarding the implementation of tools and 
techniques to improve infrastructure resilience. The mixed methods research utilized a 
qualitative search of current courses in select schools with accredited engineering 
management programs, either by the American Society for Engineering Management 
(ASEM) or the Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology (ABET), for terms 
related to infrastructure resilience in addition to content across engineering disciplines 
and their connection to current studies on engineering pedagogy to inform a systems- 
thinking approach to resilience and how the topic of infrastructure resilience is being 
taught. The results of the search were then quantitively investigated to identify trends 
and gaps in existing engineering management curriculum with respect to the topic of 
resilience. The findings from these results can be used to by the engineering management 
educator to provide coursework and training that can be used to lead teams that design, 
build, analyze the resiliency of current infrastructure systems, or restore damaged 




This study began with seeking to identify a working definition for resilience that 
could be applied to infrastructure systems. The search began with the two cornerstone 
documents published by the American Society for Engineering Management; A Guide to 
the Engineering Management Body of Knowledge and the Engineering Management 
Handbook (ASEM, 2019). It turns out that neither of these documents have any mention 
of infrastructure resilience, which indicates there is a gap and opportunity to incorporate 
concepts of and methods for addressing infrastructure resilience in the Engineering 
Management Body of Knowledge.
Previous work to determine a working definition for infrastructure resilience 
through a State-of-the-Art Matrix (SAM) analysis of resilience literature found that 
resilience is defined somewhat loosely and varies across disciplines and concluded that 
an appropriate working definition of resilience is “the is an ability to prepare for, 
withstand, and/or recover from adversity, emergencies or failures in a timely manner and 
still be able to function at least nominally while minimizing potential losses in the 
system”. (Wilt, Long, & Shoberg, 2016). This definition informed the research of courses 
in the targeted programs that included related themes or topics.
Since the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the agency given the 
responsibility for infrastructure planning and projection at the Federal level, it is 
instructive to investigate what efforts they have put forth towards educational initiatives 
in infrastructure resilience. Ramirez and Rioux conducted a survey of select DHS 
personnel to identify potential courses and topics to be included in Homeland Security
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programs to help inform those involved in curriculum development, and their assessment 
indicates that there is a significant gap and a strong need to include courses into curricula 
that address response to and mitigation of disasters (Ramirez & Rioux, 2012).
This infrastructure resilience gap was also identified at the highest levels of our 
national government and addressed with the White House Educators Commitment on 
Resilient Design, signed in 2016 that calls for a focus on resilient design across all 
disciplines. Eighty-three schools and fourteen research centers, institutes and associations 
signed the commitment, to include several of these schools were studied in this research 
based on their accreditation with either ABET or ASEM. The intent of this commitment 
is for institutions to commit to teach students who can lead the various activities (such as 
planning, design, engineering, and construction) to build resilient infrastructure (White 
House, 2016). This commitment is in line with the goals of this research to identify where 
and how infrastructure resilience is being taught at institutions of higher education.
Though not an exhaustive search, another avenue pursued was to conduct a search 
for infrastructure resilience related articles in the American Society for Engineering 
Education (ASEE) annual conference proceedings over the past 10 years. ASEE is the 
largest annual gathering of engineering educators in the country and an investigation of 
the types of articles and divisions in which they appear were used to identify the closest 
to “real time” state-of-the-art educational research as well as trends in infrastructure 
resilience education. The search, which incorporated the keywords of either 
infrastructure, resilience or both, yielded a total of 244 results.
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Table 1. Infrastructure and/or Resilience Articles in ASEE Conference Proceedings 1998­
2018.
R esults by Year Results by Division
2018 34 Civil Engineering 44
2017 51 Multidisciplinary Engineering 12
2016 41 Community Engagement Division 11
2015 19 Environmental Engineering 9
2014 17 Liberal Education/Engineering & Society 8
2013 17 Minorities in Engineering 8
2012 16 Electrical and Computer 6
2011 12 Construction 5
2010 10 Cooperative & Experiential Education 5
2009 2 Energy Conversion and Conservation 5
2008 3 Entrepreneurship & Engineering Innovation 5
2007 7 International 5
2005 5 K-12 & Pre-College Engineering 5
2004 4 Design in Engineering Education 4
2003 2 First-Year Programs 4
2002 2 Mechanics 4
2001 1 College Industry Partnerships 3
1998 1 Computing & Information Technology 3




Computing and Information Technology 2
Graduate Studies 2
Information Systems 2
Military and Veterans 2
Military and Veterans Constituent Committee 2
Technological and Engineering Literacy/Philosophy of 
Engineering 2
Women in Engineering 2
Aerospace 1
Architectural Engineering 1
Division Experimentation & Lab-Oriented Studies 1
Engineering Economy 1
Engineering Ethics 1
Engineering Leadership Development 1





National Science Foundation 1
Pre-College Engineering Education 1
Pre-College Engineering Education Division 1
Two Year College Division 1
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There was a significant jump from 19 articles in the 2015 proceedings to over 30 
each of the past three years. The division with the largest number of articles was the Civil 
Engineering Division followed by the Multidisciplinary Engineering Division. The 
Engineering Management had three articles over the period covered by the search. The 
search results are shown in Table 1.
Findings from the review of current literature are that there is a significant gap in 
addressing infrastructure resilience in both the formal engineering management body of 
knowledge and engineering management educational research perspectives. This study 
aims to address overall trends in infrastructure resilience to help close that gap.
3. MULTIDISCIPLINARY PEDAGOGY
Due to the wide range of systems and disciplines involved in infrastructure 
resilience, effective educational efforts should be multi- or inter-disciplinary. Stember 
provides a good elaboration of the distinctions between the two approaches. 
Multidisciplinary involves several disciplines who each provide a different perspective on 
a problem or issues. The student is required to integrate the often-diverse ideas. 
Interdisciplinary: integration of the contributions of several disciplines to a problem or 
issue is required. Interdisciplinary integration brings interdependent parts of knowledge 
into harmonious relations through strategies such as relating part and whole or the 
particular and the general. A genuinely interdisciplinary enterprise is one that requires 
more or less integration and even modification of the disciplinary contributions while the 
inquiry or teaching is proceeding and is a complex endeavor to explicate relationships,
processes, values, and context using the diversity and unity possible only through 
collaborative approaches. (Stember, 1991). This study incorporated a multidisciplinary 
approach to its search for infrastructure resilience courses and research areas.
4. METHODOLOGY
The research started with an online search conducted for infrastructure resilience 
education that yielded over 39 million website hits. The search was refined by searching 
only for “infrastructure resilience education”, but still yielded about 575 website hits, 
many of which were not related to this investigation. This is due to the various ways that 
resilience, infrastructure, and education are defined and used in practice. To narrow the 
study down and make it more pertinent to undergraduate and graduate level education, 
this study focused on two groups of universities. The first group of institutions considered 
were the seven institutions with graduate Engineering Management programs certified by 
the American Society for Engineering Management (ASEM, 2019). This initial group 
was expanded to include the sixteen schools with Accreditation Board of Engineering and 
Technology (ABET) accredited Engineering Management programs (ABET, 2019). One 
school, the Missouri University of Science and Technology, fit both criteria.
This sample was selected to filter out the various types of engineering 
management programs since engineering management can be loosely interpreted and 
housed in various departments or programs (such as a business school, industrial 
engineering department, etc.). This list was not designed to be all inclusive, but rather a 
cross section of schools that have been accredited in order to provide a look at a broad
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range of programs and institutions that are well regarded in the field and have met 
common criteria. This also narrowed down the programs to an appropriate number from 
which to build the framework of this study which can be utilized as the scope is increased 
in future work.
Additionally, information on infrastructure resilience related courses was not 
found for all schools, so the final list of schools studied was reduced to fifteen, as shown 
in Table 2.
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Table 2. List of ASEM and ABET Accredited Engineering Management Programs.
Institution Category
1
Missouri University of Science and Technology ASEM Accredited & ABET EM 
Accredited
2 Drexel University ASEM Accredited
3 Old Dominion ASEM Accredited
4 University of Idaho ASEM Accredited
5 Western Michigan University ASEM Accredited
6 Air Force Institute of Technology ABET EM Accredited
7 Arizona State University * ABET EM Accredited
8 Clarkson University * ABET EM Accredited
9 Gonzaga University ABET EM Accredited
10 Montana State University ABET EM Accredited
11 North Dakota State University ABET EM Accredited
12 Rensalear Polytechnic Institute * ABET EM Accredited
13 Stevens Institute of Technology * ABET EM Accredited
14 United States Military Academy ABET EM Accredited
15 University of Connecticut ABET EM Accredited
Not included due to lack of data Category
1 The British University in Dubai ASEM Accredited
2 St. Cloud State ASEM Accredited
3 California State University, Northridge ABET EM Accredited
4 South Dakota School of Mines and Technology ABET EM Accredited
5 Universidad Ana G. Mendez - Gurabo Campus ABET EM Accredited
6 University of Arizona ABET EM Accredited
7 University of the Pacific ABET EM Accredited
* Signatory Institution to the White House Educators Commitment on Resilient Design
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The evaluation of each program followed the methodology of Klassen, Reeve, 
Rottmann, Sacks, Simpson, and Huyuh who assessed how engineering leadership 
programs bin together along various dimensions -  end goal, application of leadership 
learning, scale of leadership action, leadership emphasis, participant selection, 
compulsoriness, and integration (Klassen, Reeve, Rottmann, Sacks, Simpson, & Huyuah, 
2016). The qualitative evaluation of these Engineering Management programs sought to 
identify key dimensions and develop a conceptual framework based on the pedagogical 
research that applied to the institutions studied. This strategy employed a modified 
version of analytical induction (Patton, 2014).
The search began in the course catalog for each institution’s engineering 
management program for the keywords “infrastructure” and “resilience” other related 
terms. Then the search was expanded for any course in the institution’s catalog with these 
keywords. Finally, the search expanded to research centers and faculty. The results from 
the search from each institution were captured and cataloged according to institution, 
program, individual course number and description, graduate or undergraduate, course 
focus, and whether the courses were cross listed or included other departments to indicate 
multidisciplinary.
From the search of each school’s website and course catalog for courses and reach 
related to infrastructure resilience, five dimensions emerged to assess the programs 
emerged. The schools were assessed on: Program Structure, Academic Focus, Research 
Center/Focus Area, Multidisciplinary, and Disciplinary Programs. By conducting a 
qualitative analysis of the program and course descriptions focused on keywords linked 
to infrastructure resilience, a quantitative assessment of the types and numbers of
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programs reveals the state-of-the art of current infrastructure resilience education at these 
selected schools. An in-depth discussion on each dimension follows.
4.1. DIMENSION 1: PROGRAM STRUCTURE
The structure of each program fell into one of the following categories: 
undergraduate courses only, graduate courses only, or a mix of undergraduate and 
graduate courses. Some programs also afforded the opportunity to earn either an 
infrastructure resilience related minor/focus area or graduate certificate. No programs 
offered a purely infrastructure resilience related graduate degree (Master or PhD). The 
breakdown across these categories are shown in Figure 1.
6
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Figure 1. Dimension 1: Program Structure.
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Assessing the program and course descriptions for each institution identified 
whether the program/courses focused more on design for resilience, assessment of as- 
built environment, or disaster response. The determination the breakdown of the courses 
focused on if the course descriptions described designing infrastructure to be resilience, 
how to assess current infrastructure for resiliency, how to restore infrastructure/disaster 
response. Several of the programs incorporated a mix of these three focus areas. The 
breakdown across these categories are shown in Figure 2. The majority of programs focus 
on assessment of the as-built environment for resilience with a slightly smaller number of 
programs focused on incorporating resilience into design. Only two programs taught 
response concepts. About a third of the programs incorporated a mix of the three areas, 












Design Analysis Response Mix
4.2. DIMENSION 2: ACADEMIC FOCUS
Figure 2. Dimension 2: Academic Focus.
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The program descriptions and instructor biographies identified if the institution 
had a specific center that conducted research into infrastructure resilience or if it is a 
faculty area of research. Housing of a research center or the indication that infrastructure 
resilience is a research topic of the faculty typically provides opportunities for this 
research to enter into the classroom or student research opportunities, thereby enhancing 








No formal research Some formal research Research Center
4.3. DIMENSION 3: RESEARCH CENTER/FOCUS AREA
Figure 3. Dimension 3: Research Center or Research Focus Area.
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The level of multidisciplinary work was assessed for each program by looking at 
several elements to include if the course was cross-listed with multiple departments, the 
number and types of departments listed in the program or course descriptions, and the 
number and types of departments included in research descriptions. A slight majority of 
programs are multidisciplinary, but a large number do not appear to incorporate 
multidisciplinary education into their teaching of infrastructure resilience topics. The 
rankings were based on the following rubric:
Not multidisciplinary: only one department listed in program, course, or research 
material
Somewhat multidisciplinary: only one additional department listed in program, 
course, or research material
Very multidisciplinary: more than one additional department listed in program, 










Not multidisciplinary Somewhat multidisciplinary Very multidisciplinary
4.4. DIMENSION 4: MULTIDISCIPLINARY
Figure 4. Dimension 4: Multidisciplinary.
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Related to the investigation of the programs relative level of multidisciplinary 
connectedness, the types of disciplinary departments involved in infrastructure resilience 
was captured. As shown in Figure 5, the majority of programs house their infrastructure 
resilience education capacity in their civil engineering program, with environmental 
engineering and engineering management. Departments in the other category include 









Civil Engineering Engineering Management Environmental Other
Engineering
Figure 5. Dimension 5: Disciplinary Departments.
5. DISCUSSION
The significant weather events of the Spring of 2019 (unprecedented numbers of 
tornados and historic flooding along some of our nation’s major waterways), demonstrate 
the need and timeliness of this research into where and how infrastructure resilience is
4.5. DIMENSION 5: DISCIPLINARY DEPARTMENTS
being incorporated into engineering management education. Engineering managers are 
uniquely postured, based on the nature of the discipline, to lead the design, analysis and 
response to improving the resilience of complex and multidisciplinary infrastructure 
systems. But the study of where and how infrastructure resilience is being incorporated 
within these fifteen institutions with engineering management programs is very 
instructive as to the gaps in the current state of infrastructure resilience education.
Through the qualitative investigation of the 15 programs selected for this study, 
five dimensions emerged from which to quantify the number of programs in each portion 
of the spectrum under each specific dimension. This quantitative assessment helps 
identify the trends and gaps in current infrastructure resilience education.
There is a significant lack of discussion on the instruction of infrastructure 
resilience education within the engineering management education discipline. Less than 
2% (3 of 244) papers presented at the ASEE Annual Conference over the past ten years 
tied to infrastructure resilience education were tied to the Engineering Management 
Division.
The breakdown across programs teaching at the undergraduate, graduate, or a mix 
of both is evenly distributed. This is greatly impacted by whether the school has an 
undergraduate or graduate program. More enlightening though is where the institution 
has a research center or research focus from their faculty on infrastructure resilience.
Only one third of the institutions in the study incorporate infrastructure resilience 
research, whether in the form of a research center or a faculty research focus area.
Finally, the most significant gap is in the incorporation of a multidisciplinary 
approach to infrastructure resilience education. Almost half (7 of 15) of the institutions
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did not describe a multidisciplinary approach to infrastructure education. And the clear 
majority (11 of 15) of the programs connected infrastructure education to the civil 
engineering program. While the largest component of an infrastructure system is typically 
the structural, and hence, civil engineering component, infrastructure systems are 
increasingly complex and multidisciplined when the electrical, mechanical, information 
technology, environmental, and safety/security components are incorporated. Only 20%
(3 of 15) programs had a connection to engineering management courses displays the gap 
due to the lack of connection to engineering management programs. Due to the nature of 
the engineering management discipline as teaching engineers how to design, build, 
analyze, and restore across a multitude of disciplines, there is great opportunity to 
demonstrate the value and applicability of engineering management programs as 
multidisciplinary.
In summary, the teaching of infrastructure resilience tends to be siloed into 
graduate civil engineering programs and not strongly linked to faculty and/or research 
centers. The academic focus of the programs is relatively evenly split between design of 
new infrastructure systems and analysis of the as-built or to be built environment. There 
are a few institutions that are focused on the mix of design, analysis, and disaster 
response for infrastructure resilience, incorporating a multidisciplinary approach, and 
integrating research into classroom instruction. There appears to be a large gap, and 
therefore a great opportunity, for engineering management programs to expand their 
instruction in infrastructure resilience topics. The lessons learned from this study can 
inform institutions that are looking to broaden their incorporation of infrastructure 
resilience into their academic program as to best practices linked to pedagogy.
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6. RECOMMENDATIONS AND POTENTIAL AREAS FOR FUTURE
RESEARCH
The major recommendation is that academic institutions with engineering 
management programs at either the undergraduate and/or graduate level use this 
framework with which to evaluate how their program addresses the instruction of 
infrastructure resilience. Specifically, they can assess if they have coursework in these 
topic areas, if there is multidisciplinary approach, and if faculty research is being 
connected to classroom instruction. They can then look to the best practices from other 
institutions identified in this study to fill in the gaps in their programs.
The most robust programs studied incorporated a research center and/or faculty 
research with an online certificate or graduate program that included several classes in 
infrastructure resilience that incorporated all three focus areas: design for resilience, 
assessment of the as-built environment, and disaster response. This can serve as a model 
for programs seeking to be at the leading edge of meeting the increasing demand for 
engineer managers that can lead and solve these complex infrastructure resilience issues.
A second recommendation is to expand this study to non-ASEM and non-ABET 
accredited institutions. There are many more engineering management programs across 
the country that can be investigated to determine what other best practices are available to 
incorporate across the field to improve the overall instruction of infrastructure resilience 
topics.
Additionally, academic institutions are not the only entities operating in the 
infrastructure resilience education realm. Several societies, Federal agencies, cooperative 
programs, and conferences are offering professional education courses or programs in
infrastructure resilience. These include the American Society for Civil Engineering 
(ASCE) (American Society of Civil Engineers, 2019), the Center for Infrastructure 
Transformation and Education (CIT-E), a community of practice comprised of faculty 
members who share a passion for infrastructure education and intends to transform the 
way that civil and environmental engineering topics are taught, (Center for Infrastructure 
Transformation and Education, 2019) the George Mason University Center for 
Infrastructure Protection & Homeland Security which is currently completing a multi­
year Higher Education Initiative with DHS to develop and evaluate curriculum for 
graduate and professional workforce training and education in topics vital to the critical 
infrastructure community (Center for Infrastructure Protection and Homeland Security, 
2019), and the Critical Infrastructure Resilience Institute, which conducts research and 
education that enhances the resiliency of the nation’s critical infrastructures and the 
businesses and public entities that own and operate those assets and systems (Critical 
Infrastructure Resilience Institute, 2019).
Finally, the investigation can be further expanded to survey practicing 
engineering managers in the field of infrastructure resilience to identify the education 
gaps they feel should be filled to assist them in their work. Expanding the research in 
these areas will not only provide a larger menu of best practices from which programs 
can incorporate infrastructure resilience, but also provide a more holistic look at 
infrastructure education as a whole to identify system gaps and opportunities for 
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ABSTRACT
It is critical to improve the resilience of military installations and their complex 
infrastructure systems to strengthen response to the uncertainty and threat driven by the 
increasing frequency and severity of natural and man-made disasters. This research 
addresses a considerable gap in the existing Department of Defense (DoD) Mission 
Assurance Framework between the infrastructure assessment process and resilience 
considerations and integrates a resilience matrix that converts qualitative assessment data 
into a quantifiable and interactive resilience decision support tool. The integration of the 
resilience matrix provides a quantitative visual tool to communicate the impact of 
decisions made using the tradespace analysis. This methodology provides a framework to 
improve the selection of projects that enhance resilience of military infrastructure 
systems and assist decision makers in understanding how a singular project may 
influence the resilience of multiple systems. The results of this research, which are built
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for a specific installation, are broadly applicable and can support engineers in the design 
and/or management of infrastructure systems to improve resilience in an efficient 
manner.
Keywords: Infrastructure resilience, infrastructure assessment, resilience matrix, 
decision-making tool, tradespace
1. INTRODUCTION
Military installations and their complex infrastructure systems are operating in a 
progressively more uncertain environment due to the increasing frequency and severity of 
natural and man-made disasters. Similar to civilian infrastructure systems, assessment 
and decision-making regarding improvement to the resilience of military infrastructure 
systems are extremely challenging. Each installation is a unique system of systems due to 
the interconnectedness of structural, electrical, cyber/information technology, security, 
mechanical, and environmental systems. The resilience of the installation is determined 
by how quickly the multiple integrated subsystems can return to acceptable levels of 
operation in the event of a major disruption due to a disaster. Military infrastructure 
systems possess several unique characteristics that increase the complexity of assessing 
and decision-making regarding resilience. Additionally, the constraints on military 
infrastructure systems under the current operating and fiscal climate makes it imperative 
that military decision makers have a well thought out and readily applicable methodology 
for incorporating resilience into infrastructure system decision making.
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This research integrates a resilience matrix into the existing Department of 
Defense (DoD) Mission Assurance Assessment (MAA) framework for infrastructure 
assessment, resulting in the Mission Assurance Resilience Matrix (MARM). It also 
applies concepts from the Department of Defense (DoD) Engineered Resilience Systems 
(ERS) tradespace analysis methodology used to incorporate resilience into deployable 
military systems, such as helicopters and tanks, to create a decision support tool. This 
integration of resilience matrix methodology with tradespace analysis to infrastructure 
systems has potential benefits for military infrastructure decision-making regarding 
design of new infrastructure systems for resilience, the improvement of resilience within 
the already built environment, or improvements to disaster response. This methodology 
can aid engineers, so they make better informed decisions early in the process for the 
design and/or management of infrastructure systems to improve resilience in an efficient 
manner.
1.1. MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE
Military infrastructure comprises a broad portfolio covering a wide range of 
facilities and systems. The formal definition of a military installation is “a base, camp, 
post, station, yard, center, or other activity under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of a 
military department or, in the case of an activity in a foreign country, under the 
operational control of the Secretary of a military department or the Secretary of Defense, 
without regard to the duration of operations control” (Congressional Research Service 
2019). These facilities vary from “home station” installations based in the continental 
United States, to forward based installations such as those in Germany and Korea, to
expeditionary base camps and operating bases that support operations in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and Syria (Lostumbo et al. 2013).
Military infrastructure systems possess several characteristics that make them 
unique compared to infrastructure systems in the civilian sector. They require 
consideration of operational vulnerability to an intelligent adversary, not just nature or a 
targeted act of violence, as the enemy can have an impact in a powerful and sustained 
way (Hagen et al. 2017). The requirements they must fulfill are impacted by changes to 
unit structures, deployable systems, command and control focus/emphasis, and politics. 
Additionally, the design, construction, and approval of projects to improve military 
infrastructure is impacted by the availability and limitations of different “pots” of money 
that can be appropriated by Congress for these projects such as Operations and 
Maintenance (O&M), Facilities Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization (SRM),
Civil Works, and Military Construction. The rules for each type of appropriation prohibit 
the mixing or combination of funds from various sources, often limiting efficient use of 
resources and minimizing impact of the projects (Congressional Research Service 2019). 
The combination of these unique characteristics makes it imperative that infrastructure 
resilience decision support tools are tailored for utilization within military applications.
1.2. STRATEGIC EMPHASIS ON RESILIENCE AND MISSION ASSURANCE 
STRATEGY
Congress reinforced previous mandates that the DoD address the resilience of its 
infrastructure in the Military Installation Resilience Assuredness Act enacted by the 
House of Representatives in May 2019. This act specifically requires commanders of 
military installations to integrate installation resilience in master plans that incorporate
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disaster-related and environmental conditions and the measures to mitigate these risks 
(116th Congress 2019). Towards this end, the DoD made infrastructure resilience a focal 
point of its installation management strategy implemented in the Defense Critical 
Infrastructure Program (DCIP). This risk management program confirms the availability 
of resources deemed essential to successful completion of DoD missions and includes 
assets that are essential to planning, mobilizing, deploying, executing, and sustaining 
U.S. military operations worldwide. The goal of the DCIP is to reduce or eliminate 
unacceptable risk to Defense Critical Assets, thus enabling the successful execution of 
DoD missions, regardless of the threat or hazard (Department of Defense 2018a). The 
DoD also highlighted infrastructure resilience as a key component of its National Defense 
Strategy by specifying that there will be a priority to transition to smaller, dispersed, 
resilient and adaptive basing (Department of Defense 2018b).
To establish a comprehensive and integrative assessment framework, the DoD 
implemented the Mission Assurance Strategy and defined mission assurance as a process 
to protect or ensure the continued function and resilience of capabilities and assets -  
including personnel, equipment, facilities, networks, information and information 
systems, infrastructure, and supply chains -  critical to the performance of DoD Mission- 
Essential Functions (MEF) in any operating environment or condition (Department of 
Defense 2017). The intent is for implementation of this framework to assist the DoD 
prioritize infrastructure investments and provide input into the DoD’s existing planning, 
budgeting, requirements, and acquisition process as decisions are made on increasing 
resilience capacity. The DoD Mission Assurance Strategy identified a shortfall in the 
ability to identify strategic protection and resilience risks or critical interdependencies
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within its infrastructure systems and, therefore, the ability to make sound policy and 
investment decisions. Additionally, it indicated that the visibility on emerging protection 
and resilience best practices and performance metrics is limited and the connection 
between the data collection process conducted by installation infrastructure assessment 
teams and installation risk management decision making procedures is broken. Mission 
assurance seeks to address these shortfalls and support DoD’s existing resource allocation 
and Defense Acquisition System processes (Department of Defense 2017).
1.3. DEFINITION OF RESILIENCE
Resilience is a term widely used in various industries and settings with different 
connotations depending on how the term is defined. The preponderance of literature 
focuses on returning the system to its original operating level after the impact of an 
instantaneous event, i.e. some exogenous “shock”, whether a natural or man-made 
disaster. Wilt, Long, and Shoberg conducted an integrative literature review of resilience 
definitions in recent technical literature and concluded that, “resilience is an ability to 
prepare for, withstand, and/or recover from adversity, emergencies or failures in a timely 
manner and still be able to function at least nominally while minimizing potential losses 
in the system” (Wilt et al. 2016). Furthermore, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) 
defines disaster resilience as “the ability to plan and prepare for, absorb, recover from, 
and adapt to adverse events” (Committee on Increasing National Resilience to Hazards 
and Disasters 2012). This definition not only connotates the system’s capacity to return to 
previous levels of operation, but also the ability to adapt and improve to offer even better 
levels of service and operation.
46
For military infrastructure decisions, which must be made under constrained 
resources but a long operational horizon of at least 50 years, it is appropriate to broaden 
the context of the “shock” to the system beyond a natural or man-made disaster to include 
any change in the system’s environment that degrades value delivery and ensure 
adaptation is incorporated such that the return of system “value delivery” would be the 
recovery. A simple example is a new shopping mall that initially attracts attention and is 
busy with shoppers but is not resilient to a “shock” such as changing shopping trends 
and/or local demographics, will endure a slow fade, rather than a stoppage after a singular 
event, until it becomes obsolete. Similarly, military infrastructure must be resilient to not 
only instantaneous events, but also able to adapt to changing purposes or capacities due 
to variations (i.e. “shocks”) in the environmental, political, social, or strategic 
environments.
Additionally, military infrastructure resilience as a property should be viewed in 
terms of interconnected functions and systems, not simply individual features (Aven and 
Thekdi 2018; Linkov et al. 2018) which necessitates that an installation’s resilience be 
considered broader than simply its ability to resume combat related operations following 
a shock. Thus, the framework for restoration of operations needs to scale across the 
interconnected functions and various types of disasters with minimal modification 
(Ramachandran et al. 2015). The recovery of Tyndall Air Force Base in the Florida 
Panhandle from Hurricane Michael in October 2018 is an illustrative example of the 
interconnectedness of functions on a military installation. Though the base could quickly 
remove debris and reopen the airfield, the myriad of support facilities that need to be 
rebuilt to return the base to fully operational status shows the broader contextualization of
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resilience needed for military infrastructure. The Base Commander, Colonel Laidlaw 
stated, “I can't bring lots of people back until I rebuild my child development center. I 
can't bring in new and additional airmen in until I rebuild some of the dorms” (Shapiro 
2019). These facilities do not directly influence airfield operations but are necessary for 
the restoration of the base to pre- “shock” operations. This connects the importance of 
this research as the DoD Mission Assurance Construct considers military installations as 
functions and systems rather than a set of features.
1.4. PURPOSE OF STUDY
This study integrates infrastructure resilience into the existing military installation 
mission assurance assessment (MAA) process. This integration of resilience into the 
MAA uses a resilience matrix and tradespace analysis. This not only fills a gap in the 
literature, but also provides military decision makers with a visual and interactive 
decision support tool when assessing infrastructure resilience and impacts of individual 
infrastructure improvement projects on system resilience. It also connects the 
infrastructure assessment data collection and decision-making processes.
2. METHODOLOGY
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This research applies a resilience matrix methodology to construct a Mission 
Assurance Resilience Matrix (MARM) utilizing a subset of the DoD Mission Assurance 
Assessment framework to convert current assessment collection methods to resilience
metrics and analysis. The MARM is then employed to conduct a tradespace analysis to 
investigate the impacts of project selection on installation infrastructure resilience.
2.1. MATRIX APPROACH TO RESILIENCE ASSESSMENT
Previous research proposed the use of a resilience matrix as a framework to assess 
the performance of integrated complex systems (Fox-Lent et al. 2015). The resilience 
matrix integrates assessment of resilience at the functional and system levels, so that the 
evaluation is not just based on the features of the infrastructure. This is highly applicable 
to military infrastructure assessments, due to the unique, complex, and highly integrated 
nature of military infrastructure as a system of systems. This resilience matrix framework 
consists of a 4x4 matrix. The rows describe the four general management domains of a 
complex system (physical: sensors, systems, platforms, and facilities; information: the 
information collected, posted, pulled, displayed, processed, and stored; cognitive: the 
perceptions and understanding of what this information states and means and the mental 
models, preconceptions, biases, and values that serve to influence how information is 
interpreted and understood, as well as the nature of the responses that may be considered; 
and social: command and control processes and the interactions between and among 
individuals and entities that fundamentally define organization and doctrine) described in 
the United States Army’s Network-Centric Warfare doctrine defined by Alberts and 
Hayes (Alberts and Hayes 2005). The four columns of the resilience matrix describe the 




2.2. MISSION ASSURANCE ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK
The United States Army uses the DoD MAA Benchmarks for the basis of 
assessing its installations. The guidance states that throughout the process, assessment 
teams will apply the benchmark for each category with paramount consideration toward 
the impact to mission accomplishment, sustainment, and resilience (Department of 
Defense 2018c). Resilience is defined within this framework as the ability to support the 
functions necessary for mission success with high probability, short periods of reduced 
capability, and across a wide range of scenarios, conditions, and threats, despite hostile 
action or adverse conditions and may leverage cross-domain or alternative government, 
commercial, or international capabilities (Department of Defense 2016a). Assessment 
teams submit completed MAA reports to the Office of the Secretary of Defense to apprise 
Combatant Commanders and other military leaders of the status of military installation 
infrastructure. These reports are an important input for these leaders to understand risk, 
inform the development of specific requirements for future infrastructure projects, and 
assist in making decisions about which ones to fund.
The MAA framework divides the assessment into divided into sixteen distinct 
functions, such as antiterrorism, physical security, and emergency management, with 
each area containing multiple categories to be assessed. Responsibilities for assessing the 
functions are assigned to members of the assessment team depending on their expertise. 
Assessment teams are composed of various specialties such as engineer, logistics, and 
cyber/information technology to conduct MAAs of military installations utilizing a 
checklist to assess each benchmark. For example, the engineer typically assesses around 
50 benchmark categories within four specific areas of the MAA. The specific
benchmarks utilized for this study are taken from the DoD Mission Assurance 
Benchmarks dated 28 March 2018, which are unclassified but designated as For Official 
Use Only (FOUO) (Department of Defense 2018c). Therefore, they cannot be published 
in this article in full, but the broad categories and representative identification numbers 
are summarized and implemented in this research to allow for easier connection back to 
the base document.
The implementation of the resilience matrix into the MAA process employed a 
general case based on data provided by the assessment team from the US Army Africa 
(USARAF) Deputy Chief of Staff Engineer (DCSENG) section. As one of the US 
Army’s Component Commands, USARAF has responsibility of conducting MAAs for 
several contingency site locations. Members of the Engineer section assess physical 
infrastructure systems at these locations as part of the MAA team. To complete the 
checklist, the assessor assigns a qualitative rating of “Black”, “Red”, “Amber”, or 
“Green” to each category based on their subject matter expertise and evaluation of the 
benchmark descriptions. The development of the rating is based on various Department 
of Defense guides but is largely subjective based on the experience and professional 
judgment of the assessment team. Details from the DCSENG assessment are integrated 
with assessors evaluating the other functions into a comprehensive report summarizing 
the results from the MAA team as required by the DoD Mission Assurance Construct.
2.3. MISSION ASSURANCE RESILIENCE MATRIX CONSTRUCTION
Despite Congressional guidance, the MAA framework does not specifically or 
directly assess the resiliency of a military installation as a system nor identify which
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improvements would impact resilience the most. To close this gap, this research utilizes 
the resilience matrix method to map a subset of the MAA benchmark categories that an 
engineer assessment team evaluates as part of an installation assessment and improve the 
ability to visualize the cost-benefits of potential infrastructure improvement projects to 
allow leaders to understand the influence that one project may have on multiple functions 
or systems. The construction of the Mission Assurance Resilience Matrix (MARM) and 
associated data visualization and decision analysis tools was completed using Microsoft 
Excel since this is a common and familiar platform for military assessment teams to 
collect data and implement the framework. The MARM and visualization tools were 
added as an additional tab linked to the category assessments to enable data input through 
the current process by the assessment team to directly feed into the MARM and the 
associated decision tools avoids requiring the assessment team to create a separate 
document.
The first step of construction of the MARM was to select the benchmark 
categories most pertinent to military installation infrastructure resilience based on input 
from subject matter experts from the USARAF DCSENG section. Since the benchmarks 
as they are written do not specifically address resilience, the input from subject matter 
experts was critical and identified that several of the MAA benchmark categories make 
an indirect connection to the definition of resilience to include adaptation to avoid 
becoming obsolete. For example, the requirement that the ammunition and explosive 
infrastructure should meet future and emerging mission requirements assesses how the 
installation can be resilient to a potential future “shock” to the system that would 
necessitate an expansion of ammunition and explosive storage capacity. Some
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benchmarks are written to where they may fit into multiple cells of the resilience matrix. 
Finally, to streamline this study, benchmarks specific to expeditionary installations were 
removed to further narrow the focus to more permanent installations (expeditionary 
installations can be added into the framework at a later time). This screening reduced the 
list to 41 benchmark categories.
The model converts the qualitative rating (B/R/A/G for Black, Red, Amber, and 
Green) for each category by the assessment team into a quantitative value using a 
qualitative conversion factor (Table 1). Additionally, decision makers do not prioritize all 
MAA benchmark categories equally, so to account for this, a priority weight factor, 
similar to the priority matrix developed to model resilience time (Ramachandran et al. 
2015), was incorporated (Table 2).













This framework permits the calculation of a quantitative Benchmark Score for
each category using Equation (1):
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Benchmark Score = Quantitative Assessm ent Conversion x  Priority Weight Factor (1)
A larger Benchmark Score indicates a category with a higher importance in poor 
condition. The following is an example calculation for the Antiterrorism category, ID: 
AT-19, which, in this example, was assessed at “Black” with a priority weight of 
“Highest”: “Black” Assessment Conversion = 4, Weight = 5, Benchmark Score = 4 x 5 = 
20.
To illustrate the operation of the model, an example data set for the engineer 
function MAA benchmark categories was generated to create a test case. Ratings 
(B/R/A/G) were randomly assigned for each of the categories (Table 3). These subjective 
assessments were then turned into a numerical Benchmark Score for each category using 
Table 1 and Table 2 and Equation (1).
To identify the role that each benchmark plays in resilience, each benchmark 
category was categorized according to the 16 cells within a resilience matrix (Table 4). 
For example, the Antiterrorism benchmark, AT-19, was deemed to best relate to the 
cognitive domain within the prepare phase. Some categories are written broadly enough 
that they could fit into multiple categories, so based on subject matter expert input, they 
were placed into only the most appropriate category. Also, this categorization process 
ensured that each cell in the resilience matrix contained at least one benchmark category.
A visual tool was developed to help an assessment team quickly see the results of 
the categorization and assessment and of the benchmark categories in terms of resilience. 
Using a “lookup” function, the Excel file automatically looks up where the category ID is 
placed into the resilience matrix and pulls in the qualitative assessment and matches the
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shade of the cell with the rating color code in an Initial Resilience Matrix Categorization
Dashboard (Figure. 1).
Table 3. Engineer Initial MAA Benchmark Example Data Set.
Category ID Weight B/R/A/G Score
Antiterrorism AT-19 5 B 20
Antiterrorism AT-20 3 R 9
Electromagnetic Environment EMP-01 3 A 6
Electrical Power (EP) Supply EP-01 5 A 10
Electrical Power (EP) Supply EP-02 2 G 2
Electrical Power (EP) Supply EP-03 4 B 16
Electrical Power (EP) Supply EP-04 4 R 12
Electrical Power (EP) Supply EP-05 3 A 6
Fire Protection Infrastructure FP-01 1 B 4
Fire Protection Infrastructure FP-02 4 R 12
Fire Protection Infrastructure FP-03 3 A 6
Fire Protection Infrastructure FP-04 4 G 4
Fire Protection Infrastructure FP-05 1 B 4
Fire Protection Infrastructure FP-06 4 R 12
HVAC HVAC-01 3 B 12
HVAC HVAC-02 1 R 3
HVAC HVAC-03 4 A 8
HVAC HVAC-04 4 G 4
HVAC HVAC-05 1 B 4
Munition Operations MO-02 5 G 5
Munition Operations MO-03 2 G 2
Munition Operations MO-06 5 R 15
Munition Operations MO-07 3 A 6
Munition Operations MO-08 1 G 1
Natural Gas Supply NG-01 2 A 4
Natural Gas Maintenance NG-02 1 G 1
Physical Security PS-04 2 A 4
Physical Security PS-06 1 G 1
Physical Security PS-11 5 B 20
Physical Security PS-12 4 R 12
Physical Security PS-13 4 A 8
Physical Security PS-14 4 G 4
Physical Security PS-15 5 B 20
Utilities UT-01 5 R 15
Utilities UT-02 5 A 10
Utilities UT-03 3 G 3
Utilities UT-04 2 B 8
Utilities UT-05 4 R 12
Water Systems WTR-01 5 R 15
Water Systems WTR-02 4 A 8
Water Systems WTR-03 5 G 5
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Table 4. Mission Assurance Categories to Resilience Matrix Categorization.
Prepare Absorb Recover Adapt









Information AT-20 HVAC-02 FP-01 HVAC-01
HVAC-03 NG-02 FP-04 NG-01
WTR-02 UT-02







Social FP-06 UT-04 UT-05 MO-08
PS-13 EP-03
Any changes made by the assessment team on either the location of the category 
in the matrix or its rating would automatically be updated in the dashboard. This provides 
immediate feedback as to how the installation is assessed in a manner that is very familiar 
to military decision makers as the Black, Red, Amber, and Green construct is widely used 
across the DoD.
In an ideal installation assessment, every benchmark category, no matter its 
priority, would be assessed as “Green” and its Benchmark Score would equal its priority 
weight as per Equation (2). This scoring convention was developed so that the highest 
priority category that was assessed to be the worst condition, (i.e. “Black”), would get the 
highest score. Using this convention, the difference from the ideal score (Delta from 
Ideal) for each benchmark category is calculated using Equation (3) and shown in Table
5. A Delta from Ideal equal to zero means that the benchmark category is assessed as
“Green” and cannot be improved. A larger Delta from Ideal indicates that category is 
further from ideal and may have a large negative impact on resilience if not improved.
Benchmark Ideal Score = Weight x  1 ("Green") (2)
Delta from Ideal = Benchmark Score -  Benchmark Ideal Score (3)
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Figure 1. Initial Resilience Matrix Categorization Dashboard.
Table 5. Initial MAA Delta from Ideal.
Prepare Absorb Recover Adapt
Physical 0 3 8 5







Information 6 2 3 9
4 0 0 2
4 5






Social 8 6 8 0
4 12
Most cells in the MARM contained multiple benchmark categories, so the Delta 
from Ideal for all categories in the cell were summed to calculate a MARM Cell Score 
using Equation (4). The categories with the highest priority that were furthest from ideal 
would have the greatest impact on the Cell Score. Also, this accounts for some MARM 
cells having multiple categories providing a cumulative effect of their scores. The 
summation of the benchmark Delta from Ideal scores was selected rather than the average 
to maintain the impact of categories that are both highly weighted and a significant 
difference between their assessed score and ideal score. For example, if a category was 
deemed to be a priority “5” and assessed “Black” but was averaged with several 
categories that have a lower priority and assessed “Green”, the impact of the high priority 
category would be lost.
Cell Score = =f=1 Benchm ark Delta fr o m  Ideal (4)
The cell scores were aggregated to create the Initial Mission Assurance Resilience 
Matrix and formatted by applying a conditional formatting in Excel where each cell in the 
MARM is coded with the highest scores colored red to show that these were the highest 
risk cells and dark green indicates all the categories in the cell meet their benchmarks. 
This creates a dashboard to better visualize closeness to ideal for each cell in the Initial 
MARM (Figure. 2). In this example, the Cognitive-Prepare is the furthest from ideal and 
this decision tool visually indicates this to decision makers for their consideration. The 
Cognitive-Absorb and Social-Adapt are already at ideal, so they do not warrant further 
attention. The other cells are color coded as per their cell scores as distributed between 
the highest and lowest scores.
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Prepare Absorb Recover Adapt
Physical 3 27 8 15
Information 14 2 8 11
Cognitive 36 10 0 25
Social 12 6 20 0
Figure 2. Initial MARM Dashboard.
2.4. IMPROVED STATE MISSION ASSURANCE ASSESSMENT EXAMPLE
One purpose of the MARM is to assist decision makers in determining what 
projects to fund, but at this point, the Initial MARM (Figure. 2) only serves to assist 
decision makers in identifying areas of concern. Based on the assessment details, 
members of the MAA team or other staff, as required, nominate specific projects to 
address shortfalls. Each of these projects have an estimated cost and an assessment of the 
improvement it would provide; that is, how much it would change the qualitative 
B/R/A/G assessment for the category. An Improved State MAA example data set was 
generated by randomly selecting categories to improve one or more levels in the 
qualitative assessment (i.e. from “Black” to “Red” “Amber” or “Green”, from “Red” to 
“Amber” or “Green”, and from “Amber” to “Green”) and a cost randomly assigned for 
the notional project that would contribute to the increased score (Table 6) in order to 
extend the analysis and quantify the impact of specific projects on infrastructure 
resilience. To illustrate, a project with an estimated cost of $32,601 is expected to change 
the assessment of benchmark category AT-19 to “Green” from its original “Black” 
assessment (from Table 3).
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Table 6. Engineer Improved State MAA Benchmark Example Data Set.
ID Weight B/R/A/G Score Cost
AT-19 5 G 5 $ 32,601
AT-20 3 A 6 $ 99,423
EMP-01 3 G 3 $ 88,530
EP-01 5 G 5 $ 88,694
EP-02 2 G 2 $ 70,269
EP-03 4 A 8 $ 67,219
EP-04 4 A 8 $ 48,611
EP-05 3 G 3 $ 58,969
FP-01 1 R 3 $ 40,798
FP-02 4 A 8 $ 57,938
FP-03 3 G 3 $ 1,214
FP-04 4 G 4 $ 82,379
FP-05 1 G 1 $ 84,887
FP-06 4 A 8 $ 80,862
HVAC-01 3 A 6 $ 4,383
HVAC-02 1 G 1 $ 58,018
HVAC-03 4 G 4 $ 24,381
HVAC-04 4 G 4 $ 26,317
HVAC-05 1 A 2 $ 97,110
MO-02 5 G 5 $ 28,563
MO-03 2 G 2 $ 75,880
MO-06 5 G 5 $ 88,779
MO-07 3 G 3 $ 66,845
MO-08 1 G 1 $ 22,430
NG-01 2 G 2 $ 47,680
NG-02 1 G 1 $ 47,475
PS-04 2 G 2 $ 42,392
PS-06 1 G 1 $ 56,335
PS-11 5 A 10 $ 74,194
PS-12 4 G 4 $ 29,689
PS-13 4 G 4 $ 6,552
PS-14 4 G 4 $ 85,045
PS-15 5 A 10 $ 47,119
UT-01 5 A 10 $ 64,623
UT-02 5 G 5 $ 40,840
UT-03 3 G 3 $ 22,357
UT-04 2 A 4 $ 1,984
UT-05 4 G 4 $ 23,252
WTR-01 5 A 10 $ 52,161
WTR-02 4 G 4 $ 84,541
WTR-03 5 G 5 $ 82,731
Equation (1) was applied to calculate a benchmark score for the improvement in 
each category, and Equations (2) and (3) used to calculated an Improved State Delta from 
Ideal for each benchmark category (Table 7) and an updated visualization tool (Figure.
3). Cell Scores for the improved state example were calculated using Equation (4) and 
visualized using the Improved State MARM Dashboard (Figure. 4).
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Table 7. Improved State MAA Delta from Ideal.
Prepare Absorb Recover Adapt
Physical 0 0 4 0







Information 3 0 2 3
0 0 0 0
0 0






Social 4 2 0 0
0 4
Prepare Absorb Recover Adapt
Physical G G A G







Information A G R A
G G G G
G G






Social A A G G
G A
Figure 3. Improved State Resilience Matrix Categorization Dashboard.
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Prepare Absorb Recover Adapt
Physical 0 5 4 5
Information 3 0 2 3
Cognitive 5 5 0 5
Social 4 2 4 0
Figure 4. Improved State MARM Dashboard.
The Resilience Cell Score Improvement is calculated to determine the combined 
improvements derived by completing all the possible projects in each cell in the MARM 
by subtracting the Improved State Resilience Cell Score from the Initial Resilience Cell 
Score, (Equation (5)).
Resilience Cell Score Im provem ent =
Initial Resilience Cell Score (Table 3) -  Im proved Sta te Resilience Cell Score (Table 6) ( 5 )
A larger Resilience Cell Score Improvement is better because the combined effect 
of all projects associated with each resilience cell more significantly lowered the total 
Delta from Ideal for the cell. The Difference in Delta from Ideal MARM Dashboard 
(Figure. 5) provides a visualization of which cell in the MARM has the combination of 
projects that would have the greatest impact on improving resilience towards ideal. In this 
example case, the total combination of all the projects in the Cognitive-Prepare will have 
the most impact on improving resilience, while the total combination of all the projects in 
the Cognitive-Recover and Social-Adapt will not have any impact on improving
resilience.
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Prepare Absorb Recover Adapt
Physical 3 22 4 10
Information 11 2 6 8
Cognitive 31 5 0 20
Social 8 4 16 0
Figure 5. Difference in Delta from Ideal MARM Dashboard.
2.5. INFRASTRUCTURE IMPROVEMENT PROJECT COST ANALYSIS
While the combination of all the projects in a specific cell in the MARM allows 
the visualization of the impact of completing all the projects assigned to those categories, 
the reality of a constrained resource environment is that it is not likely that all the projects 
in a particular MARM cell could be completed, or that it would be efficient to only focus 
on projects in one cell at the expense of all the projects in another cell. Decision makers 
need to visualize the impact of individual projects across the entire MARM. To 
demonstrate impact, the final component incorporates cost analysis for each benchmark 
category into the overall MARM.
A Cost Impact Score was calculated for each category to better understand and 
visualize the return on investment of the projects. The Cost Impact Score was calculated 
by taking the difference between the Initial (Table 3) and Improved (Table 6) Benchmark 
Scores and dividing it by the associated project cost (Table 6) and scaled by a factor of 
100,000 for readability (Equation 6).
Cost Im pact Score =
Initial Benchmark Score (Table 3)-Improved State Benchmark Score(Table 6) 100,000Benchmark Project Cost (Table 6) (6)
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The following is an example for AT-19:
Cost Impact Score =
20 -  5 
$32,601 * 100,000 = 46.01
The results for the example data set (initial and improved states) were 
summarized into a Project Cost Impact Summary (Table 8). Projects that were initially 
assessed as ideal (“Green”) will result in a Cost Impact Score of zero, so these projects 
would not contribute at all to improving resilience of the installation and can be screened 
out from this analysis. This is not to suggest that there is no value to these projects, just 
that they do not contribute to improve resilience.
The Cost Impact Scores were mapped back into the MARM to create the Cost 
Impact MARM Dashboard (Figure. 6) to show which specific projects had the biggest 
impact (“bang for the buck”) on improving the resilience scores. In this example, the Fire 
Protection project for ID FP-03 in the Physical-Absorb cell (Impact of 247.02) and the 
Utility project in the Social-Absorb cell (Impact of 201.59) have the greatest returns on 
investment. The same conditional formatting was applied where “Green” indicates the 
largest impact on the overall cell in the MARM (high improvement for low cost) and 
“Red” indicates zero impact. This decision tool allows decision makers to get a clear and 
concise picture of the cost impact, or return on their investment, of their potential 
resilience improvement projects on the overall resilience of the installation.
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AT-19 5 B 20 G 5 $ 32,601 46.01
AT-20 3 R 9 A 6 $ 99,423 3.02
EMP-01 3 A 6 G 3 $ 88,530 3.39
EP-01 5 A 10 G 5 $ 88,694 5.64
EP-02 2 G 2 G 2 $ 70,269 0.00
EP-03 4 B 16 A 8 $ 67,219 11.90
EP-04 4 R 12 A 8 $ 48,611 8.23
EP-05 3 A 6 G 3 $ 58,969 5.09
FP-01 1 B 4 R 3 $ 40,798 2.45
FP-02 4 R 12 A 8 $ 57,938 6.90
FP-03 3 A 6 G 3 $ 1,214 247.02
FP-04 4 G 4 G 4 $ 82,379 0.00
FP-05 1 B 4 G 1 $ 84,887 3.53
FP-06 4 R 12 A 8 $ 80,862 4.95
HVAC-01 3 B 12 A 6 $ 4,383 136.88
HVAC-02 1 R 3 G 1 $ 58,018 3.45
HVAC-03 4 A 8 G 4 $ 24,381 16.41
HVAC-04 4 G 4 G 4 $ 26,317 0.00
HVAC-05 1 B 4 A 2 $ 97,110 2.06
MO-02 5 G 5 G 5 $ 28,563 0.00
MO-03 2 G 2 G 2 $ 75,880 0.00
MO-06 5 R 15 G 5 $ 88,779 11.26
MO-07 3 A 6 G 3 $ 66,845 4.49
MO-08 1 G 1 G 1 $ 22,430 0.00
NG-01 2 A 4 G 2 $ 47,680 4.19
NG-02 1 G 1 G 1 $ 47,475 0.00
PS-04 2 A 4 G 2 $ 42,392 4.72
PS-06 1 G 1 G 1 $ 56,335 0.00
PS-11 5 B 20 A 10 $ 74,194 13.48
PS-12 4 R 12 G 4 $ 29,689 26.95
PS-13 4 A 8 G 4 $ 6,552 61.05
PS-14 4 G 4 G 4 $ 85,045 0.00
PS-15 5 B 20 A 10 $ 47,119 21.22
UT-01 5 R 15 A 10 $ 64,623 7.74
UT-02 5 A 10 G 5 $ 40,840 12.24
UT-03 3 G 3 G 3 $ 22,357 0.00
UT-04 2 B 8 A 4 $ 1,984 201.59
UT-05 4 R 12 G 4 $ 23,252 34.41
WTR-01 5 R 15 A 10 $ 52,161 9.59
WTR-02 4 A 8 G 4 $ 84,541 4.73
WTR-03 5 G 5 G 5 $ 82,731 0.00
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3. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
This section describes the applicability of the MARM to mission assurance 
assessment practitioners and conducts a tradespace analysis utilizing the example data 
set.
3.1. APPLICATION TO MISSION ASSURANCE ASSESSMENT TEAMS
The most immediate result is that the engineer MAA now has a direct connection 
and contribution to assessing resilience as defined by the installation’s ability to prepare 
for, absorb, recover from, and adapt to disasters and is visually depicted by the MARM. 
The results inform the decision-making tools used to analyze tradeoffs between various 
infrastructure improvement projects competing for limited resources.
The feedback from the subject matter experts from the USARAF DCSENG staff 
is that this will certainly assist them. The model was built in Excel and linked directly to 
the Excel file that they use to record assessment data so that it will automatically feed 
into the MARM analysis. It is also easily updated to account for changes in the 
prioritization of the benchmarks. Using the data summarized for this test case (Figure. 6), 
the assessment team could inform decision makers that the project that impacts the 
Physical-Absorb cell will provide the greatest improvement to resilience for the cost 
associated with it and that there are additional high payoff projects (one in Social-Absorb 
and another in Information-Adapt).
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Prepare Absorb Recover Adapt
Physical 0.00 5.09 8.23 5.64







Information 3.02 3.45 2.45 136.88
16.41 0.00 0.00 4.19
4.73 12.24






Social 4.95 201.59 34.41 0.00
61.05 11.90
Figure 6. Project Cost Impact MARM Dashboard.
3.2. APPLICATION OF RESILIENCE OF DEPLOYABLE SYSTEMS FOR 
TRADESPACE ANALYSIS
The next step of the research was to determine how far budgeted resources can go 
to improving resilience. For this example, could they fund these three high impact 
projects form the Physical-Absorb cell? Could additional projects be funded and in what 
order should they prioritized should additional funding become available? To answer 
these questions, ERS tradespace analysis was implemented, which is currently used to 
create an integrated capability for systems engineers, engineer managers, and acquisition 
personnel to increase the quality of acquisition decision-making for deployable systems,
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such as tanks and helicopters. ERS improves informed decision-making early in the DoD 
Acquisition process, prior to the Milestone A decision point, when there is both 
significant uncertainty in the project, but also substantial impact on overall project costs 
based on these early decisions (Sitterle et al. 2015). There are important shared resilience 
attributes between deployable military systems and the installation infrastructure which 
enables them, making the extension of ERS methods desirable (Ewing et al. 2006). This 
study applies the analogy between these deployable weapon systems and fixed site 
infrastructure, which project combat power from power projection platforms (military 
installations) around the world and assists design engineers, facility operators and 
managers, and infrastructure decision makers to see the impacts of project selection on 
resilience.
The ERS methodology for tradespace analysis was applied to the MARM to 
conduct tradeoff analysis between individual projects and their impact on infrastructure 
resilience to assist decision makers in developing answers to questions about which 
projects to fund. To facilitate the tradespace analysis, the data in Table 8 were sorted by 
Cost Impact and an additional column, Project Selection, was added to track if the project 
has been selected to include in the tradespace to produce the Tradespace Project Selection 
Dashboard (Figure. 7). The data in the dashboard was connected using “lookup” 
functions in Excel to automatically update the Improved State Delta from Ideal table, 
MARM, and Difference in Delta from Ideal dashboards to enable the impact of the 
decisions made in the tradespace analysis to be readily seen.
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Initial Improvement
Category ID W eight B/R/A/G Score B/R/A/G Score Cost Cost Impact Project Selection
Fire Protection Infrastructure FP-03 3 A 6 G 3 $ 1,214 247.02 Y
Utilities UT-04 2 B 8 A 4 $ 1,984 201.59 Y
HVAC HVAC-01 3 B 12 A 6 $ 4,383 136.88 Y
Physical Security PS-13 4 A 8 G 4 $ 6,552 61.05 Y
Antiterrorism A T-19 5 B 20 G 5 $ 32,601 46.01 Y
Utilities UT-05 4 R 12 G 4 $ 23,252 34.41 Y
Physical Security PS-12 4 R 12 G 4 $ 29,689 26.95 Y
Physical Security PS-15 5 B 20 A 10 $ 47,119 21.22 Y
HVAC HVAC-03 4 A 8 G 4 $ 24,381 16.41 Y
Physical Security PS-11 5 B 20 A 10 $ 74,194 13.48 Y
Utilities UT-02 5 A 10 G 5 $ 40,840 12.24 Y
Electrical Power (EP) Supply EP-03 4 B 16 A 8 $ 67,219 11.90 Y
Munition Operations MO-06 5 R 15 G 5 $ 88,779 11.26 Y
Water Systems WTR-01 5 R 15 A 10 $ 52,161 9.59 Y
Electrical Power (EP) Supply EP-04 4 R 12 A 8 $ 48,611 8.23 Y
Utilities UT-01 5 R 15 A 10 $ 64,623 7.74 Y
Fire Protection Infrastructure FP-02 4 R 12 A 8 $ 57,938 6.90 Y
Electrical Power (EP) Supply EP-01 5 A 10 G 5 $ 88,694 5.64 N
Electrical Power (EP) Supply EP-05 3 A 6 G 3 $ 58,969 5.09 Y
Fire Protection Infrastructure FP-06 4 R 12 A 8 $ 80,862 4.95
Water Systems WTR-02 4 A 8 G 4 $ 84,541 4.73
Physical Security PS-04 2 A 4 G 2 $ 42,392 4.72
Munition Operations MO-07 3 A 6 G 3 $ 66,845 4.49
Natural Gas Supply NG-01 2 A 4 G 2 $ 47,680 4.19
Fire Protection Infrastructure FP-05 1 B 4 G 1 $ 84,887 3.53
HVAC HVAC-02 1 R 3 G 1 $ 58,018 3.45
Electromagnetic Environment EMP-01 3 A 6 G 3 $ 88,530 3.39
Antiterrorism AT-20 3 R 9 A 6 $ 99,423 3.02
Fire Protection Infrastructure FP-01 1 B 4 R 3 $ 40,798 2.45
HVAC HVAC-05 1 B 4 A 2 $ 97,110 2.06
Electrical Power (EP) Supply EP-02 2 G 2 G 2 $ 70,269 0.00 N
Fire Protection Infrastructure FP-04 4 G 4 G 4 $ 82,379 0.00 N
HVAC HVAC-04 4 G 4 G 4 $ 26,317 0.00 N
Munition Operations MO-02 5 G 5 G 5 $ 28,563 0.00 N
Munition Operations MO-03 2 G 2 G 2 $ 75,880 0.00 N
Munition Operations MO-08 1 G 1 G 1 $ 22,430 0.00 N
Natural Gas Maintenance NG-02 1 G 1 G 1 $ 47,475 0.00 N
Physical Security PS-06 1 G 1 G 1 $ 56,335 0.00 N
Physical Security PS-14 4 G 4 G 4 $ 85,045 0.00 N
Utilities UT-03 3 G 3 G 3 $ 22,357 0.00 N
Water Systems WTR-03 5 G 5 G 5 $ 82,731 0.00 N
Total $ 2,204,072 Total $ 724,509
Figure 7. Tradespace Analysis Project Selection Dashboard.
To illustrate the tradespace analysis and the utility of the various aspects of the 
dashboard as a decision analysis tool, an example tradespace analysis was conducted 
using the example data sets and an assumed maximum budget for projects to improve the 
installation’s resilience of $750,000. The determination of which projects to pursue while
70
remaining within the prescribed budget utilizing the following steps and the Trade Space 
Tracking Table (Figure. 7).
1. Eliminated from consideration any projects that do not improve the category 
benchmark score (for example, in this case projects for benchmark EP-02, FP-04, 
HVAC-04, etc.) that are highlighted in red and note elimination by selecting “N” for each 
of these projects in the Project Selection column. For these projects not selected, their 
Initial Benchmark Assessment and Score were transferred over to the dashboard matrices.
2. Selected desired projects by choosing “Y” in the Project Selection column. In this 
example, selection started with the highest impact project from the Tradespace Project 
Selection Dashboard (Figure. 7). Once “Y” was selected in the Project Selection column 
for a project, the cost is automatically added to the total shown at the bottom the 
dashboard. This facilitated the tracking of the total cost of the projects selected for the 
analysis. Also, the improvements to the resilience assessment and benchmark scores were 
automatically updated into the dashboard matrices.
3. This project selection process continued until the total cost of the selected projects 
reached the budget limit.
For this example, the total cost of the projects reached $724,509, which was still 
under the total available budget of $750,000. There were no projects remaining to select 
that would improve resilience while remaining within the budget constraints. The 
corresponding improvements were consolidated and visualized through the Tradespace 
Analysis MARM Dashboard (Figure. 8).
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Initial MARM
Prepare Absorb Recover Adapt
Physical 3.00 27.00 8.00 15.00
Information 14.00 2.00 8.00 11.00
Cognitive 36.00 10.00 0.00 25.00
Social 12.00 6.00 20.00 0.00
Improved State MARM
Improved Prepare Absorb Recover Adapt
Physical 3.00 9.00 4.00 10.00
Information 10.00 2.00 3.00 5.00
Cognitive 11.00 5.00 0.00 5.00
Social 8.00 2.00 4.00 0.00
Difference in Delta from Ideal MARM
Difference Prepare Absorb Recover Adapt
Physical 0.00 18.00 4.00 5.00
Information 4.00 0.00 5.00 6.00
Cognitive 25.00 5.00 0.00 20.00
Social 4.00 4.00 16.00 0.00
Green indicates larger improvement
Project Cost Impact by MARM Cell
Cost Prepare Absorb Recover Adapt
Physical $ - $ 147,810 $ 48,611 $ 52,161
Information $ 24,381 $ - $ 40,840 $ 4,383
Cognitive $ 106,795 $ 64,623 $ - $ 135,897
Social $ 6,552 $ 1,984 $ 90,471 $ -
Figure 8. Tradespace Analysis MARM Dashboard.
This tradespace analysis assists decision making in three significant ways.
1. A project with a lower cost impact may still be selected over a project with a 
higher cost impact if that higher cost impact project is too expensive to fit within the 
budgetary constraints and the lower cost impact project would fit in the budgetary 
constraint. For example, using this process, selection of all the highest cost impact 
projects down through FP-02 increases the total project cost to $665,540. Selecting the 
next highest cost impact project, EP-01, would add $88,694 to the total project cost,
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increasing it to $754,234, which is over the allocated budget of $750,000. The ability to 
visualize this allows the decision makers to decide whether to select a lower cost impact 
project that fits within the overall budget.
2. The impact on the resilience matrix due to tradeoff between projects can be seen 
using the MARMs produced. As shown in Tradespace Analysis Dashboard (Figure. 8), 
within the Initial MARM, the cells Cognitive-Recover, and Social-Adapt were already at 
ideal, so it would be expected that no projects would be selected to improve these cells. 
The impact of the project selection process on the other cells in the MARM can easily be 
seen. No projects were selected to improve the Physical-Prepare or Information -Absorb 
cells. Significant improvement was in the Cognitive-Prepare and Cognitive-Adapt cells. 
Results from this analysis technique would highlight this to decision makers and allow 
them to provide guidance on the tradeoff analysis to ensure that this cell would be 
addressed, if desired.
3. The final utility of this tradespace analysis, as seen in this example, is that it 
highlights that there are no other projects available from this portfolio that will fit within 
the remaining $25,491 of the budget and still have an impact on resilience. The selection 
of either project that improves MN-08 or UT-03 would fit in the budget but would not 
improve the resilience of the installation. Therefore, neither project would be an efficient 
use of resources from a resilience standpoint. An important value of this decision analysis 
tool is to see the impact of changing the project mix to use resources efficiently.
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4. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
4.1. APPLICABILITY FOR PRACTITIONERS
This research developed and demonstrated the use of a visual and interactive 
Mission Assurance Resilience Matrix that converts the qualitative infrastructure 
assessments completed as required by the DoD Mission Assurance Strategy into a 
quantitative decision support tool. The methodology and results from the example data 
set were shared with the subject matter experts within the US Army Africa DCSENG 
staff. Their feedback as practitioners in the field is that this approach will be very useful 
in several areas.
First, this study and the interactive tools it produced connect the assessments that 
are conducted by the assessment team to the intent of the Mission Assurance Construct of 
improving the resilience of military infrastructure. Assessment teams conduct a very 
detailed assessments, but this information did not effectively inform or feed the 
installation project selection and approval process as it was not easily consolidated, 
evaluated, assessed, understood, and communicated.
The matrices described in this research assist decision makers visualize where the 
installation infrastructure is deficient in terms of resiliency and then assess where to most 
efficiently allocate resources to improve the infrastructure resiliency. Conducting 
tradespace analysis informs decision makers about which projects to pursue to improve 
resilience by relating the cost of the projects to the potential improvement within the
resilience matrix.
While the implementation in the example in this research is specific to military 
installations, the framework developed is broadly applicable. This allows it to be widely 
utilized by non-military practitioners such as facility managers, departments of public 
works, or state and national infrastructure leaders.
4.2. FUTURE WORK
The next phase of this research is to analyze a case study utilizing data from 
actual military infrastructure assessments completed by the USARAF DCSENG staff to 
identify uncertainty within and impact to the MARM. This will confirm the usefulness 
and relevance of these tools to forward based military infrastructure decision makers. It 
may also identify additional criteria to consider within the framework.
Finally, the implementation of this resilience matrix methodology to a specific 
portion of the Mission Assurance Framework can extend to other functions beyond the 
engineer assessment. Additionally, it may be applied to other types of military 
infrastructure such as civil works projects that are constructed and operated by the US 
Army Corps of Engineers but fall into a separate decision-making process and under 
differing policy and funding approvals and appropriations. These extensions will 
demonstrate the generalizability of applying the resilience matrix methodology to various 
military decision-making processes.
4.3. DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Some or all data, models, or code that support the findings of this study are 
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THROUGH THE MODIFIED DELPHI METHOD AND SYSTEM USABILITY
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ABSTRACT
The ability to quantitatively evaluate the resilience of infrastructure systems 
within an assessment framework and communicate the impact of potential infrastructure 
improvement projects is a growing topic of research. Several metrics and assessment 
techniques have been developed and verified or validated to one degree or another. The 
Mission Assurance Resilience Matrix (MARM) was developed based on previous 
resilience matrix research to address the gap in the Department of Defense’s 
incorporation of resilience into its Mission Assurance Assessment framework.
This research conducts initial verification and validation of the effectiveness and 
usability of the MARM as an acceptable and applicable computer-based resilience 
assessment and decision support tool through the use of a Modified Delphi Method to 
collect and evaluate the amount and impact of subject matter expert uncertainty and bias 
within the framework.





With the increasing frequency and severity of natural and man-made disasters 
around the world, the challenge of creating tools that assess, quantify, and clearly 
articulate the resilience of infrastructure systems is a growing topic of discussion amongst 
infrastructure system managers and researchers. Multiple efforts have been made to 
develop indices to quantify resilience using metrics (Cardoso et al. 2015; Kerner and 
Thomas 2014; Wood et al. 2019). Bakkensen et. al evaluate several different metrics and 
conclude that one of the challenges is to validate measures of performance for these 
metrics and that there is little utility unless they can be confidently used to inform 
decisionmakers. One recommendation was that indices should be much clearer in what 
they aim to explain and follow up with explicit testing to see if the indices perform well 
(Bakkensen et al. 2017).
A Mission Assurance Resilience Matrix (MARM) was previously developed by 
Richards et. al based on the resilience matrix research conducted by Linkov et. al to close 
the gap between the mandate for the Army to address resilience in its assessment process 
and its current infrastructure assessment framework. The MARM is the first application 
of the resilience matrix methodology to the Department of Defense’s (DoD) Mission 
Assurance Assessment (MAA) framework, therefore the model needs to be tested, 
verified, and validated. This study is the initial step in that process.
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1.2. RESILIENCE MATRIX FRAMEWORK
The Resilience Matrix (RM), developed by Linkov et. al (Linkov et al. 2013b; a), 
provides a framework to identify the relevant metrics to assess performance from a wider 
system perspective, is generalizable, and provides a baseline performance score on which 
the resilience improvement potential of proposed system changes can be evaluated (Fox- 
Lent et al. 2015). The columns of the matrix are based on the stages identified in the 
National Academy of Sciences definition of resilience (plan/prepare, absorb/withstand, 
recover adapt), and the rows describe the four general management domains of a complex 
system, (physical, information, cognitive, and social) (Fox-Lent et al. 2015). The RM 
framework has been applied to assess many types of infrastructure systems such as cyber 
(Linkov et al. 2013b), energy (Roege et al. 2014), coastal communities (Fox-Lent et al. 
2015), urban planning and assessment (Fox-lent and Linkov 2018), and reservoirs 
(Mustajoki and Marttunen 2019).
1.3. MISSION ASSURANCE RESILIENCE MATRIX
The RM methodology was selected to incorporate resilience into the MAA 
framework since it is generalizable and assesses performance at a system level that can 
handle the uniqueness, complexity, and integrated nature of military infrastructure 
systems. The MAA framework consists of over 200 benchmark categories assessed by a 
cross-functional team which produces a report that provides important input for leaders to 
understand risk, inform the development of specific requirements for future infrastructure 
projects, and assist in making decisions about which ones to fund. The MARM was 
constructed from a subset of the MAA benchmark categories assessed by the engineer
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function and its novel incorporation of project cost estimates with the quantification of 
qualitative assessment data into unitless and similarly scored cells within the matrix, 
enable its use as a decision support tool. The MARM is designed to improve visualization 
of the cost-benefit analysis of potential infrastructure improvement projects to allow 
leaders to understand the influence that one project may have on multiple functions or 
systems. For a full treatment of the development of the MARM see Richards et. al 
(Richards et al. n.d.).
Since the MARM is the first application of the resilience matrix methodology to 
the DoD Mission Assurance Assessment framework, verification and validation of the 
MARM as a resilience assessment and decision-support tool must be completed prior to 
expanding it to the broader DoD MAA framework. This study implements several model 
verification and validation techniques through the Modified Delphi Method to confirm 
that the MARM is an acceptable and applicable computer-based resilience assessment 
and decision support tool.
1.4. MODEL VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION
Model verification and validation are critical steps in the system development 
process. Verification is generally defined as the process of determining if you are 
building the model right and validation is generally defined as determining if you are 
building the right model (Andradhttir et al. 1997; Kleijnen 1997; Sargent 2013). 
Uncertainty in the model due to measurement error, imprecise and/or insufficient data, 
natural variability, and model uncertainty must be investigated to complete the model 
verification and validation process (Ling and Mahadevan 2013). This is especially
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important since the MAA process relies on the aggregation of the judgements from 
subject matter experts (SME) with varying amounts of experience with the assessment 
framework and familiarity with the infrastructure systems. The varying levels of expertise 
can introduce uncertainty due to conflicting opinions and judgments or judgments are 
expressed with a measure of uncertainty (Yaniv 1997).
2. MODIFIED DELPHI METHOD
This study utilized a Modified Delphi Method to solicit subject matter experts, 
collect and process the data from each round of input, and frame the next round of 
information to be requested, collected, and processed in order to implement the various 
techniques to meet each of the model verification objectives of the study. The Delphi 
Method was developed by the Research and Development (RAND) Corporation in the 
1960’s in Santa Monica California for the “systemic solicitation and collation of 
judgements on a particular topic through a set of sequential questionnaires interspersed 
with summarized information and feedback of opinions derived from earlier responses”. 
The Delphi method is based on structural surveys and makes use of the information 
provided by experts (Balasubramanian and Agarwal 2012).
The Delphi Method was selected for this study for several reasons. The first is 
that it is useful when evidence is lacking or limited: it relies on “collective intelligence” 
of group members to jointly produce better results than anyone in the group could 
produce on his or her own, resulting in increased content validity (Miller et al. 2020). It 
works well with a group of subject matter experts (SMEs), which was appropriate given
the limited number of subject matter experts available to provide input on the MARM. 
The DoD Mission Assurance Assessment community is quite small and the assessments 
process can be both functionally and installation specific. To ensure that the subject 
matter experts used in this study would have the requisite familiarity with the MAA in 
general and the specific benchmarks and metrics from the case study data set, the set of 
experts was limited to the US Army Africa Deputy Chief of Staff Engineer (DCSENG) 
staff.
To provide the requisite details on the benchmark category metrics and conditions 
for the participants to provide detailed and accurate input throughout the rounds of the 
Delphi Method, an infrastructure assessment previously completed by one of the subject 
matter experts was utilized as a case study data set. Using the case study data set allows 
for the evaluation of the consistency of the responses across the participants. The specific 
benchmarks utilized in the case study data are taken from the DoD Mission Assurance 
Benchmarks dated 28 March 2018, which are unclassified but designated as For Official 
Use Only (FOUO) (Department of Defense 2018c). Therefore, they cannot be published 
in this article in full, but the broad categories and representative identification numbers 
are summarized and implemented in this paper to allow for easier identification.
The Delphi Method typically consists of three to six rounds with qualitative and 
quantitative assessment from the previous round used to prepare the subsequent round. 
This study modified the first round of data collection from the typical Delphi Method.
The evaluation of the objectives identified in each round of the Modified Delphi Method 
were used to verify the MARM as a decision support tool and provide insight as to
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potential sources of uncertainty in the model that may have an impact on the overall 
assessment of the resilience of the infrastructure systems for an installation.
84
2.1. ROUND 1
This first round was modified from the standard Delphi Method by grouping some 
of the SMEs together to eliminate potential gaps in their expertise to assess the 
benchmark categories. Three SMEs (SME Team) collaborated to assess the benchmark 
category ratings and priority weights. The fourth SME completed the actual infrastructure 
assessment used for the case study and was very familiar with the condition statements 
and metrics. This SME, referred to as the Case Study Assessor (CSA), provided an 
individual assessment of the category ratings and priority weights.
The first objective of Round 1 was to assess the consistency between the teams 
and determine the average of their assessment of the 32 benchmark categories. The teams 
rated each category condition from Black = Worst, Red = Poor, Amber = Fair, or Green = 
Good/Ideal based on the descriptions of the conditions of the category from the case 
study assessment. Each team also assigned a priority (1 = Low through 5 = High) for 
each category based on its metric description. From this data, the resulting scores 
throughout the MARM methodology were calculated and used for comparison between 
the SMEs.
To meet the second objective, the SME Team, based on their experience with 
infrastructure improvement projects in the region, was asked to provide a three-point cost 
estimate (Low, Middle, and High) for a hypothetical improvement project to improve the
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resilience assessment to “Green” for a subset of eight categories. The data collected and 
processed from this round framed the subsequent rounds of the Modified Delphi Method.
2.2. ROUND 2
Round 2 of this study had two objectives, 1) to assess the amount of agreement of 
each SME and consensus across the SMEs of the Round 1 results, and 2) to evaluate 
consensus between the SMEs as to their categorization of each benchmark category into 
the MARM. An instructional email was sent to each of the SMEs with an attached Excel 
file that contained the formatted results of Round 1: benchmark category metric, 
condition description, average rating, and average priority weight. Each SME was asked 
to individually assess their level of agreement with the average category rating and 
priority weight as well as to categorize each of the 32 benchmark categories for the 
domain and resilience stage under which it most appropriately fit (Table 1).
Table 1. Management Domains and Resilience Stages for Resilience Matrix
Categorization.
Domains
Physical: sensors, systems, platforms, and facilities
Information: collected, posted, pulled, displayed, 
processed, and stored
Cognitive: perceptions and understanding of what 
this information states and means and the mental 
models, preconceptions, biases, and values 
influence how information is interpreted and 
understood
Social: command and control processes and the 
interactions between and among individuals and 
entities that fundamentally define organization and 
doctrine
Resilience Stages
Prepare: all the preparation (plans, training, 
projects) conducted prior to a disaster event
Absorb: how the infrastructure withstands the 
disaster and minimizes impacts to operations
Respond: the restoration of operations that were 
impacted by a disaster
Adapt: actions taken to learn from/improve 
resilience based on the previous disaster
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There is no standard across the literature as to what defines consensus when 
conducting the Delphi Method, though most studies settle in the 70-80% range with a 
mean score determined by the type of scale used (Bentley et al. 2016). This study defines 
consensus as at least three or four of the SMEs assigning the same level of agreement and 
a quantitative mean of the level of agreement of 3.75 or greater using the 5-point Likert 
scale (“Strongly Agree” = 5 and “Strongly Disagree” = 1).
2.3. ROUND 3
The objectives of Round 3 were threefold, 1) assess the amount of agreement 
between the SMEs with regard to the average Cost Impact Scores calculated in Round 1 
to determine if the MARM would perform differently from the SME heuristic project 
selection methods, 2) conduct a cumulative assessment of SME responses to investigate 
the potential of bias in responses, and 3) verify the usability of the MARM as a 
computer-based decision-support tool through the System Usability Scale methodology.
To meet the first objective, an email, with guidance and an Excel file attached 
containing the Cost Impact Score results from Round 1 for the subset of eight benchmark 
categories, asked each SME to individually assess their level of agreement of the 
prioritization of the project based on its condition description and Cost Impact Score. 
These results were used to conduct a hypothesis test to validate if the MARM performs 
differently from project selection heuristics that the experts may currently use.
Evaluation of the cumulative responses of the level of agreement for each SME 
across all the rounds was used to meet the second objective to investigate the potential for 
SME bias. Tversky and Kahneman describe three heuristics that SMEs use in making
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their judgements that can lead to bias in their judgements and highlight that the impact of 
these biases in the evaluation of compound events are particularly significant in the 
context of planning and in risk (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Though this study did not 
collect the specific data to determine which type of heuristic (representativeness, 
availability, adjustment, and anchoring) subject matter experts may be using to bias their 
assessments, the analysis of the cumulative SME levels of agreement provides an 
indication of the presence of these heuristics and their accompanying biases.
2.4. SYSTEM USABILITY SCALE
The final objective of Round 3 was to verify the usability of the MARM as a 
computer-based decision-support tool through the use of the System Usability Scale 
(SUS). The SUS was developed by John Brooke at Digital Equipment Corporation and is 
used to take a quick measurement of how people perceived the usability of computer 
systems on which they are working (Brooke, 1986). Each user is asked to provide their 
level of agreement (strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, and strongly disagree) on ten 
statements, which were slightly modified from the original SUS to specify the MARM as 
the system for evaluation and included in the Excel file sent out to collect Round 3 input 
(Table 2).
Raw scores ranging from 0 (poorest rating) to 4 (best rating) are used to calculate 
a standard SUS score, which is on a scale of 0 to 100, that can then be graded in 
comparison to other computer systems using the Curved Grading Scale (Table 3) (Lewis
2018).
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Table 2. System Usability Scale Modified Statements (Brooke, 1986).
1. I think that I would like to use this system frequently in conjunction with MAA assessments.
2. I found the system unnecessarily complex.
3. I thought the system was easy to use.
4. I think that I would need the support of a technical person to be able to use this system.
5. I found the various functions in this system were well integrated.
6. I thought there was too much inconsistency in this system.
7. I would imagine that most people would learn to use this system very quickly.
8. I found the system very cumbersome to use.
9. I felt very confident using the system.
10. I needed to learn a lot of things before I could get going with this system.______________
Table 3. Curved Grading Scale for the SUS (Lewis and Sauro 2018).
Grade SUS Percentile Range
A+ 84.1 -  100 96 -  100
A 80.8 -  84.0 90 -  95
A- 78.9 -  80.7 85 -  89
B+ 77.2 -  78.8 80 -  84
B 74.1 -  77.1 70 -  79
B- 72.6 -  74.0 65 -  69
C+ 71.1 -  72.5 60 -  64
C 65.0 -  71.0 41 -  59
C- 62.7 -  64.9 35 -  40
D 51.7 -  62.6 15 -  34
F 0 -  51.6 0 -14
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
3.1. MODIFIED DELPHI METHOD ROUND 1
The two teams of SMEs assigned a condition rating of Black, Red, Amber, or 
Green for each category based on its condition description from the case study 
assessment. For 22 of the 32 (68.75%) categories, the two teams rated the benchmark 
categories exactly the same. Of the ten categories that were not rated the same, eight 
ratings were within one rating of each other (i.e. assessed as Black and Red, Red and
Amber, or Amber and Green), one category had a two rating difference (Amber and 
Black), and the final category had a three rating difference (Black and Green).
Both teams also assigned a priority weight (“5” = Highest priority to “1” =
Lowest priority) for each category based on its metric description. The teams assigned the 
exact same priority weight to 17 of the 32 categories (53.13%). For the other 15 
categories, six categories each had a priority weight difference of one or two, with the 
remaining three categories having a spread of three or four.
To quantify the ratings and assess how the differences between the SME teams 
would propagate through the MARM, a Benchmark Score was calculated for each 
category based on the conversion of the rating and priority weight using conversion 
factors (Table 4) and Equation (1) to calculate the Benchmark Category Score (Table 4). 
A larger Benchmark Score indicates a category with a worse condition given a higher 
priority.
Benchm ark Score = Quantitative A ssessm ent Conversion x  Priority W eight Score (1)
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Green = 1 5 4 3 2 1
Amber = 2 10 8 6 4 2
Red = 3 15 12 9 6 3
Black = 4 20 16 12 8 4
The cumulative impact of the uncertainty in both rating and priority weight was 
emphasized by the reduction in consistency in Benchmark Scores. Of the 32 categories, 
less than half (46.88%) yielded the same exact score between the SME teams, though
71.88% of the categories had scores within two of each other. The mean difference 
between the 17 non-concurrent benchmark scores was 4.24, with a standard deviation of 
3.17. The impact of uncertainty on the remaining nine categories is significant as their 
mean difference between the teams was 7.00, with a maximum difference of 11, which is 
significant when comparing scores from Table 4.
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Consistency (delta = 0) 17 22 15
Consistency % 53.13% 68.75% 46.88%
Total Delta Count 15 10 17
Total Delta Percent 46.88% 31.25% 53.13%
Delta = 1 Count 6 8 4
Percent of Total Delta 40.00% 80.00% 12.50%
Delta = 2 Count 6 1 4
Percent of Total Delta 40.00% 10.00% 12.50%
Delta > 2 Count 3 1 9
Percent of Total Delta 20.00% 10.00% 28.13%
The MARM methodology was developed to quantitatively compare a category’s 
current condition to its ideal by comparing its Benchmark Score to its Ideal Score. Since 
a “Green” rating has a Score Conversion equal to one (Table 4), an ideal rating would 
yield a Benchmark Ideal Score solely based on its priority weight using Equation (2).
Benchm ark Ideal Score = W eight x  1 ("Green") (2)
For each benchmark category, the difference between the current Benchmark 
Score and its Ideal Benchmark Score was calculated to determine its Delta from Ideal 
using Equation (3).
Delta from  Ideal = Benchm ark Score -  Benchm ark Ideal Score (3)
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The next step in the MARM methodology was to determine where each category 
fits into the MARM based on the resilience stage and domain definitions (Table 1). An 
example was created by the authors to map the 32 categories used in this study to enable 
an initial comparison of the results of Round 1 (Table 6). SME input was utilized to 
create mapping specific to their input in this study in Round 3 of the Delphi Method.
Table 6. Case Study Mission Assurance Categories to Resilience Matrix Categorization.
Prepare Absorb Recover Adapt






















Social PS-13 UT-04 UT-05
EP-03
Note: The MARM as originally constructed consisted of 41 benchmark categories filling all 16
cells of the matrix. The case study data only utilized 32 categories, with all of the categories 




Fire Protection Infrastructure (FP)
Heating, Ventilation, Air Conditioning (HVAC)
Munition Operations (MO)




The Delta from Ideal score for each benchmark was plugged into the example 
MARM (Table 6) and combined with any other benchmark category Delta from Ideal 
scores in the cell to calculate the Cell Score using Equation (4) since all Delta from Ideal 
scores are unitless and are similarly scaled.
C e l l  S c o r e  = =f = 1 Benchm ark Delta fr o m  Ideal (4)
A larger Cell Score indicates that the cumulative impact of the individual category 
differences from ideal are large and therefore the resilience of that cell low. The cells 
scores were plugged into the MARM and a color scale applied to allow a decisionmaker 
to have a snapshot of the infrastructure system’s resiliency (Figures 1 and 2). The impact 
of consensus (or lack thereof) is displayed in the two MARMs created from the Round 1 
results. The MARM created from the SME Team results shows that the Physical-Absorb 
has the highest Cell Score and is significantly the least resilient based on their assessment 
with the Cognitive-Prepare cell as the second-worst, still by a significant amount over the 
other cells. The CSA MARM indicates that the Physical-Prepare is the cell that assessed 
as furthest from its ideal resilience condition with the Absorb-Physical the second worst, 
just slightly worse than Cognitive-Prepare and Cognitive-Absorb.
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Prepare Absorb Recover Adapt
Physical 10.00 23.00 4.00 0.00
Information 0.00 0.00 6.00 0.00
Cognitive 8.00 18.00 0.00 0.00
Social 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Figure 1. SME Team Round 1 MARM.
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Prepare Absorb Recover Adapt
Physical 15.00 11.00 0.00 0.00
Information 0.00 0.00 6.00 0.00
Cognitive 9.00 9.00 0.00 0.00
Social 5.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Figure 2. CSA Round 1 MARM.
The final component of the MARM methodology is to integrate the Cell Scores 
with cost estimates for infrastructure improvement projects to calculate a Cost Impact 
Score. This quantifies the improvement that you get for the resources expended and 
allows decisionmakers to compare potential infrastructure improvement projects and 
consider their impact on resilience improvement to ensure they are spending their limited 
resources in an effective manner.
As part of Round 1, the SME team provided a three-point cost estimate (Low, 
Middle, and High) for a hypothetical improvement project for eight selected categories. 
The other 24 categories were eliminated from this analysis since they were administrative 
or had been assessed by SME Team as “Green” in Round 1 and would not be a candidate 
for an improvement project. The most likely cost was calculated assuming a Beta 
distribution of the cost estimates using Equation (5) (Prakash n.d.).
(Low Cost+4*Middle Cost+High Cost)M ost Likely Cost = (5)
The Cost Impact Score was calculated by taking the difference between the Initial 
and Improved Benchmark Scores and dividing it by the associated project cost and scaled 
by a factor of 100,000 for readability (Equation 6) for each of the categories using both
the SME Team Benchmark scores and the CSA Benchmark scores to facilitate
comparison. Additionally, an Average Cost Impact Score was calculated using the 
average rating and average priority weight for each category (Table 7).
Cost Im pact Score = ----------------------------------------------------------- * 100,000 (6)
Benchmark P ro jec t  Cost
The SME Team had one and the CSA two categories with a calculated Cost 
Impact Score of zero, which would be an inefficient use of resources if the project was 
completed. This is significant as it shows the difference in how a SME rates and 
prioritizes a category will impact how much impact that project will have on the 
resilience assessment and decision-making process. Four categories had a difference 
between the SME Team and CSA Cost Impact Factors of less than five, and one category 
(PS-06) had a difference in the Cost Impact Score just under six.
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PS-04 $75,000 $187,500 $275,000 $183,333 2.73 0.00 1.36
PS-06 $5,310 $18,000 $30,000 $17,885 22.37 16.77 20.97
PS-12 $200,000 $480,000 $750,000 $478,333 3.14 1.25 2.09
PS-14 $200,000 $480,000 $750,000 $478,333 3.14 1.67 2.35
UT-01 $5,000 $42,000 $75,000 $41,333 7.26 2.42 4.84
WTR-03 $6,000 $18,000 $48,000 $21,000 19.05 0.00 8.33
HVAC-05 $3,000 $30,000 $112,000 $39,167 0.00 12.77 3.83
MO $135,000 $280,000 $350,000 $267,500 3.74 5.61 4.67
3.2. MODIFIED DELPHI METHOD ROUND 2
The results of Round 2 were evaluated from two perspectives: 1) the amount of 
agreement and consistency between SMEs for each benchmark category, and 2)
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cumulative amount of agreement and consistency between SMEs. Mean Likert scores and 
response rates were used to evaluate agreement and consensus.
There was a high amount of SME agreement regarding the average benchmark 
category ratings with at least three of the four SMEs indicating agreement with the 
benchmark category rating in 29 of the 32 categories (90.63%) (Figure 3). Only one 
category, UT-05, showed a low amount of agreement, with ratings spread from Strongly 
Disagree to Strongly Agree. There was also a high amount of consistency amongst the 
SMEs as demonstrated by 27 of the 32 (84.38%) categories having a mean Likert score of 
3.75 or greater, with 22 of the 32 (68.75%) categories having a mean Likert score of 4 or 
greater (Figure 3).
Note: X = Mean Likert score with the spread of the responses indicated by the “whiskers, and quartiles 
indicated by the shaded boxes. The smaller the shaded box, the greater the level of consensus.
Figure 3. Category Rating Level of Agreement Responses.
For the priority weight, the amount of agreement was slightly lower, but still 
relatively high, with at least three SMEs indicating agreement with the priority weight for 
23 of the 32 categories (71.88%). In only one case did a category have more than one 
SME indicate disagreement. This amount of agreement was further shown with 20 of the 
32 (62.5%) categories having a mean Likert score of 3.75 or greater and of these, 13 of 
the 32 (43.63%) categories had a mean Likert score of 4 or greater (Figure 4).
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Note: X = Mean Likert score with the spread of the responses indicated by the “whiskers, and quartiles 
indicated by the shaded boxes. The smaller the shaded box, the greater the level of consensus.
Figure 4. Priority Weight Level of Agreement Responses.
For the category ratings, there was a high amount of cumulative agreement as 
83.59% of the responses were either Strongly Agree or Agree. The responses for the 
priority weights showed a slightly lower, but still a relatively high amount of cumulative 
agreement with 71.88% of the responses either Strongly Agree or Agree. The difference
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between the two is due to the number of neutral (“Neither agree or disagree”) responses. 
There were only 10 of these responses for the category rating, but that jumped to 25 for 
the priority weight. Both had a similar number of disagreement (“Strongly disagree” or 
“Disagree”) responses (11 total responses for each) (Table 8).









Strongly Agree 59 46.09% 25 19.53%
Agree 48 37.50% 67 52.34%
Neither Agree or Disagree 10 7.81% 25 19.53%
Disagree 10 7.81% 11 8.59%
Strongly Disagree 1 0.78% 0 0.00%
For the SME categorization of the benchmark categories, the cumulative results 
show a strong preference to place the categories into the Physical domain and the Prepare 
stage (Table 9). Several cells in the MARM did not have any categories placed into them 
by the SMEs. This is problematic and indicates that without clear guidance, assessment 
teams will likely create a highly unbalanced matrix that may have many cells that look 
“Green” since they have no categories placed in them. This would indicate that the cell is 
at its ideal condition and provide a false sense that the infrastructure system has a high 
amount of resilience. This result may also be an indication of the impact of the lack of 
formal resilience education and training for engineering managers (Richards and Long
2019).
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Table 9. Modified Delphi Method Round 2: Occurrences of Cell Categorization.
Prepare Absorb Recover Adapt
Physical 50.00% 17.19% 3.91% 3.13%
Information 14.06% 2.34% 0.00% 0.78%
Cognitive 0.78% 1.56% 0.00% 0.00%
Social 3.13% 3.13% 0.00% 0.00%
Categorization of the benchmark categories by the SMEs showed less consistency 
than for the benchmark ratings or priority weights in terms of resilience stage. In 18 of 
the 32 categories (56.25%) there was consensus between at least three of the four SMEs 
with which stage the benchmark category should be placed, while in 14 of the categories 
(43.75%) there was consensus between only two of the SMEs. Of those 14 categories, 
eight were split across two stages and the other six across three stages, with no 
benchmark categories placed across all four stages (Table 10). Placement of the 
benchmark categories into a domain was more consistent with 26 of the 32 categories 
(81.25%) having consensus amongst at least three of the four SMEs into which domain 
the benchmark category should be placed. The evaluation of the amount of consensus of 
the other six categories showed that three were split across two domains, two were split 
across three domains, and one was split across all four domains (Table 10).
Table 10. Modified Delphi Method Round 2: Benchmark Categorization Consistency.







(4 of 4) 100% 6 18.75% 17 53.13%
(3 of 4) 75% 12 37.50% 9 28.13%
(2 of 4) 50% 14 43.75% 5 15.63%
(None-all different) 0 0.00% 1 3.13%
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The impact of the individual categorization completed by each SME was visually 
demonstrated by mapping their selection of resilience stage and domain into the MARM 
and incorporating the average Benchmark Scores to calculate the appropriate Cell Scores 
(Figure 5). SME 1 and 4 categorized all benchmark categories in the Prepare resilience 
stage. The other two SMEs had a broader spread of categorization across stages, but still 
most benchmark categories were assigned to the Physical-Prepare, Physical-Absorb, or 
Information-Prepare cells. Though all the SMEs were given the same guidance and 
definitions (Table 1), the differences across SME MARMs and the internal imbalance 
within each MARM (Figure 5) confirmed the difficulty in defining which cell some 
categories should belong to (Mustajoki and Marttunen 2019) and that it may be difficult 
to find indicators for the cognitive domain (Fox-lent and Linkov 2018). There were 
significant differences in the MARMS created based SME categorization. The Physical- 
Prepare cell had the highest Cell Score for three of the four SME MARMs, though the 
scores were spread from a high of 50 to a low of 28.75. The Physical-Absorb cell had 
either the highest or second highest Cell Score in one MARM each., again with a 
significant spread of score values in each instance (Figure 5).
3.3. MODIFIED DELPHI METHOD ROUND 3
Round 3 results (Figure 3 and Table 11) indicate that there was a high amount of 
agreement (at least three of the SMEs agreed with the prioritization of the project based 
on its Cost Impact Score) for six of the eight (75%) categories. Five of those categories 
(62.5%) had a mean Likert score of at least 3.75 and three of the categories (37.5%) had a 
mean Likert score of 4.0 or greater.
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SM E 1 Prepare Absorb R e co ve r Adapt
Physical 48.25 0.00 0.00 0.00
Inform ation 6.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cognitive 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Social 6.75 0.00 0.00 0.00
SM E 2 Prepare Absorb R e co v e r Adapt
Physical 18.50 29.00 3.75 0.00
In fo rm atio n 6.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cognitive 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Socia l 0.00 1.75 0.00 0.00
SM E 3 Prepare A bsorb R e co v e r Adapt
Physical 28.75 19.50 0.00 3.75
Inform ation 9.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cognitive 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Socia l 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SM E 4 Prepare A bsorb R e co v e r Adapt
Physical 50.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Inform ation 11.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cognitive 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Social 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: A higher Cell Score indicates less resilience since it has a greater cumulative Delta from Ideal for its 
assigned categories.
Figure 5. Round 3: Mission Assurance Resilience Matrix by SME.
The highest amount of disagreement occurred in categories PS-06 and HVAC-05. 
PS-06 had the lowest Most Likely Cost, but the highest Cost Impact Score while HVAC- 
05 had a low Most Likely Cost with a medium Cost Impact Score (Table 11). This may 
indicate a heuristic amongst some of the SMEs that the lower cost projects will not 
produce as big an impact on resilience and verifies that the MARM does identify projects 
that may be overlooked for their impact.
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PS-04 PS-06 PS-12 PS-14 UT-01 WTR-03 HVAC-05 MO
Note: X = Mean Likert score with the spread of the responses indicated by the “whiskers, and quartiles 
indicated by the shaded boxes. The smaller the shaded box, the greater the level of consensus.
Figure 6. Round 3: Cost Impact Score Amount of Agreement.
The individual SME amount of agreement (Table 12) was used to conduct a 
hypothesis test to validate that the MARM prioritizes improvement projects differently 
than the heuristics the SMEs use to prioritize the projects.
Table 11. Modified Delphi Method Round 3: Cost Impact Score Consistency.









PS-04 $183,333 1.36 100% 0% 0%
PS-06 $17,885 20.97 50% 25% 25%
PS-12 $478,333 2.09 75% 0% 25%
PS-14 $478,333 2.35 75% 0% 25%
UT-01 $41,333 4.84 75% 25% 0%
WTR-03 $21,000 8.33 75% 0% 25%
HVAC-05 $39,167 3.83 50% 25% 25%
MO $267,500 4.67 100% 0% 0%
The mean number of non-agreement responses (“Neither agree or disagree, 
Disagree, and Strongly Disagree) for each SME was 25% and standard deviation of 
20.41% were used as the sample mean and standard deviation to compare to the 
hypothesized population mean to determine if the study’s sample mean is significantly 
different (Gerald 2018). Since the sample size is small (n=4), a one sample t test using the 
Excel Add-In, Real Statistics (Zaiontz n.d.) with a Type I acceptable error of 5% (alpha = 
0.05), is appropriate to evaluate whether to reject the null hypothesis that the MARM 
model and US Army Africa heuristic project selection methods perform the same and 
have a mean disagreement with the category Cost Impact Scores equal to 0%. The 
alternate hypothesis is that the MARM prioritizes projects differently than SME heuristic 
project selection methods leading to a mean disagreement with the category Cost Impact 
Scores greater than 0%.
The results of the hypothesis test rejected null that there is no difference between 
the MARM and SME heuristic project selection methods (Figure 7). These results 
validate that the MARM performs differently than heuristic project selection methods, 
but more data is required to quantify the amount of that impact and validate the MARM 
as an effective decision support tool.
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Table 12. Modified Delphi Method Round 3: Cumulative Cost Impact Score Amount of
Agreement.
SME 1 SME 2 SME 3 SME 4 Total
Agree 6 8 4 6 75.00%
Neutral 1 0 1 1 9.38%
Disagree 1 0 3 1 15.63%
Percent non-agree 25% 0% 50% 25% 25%
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SU M M A R Y A lpha 0.05
C ount M ea n  S td  D ev S td  E rr t d f  C ohen d  E ffe c t r




p-value t-crit low er upper sig
O ne Tail 0.045861 2.353363 yes
Figure 7. One Sample t-Test Results (Real Statistics Output).
To investigate potential indication of SME bias, the responses of each SME to the 
72 opportunities to provide a level of agreement were aggregated (Table 14). Analyzing 
the response distribution from each SME shows potential bias, specifically when 
considering SME2 and SME3. SME2 demonstrated a cumulative agreement response rate 
greater than one standard deviation above the mean, a neutral response rate lower than 
one standard deviation from the mean, and no disagreement responses throughout the 
study. SME3 demonstrated the opposite with a cumulative agreement response rate lower 
than one standard deviation from the mean and a cumulative disagreement response rate 
greater than one standard deviation from the mean. SME3 accounted for nearly half of 
the total non-agreement responses across the study (32 of the 65, 49.23%). These 
cumulative results do indicate that the MARM may be impacted by bias, though further 
investigation needs to be conducted as to the underlying sources and impact of this 
potential bias either towards over assessing or under assessing the category rating, 
priority weight, or Cost Impact Score. This indicates that inconsistencies in infrastructure 
resilience education and training may contribute to differing SME heuristics that can bias
their assessments.
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Table 13. Modified Delphi Method Cumulative Count of Level of Agreement by SME.
SME 1 SME 2 SME 3 SME 4 Mean SD
Count Percent Count Percent Count Percent Count Percent Count Count
Agree 60 83.33% 67 93.06% 40 55.56% 56 77.78% 55.75 11.44
Neutral 9 12.50% 5 6.94% 14 19.44% 10 13.89% 9.5 3.70
Disagree 3 4.17% 0 0.00% 18 25.00% 6 8.33% 6.75 7.89
Note: Agree = Strongly agree + agree responses
Neutral = Neither disagree or agree responses 
Disagree = Strongly disagree or disagree
3.4. SYSTEM USABILITY SCALE
The responses from each SME for their level of agreement on each of the ten SUS 
questions were collected and converted from the qualitative level of agreement to a SUS 
score using Equation (7) (Lewis 2018).
S U S  =  2.5(20 + S U M ( S U S 0 1 , S U S 0 3 , S U S 0 5 , S U S 0 7 , S U S 0 9 )  -
S U M ( S U S 0 2 ,  S U S 0 4 ,  S U S 0 6 ,  S U S 0 8 ,  S U S 1 0 ) )  (7)
The mean score from the four subject matter experts was 68.75 with a mode score 
of 70, maximum score of 72.5, and minimum score of 62.5. The mean result of 68.75 
grades the MARM as a “C” and places the MARM in the average rankings when 
compared to other systems assessed with the System Usability Scale (Table 3). This is 
not unexpected since the tool was built in Excel, which is perceived as a low usability 
system with a mean SUS score of 56.5 (Lewis 2018). The Excel platform was chosen for 
development of the MARM since MAA data collection tools have already been built 
using the software and it has usage amongst the DoD MAA community (Richards et al. 
n.d.). A further indication of the ranking of this system as “average” is that the vast 
majority of ratings were assessed as Agree, Neutral, or Disagree with only three 
“Strongly Agree” ratings and no “Strongly Disagree” ratings. This verifies the MARM as
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an acceptable, though not an excellent computer system for infrastructure assessment data 
collection and decision support tool through tradespace analysis.
Consistency of the level of agreement (strongly agree or agree) or disagreement 
(strongly disagree or disagree) for individual questions was quite high (Table 15). 
Analysis can also be done for each question; a better performing system would have a 
higher amount of agreement for positive (odd) toned questions and would have a higher 
amount of disagreement for negative (even) toned questions. Three of the five positive 
toned questions had 100% agreement, one question had a 75% neutral (neither agree nor 
disagree) amount of agreement, with the fifth question having a spread across all levels of 
agreement. For the negative toned questions, one question had 100% disagreement, two 
had 75% disagreement, one question was split between disagreement and neutral, with 
one question spread across all levels of agreement.
Table 14. System Usability Scale Results.
Please indicate your level of agreement to the following 













1. I think that I would like to use this system frequently in 
conjunction with MAA assessments. Positive 100% 0% 0%
2. I found the system unnecessarily complex. Negative 0% 0% 100%
3. I thought the system was easy to use. Positive 50% 25% 25%
4. I think that I would need the support of a technical 
person to be able to use this system. Negative 0% 25% 75%
5. I found the various functions in this system were well 
integrated. Positive 100% 0% 0%
6. I thought there was too much inconsistency in this 
system. Negative 0% 50% 50%
7. I would imagine that most people would learn to use this 
system very quickly. Positive 100% 0% 0%
8. I found the system very cumbersome to use. Negative 0% 25% 75%
9. I felt very confident using the system. Positive 25% 75% 0%
10. I needed to learn a lot of things before I could get going 
with this system. Negative 25% 25% 50%
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The analysis of low levels of agreement or consensus by question identified areas 
for improvement of the MARM as a system. Question 3, “I thought the system was easy 
to use” and Question 10, “I needed to learn a lot of things before I could get going with 
this system” both had a lower amount of agreement. Considering that a user manual was 
not developed or provided for the use by the subject matter experts and their only 
instructions were over email, these results are both expected and reasonable, but indicate 
that better guidance will lead to a better user experience. Two other questions showed a 
strong neutral trend, with at least 50% of the users indicating a rating of neither agree nor 
disagree: Question 6, “I thought there was too much inconsistency in this system”, and 
Question 9, “I felt very confident using the system”. The results for these questions 
indicate additional opportunities for improvement in the consistency of how assessment 
information is collected, processed, and presented as well as instruction provided to the 




This study implemented several model verification (building the model right) and 
validation (building the right model) techniques on the MARM through the Modified 
Delphi Method framework. The results verify that the MARM methodology is acceptable 
and applicable and warrants further refinement and development as a computer-based 
resilience assessment and decision support tool.
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Though the sample size was small, this study did validate that the MARM does 
perform differently from SME project selection heuristics, though more work needs to be 
done to quantify the amount of that impact and determine underlying factors (experience, 
training, education, etc.) contributing to differences. Additionally, the study does indicate 
that SME bias, which may be due to inconsistent resilience experience, education, and/or 
training, may enter into the assessment process. There is potential for this bias to lead to 
an assessment team creating an unbalanced MARM due to the flexibility built in to the 
framework that allows the team to determine where to place each category into the 
matrix. The impacts of having an imbalance matrix and its impact on resilience 
assessment and decision-making need to further investigated. Due to the anonymous 
structure of the data collection process used in this study’s Modified Delphi Method, 
further insight into the SME levels of experience and education are not available, but 
deserves additional investigation in subsequent research. This study’s results indicate that 
the MARM can improve upon typical heuristic decision-making processes and merits 
further development for application as a decision support tool.
The results of the SUS verified the MARM as an acceptable, though not excellent, 
computer system for infrastructure assessment data collection and decision support and 
identified opportunities for improvement to increase the system usability by refining the 
MARM interface and develop a short user manual/tutorial which will make it easier to 
use as a decision support tool and improve the user experience. Along with this usability 
assessment, this study verifies that the amount of consistency within the MARM 
methodology is acceptable enough to broaden this methodology to incorporate all the
MAA functions and expand to assess infrastructure across the Army’s landscape of 
installations.
4.2. FUTURE WORK
There are three significant areas for future work resulting from this study: 1) 
improve and refine the MARM based on the results and feedback from the study, 2) 
conduct additional research into the impact of resilience experience, education, and 
training on SME uncertainty and bias within the MAA framework, and 3) expand the 
MARM and verify and validate the expanded mode.
Specific aspects of the MARM that were identified to improve are: 1) increase the 
system usability by refining the MARM interface and, 2) develop a short user 
manual/tutorial which will make it easier to use and utilize as a decision support tool. 
Also, clearer guidance and specific definitions should be provided to assessors as to how 
to categorize the benchmark categories into the appropriate resilience stage and 
management domain. This will help mitigate concerns of creating imbalanced matrices, 
the impacts of which deserve further investigation. Additional research into SME 
resilience experience, education, and training and its impact on the MARM framework 
will identity improvements to the MARM to mitigate impacts due to SME bias and 
uncertainty. This research will also contribute to the broader discussion on incorporation 
of resilience education at the undergraduate, graduate, and professional levels. These 
improvements will improve consistency between assessment professionals and help 
mitigate introduction of uncertainty of assessor judgments or conflicts of opinion.
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Finally, the MARM should be expanded beyond the MAA engineer function to 
include benchmark categories from all the other assessment functions. Additional data 
from all the functions and across multiple installations should be included to broaden the 
statistical verification and validation that consistency still holds when incorporating 
increased number of functions. This additional information should also be used to 
validate that the tool does outperform, or is at least on par with, the currently utilized 
heuristic based assessment and decision-making process to prioritize projects to improve 
infrastructure resilience decision making. This expanded research should also include 
investigation of the propagation of uncertainty within in the MARM due to SME 
assessment of priority weights and ratings and their impact on the sensitivity of the 
Resilience Scores used to calculate the Cost Impact Scores and drive tradespace analysis 
for project selection decision-making.
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ABSTRACT
The Department of Defense has been mandated to incorporate resilience into its 
assessment, planning, and resourcing of its critical infrastructure. There is a gap between 
this guidance and the ability to identify the resiliency of a military installation as a system 
and identify which improvements would most impact resilience. Based on resilience 
matrix research, the Mission Assurance Resilience Matrix (MARM) was developed to 
close this gap and integrate resilience quantification into the existing infrastructures 
assessment construct. This study extends previous research to verify the usability of the 
MARM as a decision support tool by investigating the impact of uncertainty in this 
model. Monte Carlo simulation was used to conduct a sensitivity analysis of the 
assessment ratings and prioritization of the benchmark categories utilized to calculate the 
scores of the cells in the MARM.
The results of this analysis demonstrate the ability to use sensitivity analysis to 
investigate uncertainty in the MARM, verify the usability of the MARM as a decision 
support tool, highlight the challenges of extending the MARM to the other functions 
within the existing DoD Mission Assurance Assessment, and provide recommendations 
on improvements to the integration and use of the MARM.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A decision support tool is most useful when the impact of underlying uncertainty 
inherent in the model is understood. This study extends previous research to verify the 
usability of the Mission Assurance Resilience Matrix (MARM) a decision support tool 
through analysis of the model’s sensitivity to uncertainty. The MARM is a decision 
support tool developed by Richards et. al based on previous resilience matrix research to 
integrate resilience into the existing Department of Defense (DoD) Mission Assurance 
Assessment (MAA) infrastructure assessment construct. The use of Monte Carlo 
simulation to determine the sensitivity of the cells within the MARM to uncertainty in the 
prioritization and rating of the physical infrastructure benchmark categories identified 
improvements to the MARM as a decision support tool.
Linkov et al. developed a matrix-based assessment procedure for cyber resilience 
based on the National Academy of Sciences definition of resilience as a framework to 
assess the performance of integrated complex systems (Fox-Lent et al. 2015; Linkov et 
al. 2013a; Wood et al. 2019). One goal of the Resilience Matrix (RM) as a guiding 
framework is to organize data collection and facilitate communication (Fox-lent and 
Linkov 2018) since the RM is flexible enough to be used as a screening tool but detailed 
enough to support actionable decision making (Linkov et al. 2013a). RM is a 4x4 matrix 
such that the four columns of the resilience matrix describe the four stages of disaster
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management (plan/prepare, absorb/withstand, recover, adapt). The rows describe the four 
general management domains of a complex system, (physical, information, cognitive, and 
social), as described in the US Army’s Network-Centric Warfare doctrine (Alberts and 
Hayes 2005). The RM integrates assessment of resilience at the functional and system 
levels, so that the evaluation is not solely based on the features of the infrastructure and 
helps decision makers answer the question “ How is the system’s ability to [plan/prepare 
for, absorb, recover from, adapt to] a cyber disruption implemented in the [physical, 
information, cognitive, social] domain? ”(Linkov et al. 2013a). This RM methodology 
has been applied to several different infrastructure systems; cyber (Linkov et al. 2013b), 
energy (Roege et al. 2014), coastal and community resilience assessment (Fox-Lent et al. 
2015), urban resilience planning (Fox-lent and Linkov 2018), and reservoir operations 
(Mustajoki and Marttunen 2019).
The RM methodology is highly applicable to military infrastructure assessments 
due to the unique, complex, and highly integrated nature of military infrastructure as a 
system of systems. Richards et. al adapted the RM construct to develop the MARM to 
incorporate resilience measurement and quantification into the existing DoD MAA 
framework for infrastructure assessment. The MARM was developed for the physical 
infrastructure subset of mission assurance benchmarks assessed by the engineer function 
with the objective to expand the methodology to all 23 functions within the DoD MAA 
framework. Additionally, the MARM methodology extends the RM framework by 
automating the decision support tool framework and resilience assessment process.
The MARM differs in three significant respects from the RM framework that 
supports the investigation of uncertainty in the MARM through sensitivity analysis,
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which has not been previously done with the RM framework. First, each cell in the RM is 
constructed from metrics specified for that cell that can be independent from the other 
cells and utilizes a linear function scaled from 0 to 10 to determine the score in each cell 
(Fox-lent and Linkov 2018). This could lead to the incorporation of up to sixteen 
different units of measure throughout the matrix, making it a challenge to compare the 
impact of uncertainty throughout the matrix through sensitivity analysis. Conversely, the 
MARM was constructed from benchmark categories that all apply a common qualitative 
assessment that is converted to a unitless and similarly scaled quantitative resilience 
matrix cell score. These cell score qualities support the conduct of analysis of the 
sensitivity of the resilience cells to the uncertainty of the assessment of the category 
ratings and priority weights.
Second, this similarity of unitless and scale throughout the matrix also allows for 
the flexibility to combine benchmark categories into cells of the MARM according to the 
assessment team’s determination of where the benchmark category best fits. The RM 
methodology does allow for combination of multiple metrics within a cell, but only if the 
units and scale were similar (Fox-Lent et al. 2015). The MARM’s structure to incorporate 
multiple benchmarks into one cell provides flexibility but leads to the task of determining 
the best method to combine the individual scores in a cell of the MARM, either a 
summation or an average of the individual category scores. Sensitivity analysis was used 
in this study to investigate this difference in cell score calculation methodology.
Finally, the overall system resilience in the RM framework is determined from the 
aggregation of the sixteen metrics that result from multi-criteria decision analysis 
methods (Heinimann and Hatfield 2017). A system with robust safeguards where all
elements of the resultant matrix have been addressed can be considered to be highly 
resilient. In contrast, a lack of attention to one or more elements in the resilience matrix 
would indicate a point of vulnerability, which may be used to direct attention to improve 
the security of the system as a whole (Zussblatt et al. 2017). Similarly, for an 
infrastructure system to be considered using the MARM methodology, every category 
within each cell would need to be rated in its ideal condition for the system be considered 
resilient. The realities of operating in a fiscally constrained environment lead to the 
opportunity to utilize the MARM to support a tradespace analysis of the impact of 
potential projects that would improve certain benchmark categories as part of decision 
analysis during the project selection process. In this regard, the MARM is more than just 
a tracker for whether a benchmark category meets its metrics, but also seeks to scale the 
prioritization and closeness of the benchmark to its metrics that creates a tradespace to 
support decision making and resource allocation.
1.1. MISSION ASSURANCE RESILIENCE MATRIX CONSTRUCT
The Department of Defense (DoD) uses the Mission Assurance Assessment 
(MAA) benchmarks for the basis of assessing its installations to meet its mandate to 
incorporate resilience measurement and quantification into its existing decision-making 
framework (Department of Defense 2018c). The MAA framework divides the assessment 
into twenty-three distinct functions, such as antiterrorism, physical security, and 
emergency management, with each function comprised of multiple categories to be 
assessed, for a total of over 200 benchmark categories. Responsibilities for assessing the 
functions are assigned to members of the assessment team depending on their expertise.
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The specific benchmarks utilized for this study are taken from the DoD Mission 
Assurance Benchmarks dated 28 March 2018, which are unclassified but designated as 
For Official Use Only (FOUO) (Department of Defense 2018c). Therefore, they cannot 
be published in this article in full, but the broad categories and representative 
identification numbers are summarized and implemented in this paper to allow for easier 
connection back to the base document. Assessment reports are created for military 
installations and provide important input for leaders to understand risk, inform the 
development of specific requirements for future infrastructure projects, and assist in 
making decisions about which ones to fund.
The MARM was developed to close the gap between the guidance for the Army 
to address resilience in its assessment process and the fact that the current assessment 
process does not specifically nor directly assess resilience. There is currently not a direct 
method to identify the resiliency of a military installation as a system nor identify which 
improvements would impact resilience the most. The MARM was developed to convert 
qualitative infrastructure assessment data into quantitative data that can be analyzed and 
presented in a format that improves the visualization of the cost-benefits of potential 
infrastructure improvement projects and allow leaders to understand the influence on 
resilience that one project may have on multiple functions or systems (Richards et al. 
n.d.). The MARM was built by categorizing a subset of 41 of the Mission Assurance 
Benchmark Categories (Department of Defense 2018c) most pertinent to military 
installation infrastructure resilience based on input from subject matter experts from the 
US Army Africa Deputy Chief of Staff Engineer (USARAF DCSENG) section. To 
identify the role that each benchmark plays in resilience, each benchmark category was
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further categorized based on its description and metrics into one of the sixteen cells 
within a resilience matrix (Table 1). For example, the Antiterrorism benchmark AT-19 
was deemed to best relate to the cognitive domain within the prepare phase. All 
benchmark categories were included in the categorization and placed where they most 
logically fit into the matrix, which led to an imbalance of categories within the cells.
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Table 1. Example Mission Assurance Categories to Resilience Matrix Categorization.
Prepare Absorb Recover Adapt

































Fire Protection Infrastructure (FP)
Heating, Ventilation, Air Conditioning (HVAC) 
Munition Operations (MO)




The model was built to convert the qualitative ratings of Black (B), Red (R), 
Amber (A), and Green (G), identified for each category by the assessment team into a
quantitative value using a qualitative assessment conversion factor (Table 2). Previous 
research using resilience matrix methodology found that users identified a weakness 
when all categories are treated similarly (Mustajoki and Marttunen 2019), which was 
reinforced through discussions with the USARAF DCSENG subject matter experts. To 
account for the fact that decision makers do not prioritize all categories equally, a priority 
weight factor, similar to the priority matrix developed to model resilience time 
(Ramachandran et al. 2015), was incorporated (Table 3). It is the uncertainty in the 
assessment of these qualitative ratings and priority weight factors that are the focus of the 
sensitivity analysis conducted in this study.
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The Benchmark Score was calculated for each category using the converted 
quantitative factors and Equation (1). A larger Benchmark Score indicates a category 
with a poor condition at a higher importance.
Benchm ark Score = Quantitative A ssessm ent Conversion x  Priority W eight Factor (1)
In an ideal installation assessment, every benchmark category, no matter its 
priority, would be assessed as “Green” and its Benchmark Score would equal its priority 
weight as per Equation (2).
Benchm ark Ideal Score = W eight x  1 ("Green") (2)
This allows for the calculation of the difference from the ideal score (Delta from 
Ideal) using Equation (3) for each benchmark category, which is then mapped back into 
the MARM for which an example is provided in Table 4.
Delta from  Ideal = Benchm ark Score -  Benchm ark Ideal Score (3)
A Delta from Ideal score equal to zero means that the benchmark category is 
assessed as “Green” and cannot be improved. A larger Delta from Ideal score indicates 
that category is further from ideal and may have a large negative impact on resilience if 
not improved.
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Physical 0 3 8 5







Information 6 2 3 9
4 0 0 2
4 5






Social 8 6 8 0
4 12
M o s t  c e lls  in  th e  M A R M  c o n ta in e d  m u lt ip le  b e n c h m a rk  c a te g o rie s , so  th e  C ell 
S c o re  w a s  c a lc u la te d  as th e  s u m m a tio n  o f  th e  in d iv id u a l b e n c h m a rk  D e l ta  f ro m  Id ea l 
s c o re s  f ro m  e a c h  c a te g o ry  in  th e  ce ll u s in g  E q u a tio n  (4 ). T h is  m e th o d  c a p tu re s  th e  im p a c t  
th a t  th e  c a te g o rie s  w ith  th e  h ig h e s t  p r io r ity  th a t  w e re  fu r th e s t  f ro m  id e a l w o u ld  h a v e  o n  
th e  C e ll S co re . T h e  s u m m a tio n  o f  th e  b e n c h m a rk  D e l ta  f ro m  Id ea l sc o re s  w a s  s e le c te d  
ra th e r  th a n  th e  a v e ra g e  to  m a in ta in  th e  im p a c t  o f  c a te g o r ie s  th a t  a re  b o th  h ig h ly  w e ig h te d  
a n d  a  s ig n if ic a n t  d if fe re n c e  b e tw e e n  th e ir  a s se s se d  sc o re  a n d  id ea l sco re . F o r  e x a m p le , i f  
a  c a te g o ry  w a s  d e e m e d  to  b e  a  p r io r ity  “ 5” a n d  a s se s se d  “B la c k ” b u t  w a s  a v e ra g e d  w ith  
se v e ra l c a te g o rie s  th a t  h a v e  a  lo w e r  p r io r ity  a n d  a s se s s e d  “ G re e n ” , th e  im p a c t  o f  th e  h ig h  
p r io r ity  c a te g o ry  w o u ld  b e  lo st.
C e ll  S c o r e  =  = f = 1 B e n c h m a r k  D e l t a  f r o m  I d e a l  (4 )
T h e  ce ll s c o re s  w e re  a g g re g a te d  to  c re a te  th e  In itia l M is s io n  A s s u ra n c e  R e s ilie n c e  
M a tr ix  (T a b le  5). In  th is  e x a m p le , th e  C o g n it iv e -P re p a re  is  th e  fu r th e s t  f ro m  id e a l a n d  th e  
C o g n itiv e -A b s o rb  a n d  S o c ia l-A d a p t a re  a lre a d y  a t id ea l, so  th e y  d o  n o t  w a r ra n t  fu r th e r  
a tte n tio n .
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T a b le  5. E x a m p le  M A R M .
Prepare Absorb Recover Adapt
Physical 3.00 27.00 8.00 15.00
Information 14.00 2.00 8.00 11.00
Cognitive 36.00 10.00 0.00 25.00
Social 12.00 6.00 20.00 0.00
T h e  q u a n tif ic a tio n  o f  th e s e  q u a li ta t iv e  a s se s s m e n ts  in to  a  u n itle s s  a n d  s im ila rly  
s c a le d  C e ll S c o re  a llo w  fo r  th e  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  se n s it iv ity  a n a ly s is  to  u n d e rs ta n d  th e
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impact of uncertainty within the assessment of benchmark category priority weights and 
ratings. Previous research identified that while there was no evidence of a significant 
amount of uncertainty and differences of opinion, subject matter judgement may have an 
impact on the MARM methodology that should be further investigated (Richards and 
Long n.d.).
1.2. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
The benefits of sensitivity analysis on the MARM are to gain basic insight on the 
system, to indicate whether the model operates as intended, to identify the key 
components of the model that require further calibration and/or study, and to assess the 
relative importance of input variables for guidance in data collection and model 
calibration (Manache and Melching 2008). To achieve this, a global, all-at-a-time 
sensitivity analysis for decision-making (Pianosi et al. 2016) was used to analyze the 
impact of uncertainty arising from an assessment team’s selection of the benchmark 
category weights and criteria within the model to verify the consistency of the MARM 
with expected real-world behavior. Sensitivity analysis explores the relationships 
between the output and the inputs of a modeling application and is crucial to the 
verification, validation, and calibration of numerical models. It can be used to check the 
robustness of the final outcome against slight changes in the input data and can help 
reduce uncertainty in multi-criteria decision-making and the stability of its outputs by 
illustrating the impact of introducing small changes to specific input parameters on 
evaluation outcomes (Chen et al. 2010). The MARM, constructed as a quantitative 
conversion of the qualitative assessment priority and ratings into a singular score, is a
good candidate for sensitivity analysis to determine relations between parameters and 
outputs of a simulation model (Norton 2015).
Sensitivity analysis was used to determine how the scores in the resilience cells of 
the MARM changed due to uncertainty in the starting conditions, i.e. the benchmark 
category weights and ratings, in order to improve the decision making process by 
identifying the critical criteria and then reevaluating more accurately the weights of these 
criteria since in this model, there is subjectivity causing difficulty in accurately 
representing the importance of these criteria (Triantaphyllou and Sanchez 1997). This 
information will be useful in decision making since it explains synthetically how much 
the assessment may be biased by the assessor judgements (Zavadskas et al. 2007). In 
typical optimization applications, uncertainty is considered a potentially harmful factor 
and the aim of analysis is to explore and discover the degree of sensitivity of the optimal 
solution to changes in key factors. An insensitive solution is considered advantageous 
(Munoz et al. 2016). Since the MARM is not an optimization tool, but rather an 
assessment and decision support tool, it is intended to be sensitive to allow the initial 
conditions to determine which cell in the matrix is the furthest from ideal and needs the 
most attention to conduct projects to bring it to the ideal state. Sensitivity analysis was 
utilized to determine how the model as originally constructed responds to the uncertainty 
in assessment of benchmark category priority weights and ratings as well as applied to 
assess the difference between the summation versus average of benchmark category cells
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in each resilience matrix cell.
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1.3. MONTE CARLO SIMULATION
Based on the construction of the MARM and its design to be a decision-support 
tool, the exploration of the sensitivity of the cells within the MARM due to uncertainty of 
the assessments is very suitable for Monte Carlo simulation (Van Hoey et al. 2014). This 
is similar to the approach that Nguyen et. al took with development of resilience indices 
for Multi Echelon Assembly Supply Chains (MEASC), though that research sought to 
optimize the supply chain network. Both the supply chain resilience indices and the 
MARM can help decision makers make the trade-off between resilience and cost 
(Nguyen et al. 2020).
The impact of these assumptions on the sensitivity of the ranking of the overall 
Cell Score for the sixteen cells in the MARM was captured by creating a frequency 
histogram for the ranking of each MARM cell from 1 (the highest cell score in the 
MARM) to 16 (lowest cell score in the MARM) for 1000 trials in each simulation. The 
highest scores in the MARM indicate the cells that need the most attention to improve 
resilience and the lowest scores would need the least attention.
The first set of Monte Carlo simulations compared the difference in sensitivity in 
the MARM between using a summation of individual benchmark category Delta from 
Ideal scores versus an average of those scores in each cell of the MARM. The MARM 
methodology uses the summation of the benchmark scores within a cell to facilitate the 
comparison of resilience assessment across the matrix as well as support the project 
selection tradespace analysis. The RM framework allows combining of metrics in a cell 
by either averaging or using a weighted sum of multiple metrics after the individual
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metrics have been contextualized with a linear utility function (Fox-Lent et al. 2015).
This study investigates the differences between the two methodologies.
A uniform distribution was assumed for the selection of priority weights from 1 to 
5 and the rating of each category, G, A, R, and B (quantified from 1 to 4 respectively) 
which were used to compute the Benchmark Score (Equation 1), Benchmark Ideal Score 
(Equation 2), and Delta from Ideal (Equation 3). The first Monte Carlo simulation 
utilized Equation (4) to calculate each Cell Score from the sum of the individual 
benchmark category Delta from Ideal scores within the cell, since this method was 
selected in the original development of the MARM to capture the impact of categories 
that are both highly weighted and a significant difference between their assessed score 
and ideal score. The second Monte Carlo simulation employed an average of the 
benchmark category Delta from Ideal scores to compute the Cell Score using Equation
(5).
_  . .  _  V f .- ,  Benchm ark Delta from  Ideal
C e l l  S c o r e  =  -----------------------------
Num ber o f  C ategories in Cell
(5)
For example, if a category was deemed to be a priority “5” and assessed “Black” 
there would be a distinction between how that score would impact the Resilience Cell 
Score if added to the others versus averaged with several categories that have a lower 
priority and assessed “Green”. The calculation of the average of the scores would mute 
the impact of the higher priority, lower assessed categories.
A second set of the Monte Carlo simulations were run to investigate the impact of 
using a non-uniform distribution of the frequency of the priority weight and rating based 
on data extracted from an actual Mission Assurance Assessment recently completed by 
the USARAF DCSENG section (Tables 6 and 7). Though not a robust data set, the
127
analysis illuminates the impact of potential bias within the assessment process that will 
lead to the result that a uniform distribution is not the most accurate depiction of the 
probability of occurrence for the weights and ratings selected by a real-world assessment 
team. The analysis supports the logical conclusion that due to operations maintenance 
and funding as well as regular capital improvement projects, not all benchmark category 
ratings will be evenly distributed from Black to Green, and in fact, a significant 
proportion of the infrastructure will be in decent to good shape. Also, without a function 
to force assessors to evenly distribute the prioritization of the benchmark categories, they 
may tend to weight more categories higher.
Table 6. Case Study Benchmark Category Priority Weight Frequencies.












The final set of Monte Carlo simulations investigated the impact of changing the 
MARM to include an equal number of benchmark categories in each cell to compare the 
results of the previous simulations to a resilience matrix where all the cells have the same




For each Monte Carlo simulation, the results are shown for selected representative 
cells of the MARM, one for each of the number of categories in a cell (since there were 
multiple MARM cells that contained three, two, or one benchmark categories, which all 
behaved similarly in each simulation the results of a representative cell is shown). Each 
of the columns in the results table represent one example of a MARM cell with that 
number of benchmark categories and includes the number of benchmark categories, the 
results for the Mean Resilience Cell Score with its standard deviation, the Mean 
Resilience Cell Rank within the MARM for each trial with standard deviation, since the 
standard deviation is an important measure of the uncertainty involved (Fagerholt et al. 
2010). The results for each simulation also include the frequency of that cell in the top 
quartile and bottom quartile of the rankings, as well as the percent of trials that the Cell 
Score equaled zero, “ideal”. For the top quartile, each simulation collected the frequency 
that the category was in the top four rankings. For the bottom quartile, there was a 
significant difference between the simulations assuming a uniform distribution versus the 
case study distribution. For the uniform distribution, the bottom quartile generally aligned 
with the bottom four rankings (13-16), while for the case study frequency distribution, 
due to the higher frequency of categories in each trial having an ideal score, the bottom 
quartile generally aligned with the bottom seven rankings (10-16). Additionally, a
frequency histogram was built to display the distributional pattern for the number of 
occurrences for each ranking of each of the selected cells across the 1000 trials in the 
simulation with a rank of 1 = highest Resilience Cell Score in the MARM and furthest 
from ideal, the rank of 16 = lowest Resilience Cell Score in the MARM and the 
histogram displayed for each representative cell.
The first Monte Carlo simulation selected the benchmark category priority 
weights and ratings from a uniform distribution and totaled the benchmark categories 
within the cell to determine the Cell Score. From this simulation, the MARM is shown to 
be insensitive to uncertainty in the weights and ratings (Table 8). The cells containing the 
highest number of categories (Physical-Absorb and Cognitive-Prepare) dominate the 
model, appear almost exclusively in the top quartile (96.80% and 85.80% respectively), 
do not have any occurrences of having an Ideal Cell Score, have a significantly higher 
Mean Resilience Cell Score, and standard deviation than the cells containing only one or 
two categories. Those cells containing only one or two categories are dominated, appear 
disproportionally in the bottom quartile of the rankings, and have a significantly lower 
Mean Resilience Score and much higher Mean Resilience Cell Rank, indicating they will 
also be the low priority. The frequencies shown in Figure 1 graphically display the 
skewed results and the insensitivity of the MARM as originally constructed under the 
assumption of a uniform distribution of weights and ratings.
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Categories in Cell 1 2 3 6 8
Mean Resilience Cell Score 4.61 8.97 13.35 26.98 36.19
Standard Deviation 4.36 6.25 7.44 10.37 12.05
Mean Resilience Cell Rank 11.73 8.77 6.52 2.50 1.51
Standard Deviation 3.46 3.97 3.67 1.82 1.11
Frequency Top Quartile (1-4) 3.00% 18.00% 41.20% 85.80% 96.80%
Frequency Bottom Quartile (13-16) 51.80% 22.00% 6.10% 0.50% 0.00%
Ideal Percent 25.60% 6.30% 1.50% 0.00% 0.00%
Social-Adapt 700 Social-Recover 700 Information-Recover
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Figure. 1. Simulation 1: Cell Ranking Frequency. Total Cell Score with Varying 
Categories per Cell (Uniform Distribution).
The second Monte Carlo simulation selected the benchmark category priority 
weights and ratings from a uniform distribution but averaged the benchmark categories 
within the cell to determine the Cell Score. From this simulation, the MARM is also 
shown to be insensitive to uncertainty in the weights and ratings, but in a different 
manner from the first simulation. The cells containing only one category dominate the 
model, appear disproportionally in both the top and bottom quartiles, and have a much
higher standard deviation of Mean Resilience Scores (Table 9). The Mean Resilience 
Cell Scores and Cell Ranks are much closer across the varying number of categories per 
cell, but the frequencies shown in Figure 2 graphically display how the distribution of the 
rankings results in the insensitivity of the MARM utilizing the average category 
benchmark Delta from Ideal Score under the assumption of a uniform distribution of 
weights and ratings. As in the summation of the Cell Scores, the Physical-Absorb and 
Cognitive-Prepare cells do not have any occurrences of Ideal Cell Scores.
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Categories in Cell 1 2 3 6 8
Mean Resilience Cell Score 4.51 4.58 4.49 4.41 4.37
Standard Deviation 4.25 2.95 2.56 1.63 1.51
Mean Resilience Cell Rank 8.76 7.97 8.18 7.92 8.05
Standard Deviation 5.40 4.51 4.21 3.30 3.09
Frequency Top Quartile (1-4) 30.40% 29.30% 22.60% 19.60% 14.30%
Frequency Bottom Quartile (13-16) 34.20% 22.70% 18.30% 8.60% 7.30%
Ideal Percent 24.60% 6.20% 1.80% 0.00% 0.00%
The third and fourth Monte Carlo simulations employed the case study frequency 
distributions and the results mirrored those using the uniform distribution whether using 
the total or average benchmark category Delta from Ideal scores (Figures 3 and 4), just 
with a lower Mean Resilience Score and much higher Ideal Percent due to the higher 
frequency of “Green” ratings in the case study data than would be from a uniform 
distribution. This indicates that for either assumption of the distribution of priority 
weights and ratings, uniform or from the case study frequency, the MARM is insensitive
to their uncertainty. This shows the impact of potential bias from the assessment team 
and further reinforces the insensitivity in the MARM as initially constructed.
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Figure. 2. Simulation 2: Cell Ranking Frequency. Average Cell Score with Varying 










2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
700 Social-Recover 700






1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Infoimation-Recover 
(3 Categories)
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Figure. 3. Simulation 3: Cell Ranking Frequency. Total Cell Score with Varying 
Categories per Cell (Case Study Frequency Distribution).
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Figure. 4. Simulation 4: Cell Ranking Frequency. Average Cell Score with Varying 
Categories per Cell (Case Study Frequency Distribution).
The final set of Monte Carlo simulations investigated the difference in sensitivity 
in the MARM if each cell was forced to contain the same number of benchmark 
categories. The number of benchmark categories incorporated into the MARM was 
reduced from the original 41 to 32 and redistributed evenly throughout the matrix so that 
each cell would have two categories. Two Monte Carlo simulations were run on this 
adjusted MARM, both times using the assumption of a uniform distribution for the 
weights and ratings but either taking the total (Table 10 and Figure 5) or average (Table 
11 and Figure 6) of the benchmark category Delta from Ideal Scores to calculate the Cell 
Score to compare the results between sets of Monte Carlo Simulations. Changing the 
model to where each cell in the MARM is forced to have the same number of categories 
makes the MARM sensitive to the uncertainty of benchmark category priority weights 
and ratings. The Mean Resilience Cell Score and its standard deviation, along with the 
Mean Resilience Cell Rank and standard deviation are all similar across all cells in the 
adjusted MARM model (Tables 10 and 11). The frequency of distribution of the cells in
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the top and bottom quartile are also similar across the adjusted MARM model (Figures 5 
and 6).
This sensitivity holds true whether the model uses the total or average of the 
benchmark categories for the Cell Score. Comparing Tables 10 and 11, the only 
significant difference is in the Mean Resilience Cell Score, which is about half when 
taking the average as opposed to the total benchmark category Delta from Ideal scores.












Categories in Cell 2 2 2 2 2
Mean Resilience Cell Score 8.972 8.776 8.97 8.84 8.97
Standard Deviation 6.10 6.09 5.98 6.12 6.15
Mean Resilience Cell Rank 8.16 8.31 8.04 8.19 8.10
Standard Deviation 4.52 4.59 4.54 4.53 4.55
Frequency Top Quartile (1-4) 26.40% 25.60% 27.60% 27.10% 27.70%
Frequency Bottom Quartile (13-16) 21.50% 23.80% 20.20% 22.80% 21.50%
Ideal Percent 2.90% 2.90% 3.70% 3.40% 3.20%
Social-Adapt 200 Social-Recover 200 Information-Recover
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Cognitive-Prepare 200 Physical-Absorb
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Figure. 5. Simulation 5: Cell Ranking Frequency. Total Cell Score with Two Categories
per Cell (Uniform Distribution).
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This sensitivity holds true whether the model uses the total or average of the 
benchmark categories for the Cell Score. Comparing Tables 10 and 11, the only 
significant difference is in the Mean Resilience Cell Score, which is about half when 
taking the average as opposed to the total benchmark category Delta from Ideal scores.












Categories in Cell 2 2 2 2 2
Mean Resilience Cell Score 4.47 4.59 4.38 4.59 4.46
Standard Deviation 3.02 3.06 2.98 3.09 3.11
Mean Resilience Cell Rank 8.17 7.97 8.31 7.92 8.16
Standard Deviation 4.56 4.60 4.52 4.50 4.66
Frequency Top Quartile (1-4) 27.90% 29.00% 26.10% 27.40% 28.20%
Frequency Bottom Quartile (13-16) 22.90% 21.90% 23.20% 19.60% 23.20%
Ideal Percent 7.00% 6.70% 6.40% 6.70% 6.70%
Figure. 6. Simulation 6: Cell Ranking Frequency. Average Cell Score with Two 
Categories per Cell (Uniform Distribution).
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3. DISCUSSION
The MARM, as originally constructed with the number of benchmark categories 
varying by cell based on categorization of the benchmark descriptions and each 
Resilience Cell Score calculated from the total of its individual Delta from Ideal Scores, 
leads to a model that is insensitive to uncertainty in the benchmark category weights and 
ratings. This result holds whether the priority weights are selected from a uniform 
distribution (Simulation 1) or using the frequency distribution from the case study data 
(Simulation 3). The result of this insensitivity is that the cells containing the highest 
number of benchmark categories almost always have the largest Resilience Cell Scores 
and would draw the most attention from decision makers using the MARM as a decision 
support tool. The MARM cells with the fewest benchmark categories will nearly always 
be near the bottom of the cell rankings, no matter how high the priority weight it was 
given or how poorly rated the condition of the benchmark, leading to that cell likely not 
receiving the attention of decision makers.
Changing the MARM model to use the average of the benchmark category Delta 
from Ideal scores still yields an insensitive model whether using a uniform (Simulation 2) 
or frequency (Simulation 4) distribution of the benchmark category priority weights and 
ratings, but changes the dynamics, whereby the MARM cells with the fewest categories 
results in a bimodal distribution (approximately 30% in each of the top and bottom 
quartiles) while the MARM cells with the most categories show a more normal
distribution of results.
While insensitivity might be acceptable and even desired in an optimization 
application, the desire is for the MARM model to be sensitive to uncertainty in the 
benchmark category priority weights and ratings. Since the benchmark category priority 
weights and ratings are independent, the MARM resilience cell ranking should have a 
uniform distribution allowing the cells to be sensitive to the results of the assessment of 
priority weights and ratings for each of the benchmark categories so that the categories 
given a higher priority or a worse rating impact the MARM and drive decisions. 
Therefore, the insensitivity in the model as constructed leads to inherent bias in the model 
and is undesirable.
When the model was changed to limit each cell in the MARM to only two 
categories, the model does become sensitive to uncertainty in benchmark category 
weights and ratings, and the difference between using the total or average Cell Score is 
eliminated. The simulations run with the uniform distribution of priority weights and 
ratings show a very even distribution of the frequency of the ranking of each category 
whether using the total or average of the benchmark categories to calculate the Resilience 





The results of this study demonstrate that sensitivity analysis is useful and 
applicable for investigating uncertainty within the MARM due to methodology used to
convert the qualitative benchmark category assessments into a unitless and similarly 
scaled quantitative assessment. The results indicate that there is not a significant 
difference in the sensitivity of the model to use the total or average of the benchmark 
scores to calculate the Resilience Cell score, so that does not need to be changed in the 
MARM. This result is significant because the aggregation of category scores within a cell 
supports the use of the MARM as a tradespace analysis tool.
The results of the Monte Carlo sensitivity analysis indicate that the model as 
originally constructed is insensitive and biased by the unequal number of categories 
assigned to various cells within the MARM. Changing the MARM to force all cells to 
have an equal number of benchmark categories to determine the resilience score would 
eliminate that insensitivity and improve the MARM that is uniformly sensitive to 
uncertainty in the prioritization and rating of the benchmark categories.
The insensitivity of the model highlights the challenge of trying to integrate a 
resilience matrix into the existing mission assurance framework and expand the MARM 
model to encompass the entire set of 200 individual benchmark categories within the 
DoD MAA construct to determine the overall resilience of an infrastructure system. In 
the original RM created by Linkov et. al, all cells in RM must meet its metric to be 
considered resilient. This is straightforward when integrating one metric for each of the 
sixteen cells in the RM, but becomes more challenging as more metrics are added to each 
cell. This large amount of data to incorporate leads to critical questions of which 
categories should be mapped to the MARM and which, if any, should be excluded? How 
much flexibility, discretion, and guidance should be given to the individual assessment 
teams to select benchmark categories to include in the MARM to assess infrastructure
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resilience or should it be centralized and standardized? What flexibility and guidance 
should be given on how assessment teams should map the benchmark categories to the 
MARM? Further investigation of the usability of the MARM in light of these questions is 
required to validate the model.
4.2. FUTURE WORK
The next step in incorporating the MARM into the DoD MAA framework is to 
categorize the entire set of over 200 benchmark categories to the MARM while forcing 
each cell to have an equal number of benchmark categories. This will entail difficult 
decisions on which categories to include and which to leave out, since there may not be 
an even distribution across the matrix. Fox and Linkov cautions that forcing everything 
into the assessment can lead to over-weighting specific processes within the assessment 
(although the cellular structure of the matrix will minimize that effect) (Fox-lent and 
Linkov 2018). Additional analysis will be needed to verify and validate the feasibility of 
incorporating the larger amount of data and an equal number of categories into the 
MARM or if separate sets of MARM should be created to capture the various functions 
and missions of the system.
Another step will be to incorporate a more robust set of actual MAA data to 
determine if there is a difference in the sensitivity due to using different distribution 
assumptions to determine if the MARM would be biased to specific cells, i.e. categories 
in specific cells tend to have a higher priority and/or assessed at a specific rating.
Finally, this study did not incorporate cost uncertainty and its impact on the 
potential use of the MARM as a tradespace decision support tool. Exploring how to
139
incorporate cost uncertainty and its impact on the MARM as a decision tool will be 
crucial to validating its applicability to assessment practitioners.
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SECTION
2. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
2.1. CONCLUSIONS
This research contributes to closing the gap in resilience education within 
engineering management education, addresses gaps in the current DoD infrastructure 
assessment and decision-making framework, and extends the literature in several unique 
and novel aspects.
2.1.1. Engineering Management Education. The first contribution of this 
research identified the gaps of how and where modeling under uncertainty, infrastructure 
systems management, and resilient systems are integrated into standard undergraduate 
and graduate engineering management curriculum. Currently, there is no formal 
methodology for which to evaluate undergraduate or graduate engineering programs in 
their incorporation of a multidisciplinary approach to instruction of infrastructure 
resilience topics. In fact, the trend is for infrastructure resilience to be siloed into graduate 
civil engineering programs and not strongly linked to faculty and/or research centers.
This is detrimental to the DoD’s ability to cultivate engineer managers with the requisite 
skills to incorporate resilience into infrastructure assessment and decision making and 
may contribute to inconsistency and uncertainty within the infrastructure assessment 
framework.
Based on the nature of the discipline, engineering managers are uniquely postured 
to lead the design, analysis and response to improving the resilience of complex and
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multidisciplinary infrastructure systems. This posture makes it critical they possess the 
requisite skills to integrate resilience into decision making processes and frameworks.
The information from this research enables engineering management programs ensure 
that the future workforce has the necessary instruction regarding the implementation of 
tools and techniques to improve infrastructure resilience. These include combining a 
topic mix of design and analysis of resilient infrastructure systems with disaster response 
in the curriculum, incorporating a multidisciplinary approach, and integrating research 
into classroom instruction.
Finally, this research will extend literature on infrastructure resilience education 
with the identification of five dimensions upon which to assess EM programs to detect 
trends and gaps in infrastructure resilience education, both current and future.
2.1.2. Mission Assurance Resilience Matrix Development. The second 
contribution of this research is to quantify resilience from current human-expert centered 
qualitative decision-making methods, which removes subjectivity from the decision­
making process. This, combined with the ability to conduct tradespace analysis, will 
facilitate and improve selection of potential infrastructure improvement projects. This 
research developed and demonstrated the use of the Mission Assurance Resilience Matrix 
(MARM), a visual and interactive tool that converts the existing qualitative infrastructure 
assessments completed as required by the DoD Mission Assurance Strategy into a 
quantitative decision support tool. This tool provides consistency across the infrastructure 
assessment framework and enables decision makers to visualize where the installation
infrastructure is deficient in terms of resiliency and then assess where to most efficiently
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a llo c a te  l im ite d  re s o u rc e s  to  im p ro v e  c ritic a l m il ita ry  in f ra s tru c tu re  sy s te m s  to  im p ro v e  
th e  in f ra s tru c tu re  re s ilie n c y .
T h is  to o l e x te n d s  p re v io u s  re s i lie n c e  m a tr ix  m e th o d o lo g y  a n d  a p p lie s  i t  in  a  n o v e l 
w a y . In  p re v io u s  a p p lic a tio n s  o f  th e  re s i lie n c e  m a tr ix  m e th o d o lo g y , d ire c t  c o m p a r is o n  o f  
in d iv id u a l c e lls  in  th e  m a tr ix  w a s  p ro b le m a tic , s in c e  th e  s c o rin g  o f  ce lls  c o u ld  b e  b u ilt  o n  
in d e p e n d e n t a n d  u n re la te d  u n its  a n d  sca lin g . T h e  M A R M  c o n v e rts  th e  q u a li ta t iv e  
in f ra s tru c tu re  a s se s s m e n t d a ta  in to  u n itle s s  a n d  s im ila r ly  sc a le d  c e lls  w ith in  th e  m a tr ix  so  
i t  c a n  b e  u s e d  as  a  d e c is io n  s u p p o rt to o l to  c o m p a re  a n d  p r io r it iz e  in f ra s tru c tu re  
im p ro v e m e n t p ro je c ts  th ro u g h  tra d e s p a c e  a n a ly s is . I t  a lso  e x te n d s  p re v io u s  tra d e s p a c e  
a n a ly s is  l ite ra tu re  o n  th e  a b ility  to  c o m m u n ic a te  th e  im p a c t  o f  p ro je c t  se le c tio n  to  
e n h a n c e  re s i lie n c e  o f  m ilita ry  in f ra s tru c tu re  sy s te m s  a n d  a s s is t  d e c is io n  m a k e rs  in  
u n d e rs ta n d in g  h o w  a  s in g u la r  p ro je c t  m a y  in f lu e n c e  th e  re s i lie n c e  o f  m u ltip le  sy s te m s  
u s in g  th e  tra d e s p a c e  an a ly s is .
2.1.3. Mission Assurance Resilience Matrix Verification and Validation. T h e
th ird  c o n tr ib u tio n  o f  th is  re s e a rc h  w a s  to  im p le m e n t se v e ra l te c h n iq u e s  a c ro ss  tw o  
se p a ra te  s tu d ie s  to  v e r ify  th e  u s e  o f  th e  M A R M  as a n  in f ra s tru c tu re  re s i lie n c e  d e c is io n  
su p p o rt to o l. T h e  f ir s t  s tu d y  u til iz e d  th e  M o d if ie d  D e lp h i M e th o d  to  e x a m in e  th e  a m o u n t 
o f  p o te n tia l  u n c e r ta in ty  in  th e  M A R M  d u e  to  s u b je c t m a tte r  e x p e r t  a s se s s m e n t o f  
b e n c h m a rk  c a te g o ry  p r io r ity  w e ig h ts  a n d  ra t in g s  as w e ll as  v a lid a tin g  th e  h y p o th e s is  th a t  
th e  M A R M  d o e s  p e rfo rm  d if fe re n tly  f ro m  th e  S M E  p ro je c t  s e le c tio n  h e u ris tic s , th o u g h  
fu r th e r  re s e a rc h  m u s t  b e  c o n d u c te d  to  q u a n tify  th e  a m o u n t o f  th a t  im p a c t. T h e  s tu d y  a lso  
in c o rp o ra te d  a  S y s tem  U s a b ili ty  S ca le  to  e s ta b lish  th e  lev e l o f  u s a b il i ty  o f  th e  M A R M  as 
an  in fo rm a tio n  te c h n o lo g y  to o l.
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T h e  se c o n d  s tu d y  in v e s tig a te d  th e  b e h a v io r  o f  th e  M A R M  d u e  to  u n c e r ta in ty  b y  
u s in g  a  M o n te  C a r lo  s im u la tio n  to  c o n d u c t  a  se n s it iv ity  a n a ly s is  o f  th e  p r io r it iz a t io n  an d  
ra t in g s  o f  th e  b e n c h m a rk  c a te g o rie s  im b e d d e d  in to  th e  c e lls  o f  th e  m a tr ix . T h e  M A R M , 
as o r ig in a lly  c o n s tru c te d , is  in se n s itiv e  to  u n c e r ta in ty  in  th e  in d iv id u a l b e n c h m a rk  
c a te g o ry  p r io r ity  w e ig h ts  a n d  ra tin g s , w h ic h  is  p ro b le m a tic . T o  o v e rc o m e  th is  issu e , tw o  
s ig n if ic a n t  im p ro v e m e n ts  w e re  id e n tif ie d ; e x p a n d  th e  M A R M  to  in c lu d e  all fu n c tio n s  
w ith in  th e  D o D  M A A  f ra m e w o rk  a n d  e n su re  th a t  all c e lls  w ith in  th e  M A R M  c o n ta in  an  
e q u a l n u m b e r  o f  b e n c h m a rk  c a te g o rie s .
T h e  re su lts  o f  th e s e  tw o  s tu d ie s  e x te n d  c u rre n t l ite ra tu re  b y  d e m o n s tra t in g  th e  
a b ility  to  u se  s e n s it iv ity  a n a ly s is  to  in v e s tig a te  u n c e r ta in ty  in  th e  M A R M , h ig h lig h tin g  
th e  c h a lle n g e s  o f  in c o rp o ra tin g  th e  M A R M  in to  th e  e n tire  D o D  M is s io n  A ss u ra n c e  
A s s e s s m e n t c o n s tru c t  to  a s se s s  in f ra s tru c tu re  re s ilie n c e , v e r ify in g  th e  u s a b il i ty  o f  th e  
M A R M  as a  c o m p u te r-b a se d , d e c is io n -s u p p o r t  to o l, a n d  id e n tify in g  o p p o r tu n itie s  to  
im p ro v e  th e  in te g ra t io n  a n d  u s e  o f  th e  M A R M  fo r  e x te n s io n  a n d  e x p a n s io n  to  th e  b ro a d e r  
in f ra s tru c tu re  re s i lie n c e  c o m m u n ity .
2.2. RECOMMENDATIONS
T h e  M is s io n  A ss u ra n c e  R e s ilie n c e  M a tr ix  d e v e lo p e d  a n d  v e r if ie d  th ro u g h  th is  
re se a rc h  in te g ra te s  e x is t in g  in fra s tru c tu re  a s se s s m e n t m e th o d s  w ith  e m e rg in g  re s ilie n c e  
re se a rc h  to  e n a b le  m ilita ry  d e c is io n  m a k e rs  to  e a s ily  v isu a liz e  d e f ic ie n c ie s  in  
in f ra s tru c tu re  re s i lie n c e  a n d  a s se s s  w h e re  to  m o s t  e ff ic ie n tly  a llo c a te  re so u rc e s . W h ile  th e  
im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  th is  re s e a rc h  is  s p e c if ic  to  m ilita ry  in s ta lla tio n s , th e  f ra m e w o rk  
d e v e lo p e d  e x p a n d s  th e  m e n u  o f  to o ls  in  th e  m u lti-c r ite r ia l  d e c is io n -m a k in g  p ro c e s s  fo r
in f ra s tru c tu re  sy s te m s  w ith  a  f ra m e w o rk  th a t  c a n  b e  b o th  sp e c if ic  to  an  in d iv id u a l 
in s ta lla tio n  as w e ll as g e n e ra liz a b le  to  v a r io u s  ty p e s  o f  fa c i l i t ie s  w h ic h  c a n  b e  e x te n d e d  to  
a s se s s  th e  re s i l ie n c e  o f  p u b lic  a n d  p r iv a te  n o n -m ili ta ry  in f ra s tru c tu re  sy s te m s. T h e  
f le x ib ility  a n d  a b ility  to  v isu a liz e , b o th  s u p p o r t  th e  D o D ’s m a n d a te  fo r  th e  M is s io n  
A s s u ra n c e  f ra m e w o rk  to  “ c o n ta in  su ff ic ie n t  f le x ib ility  to  e n a b le  its  d e c e n tra l iz e d  
a p p lic a t io n  a c ro s s  d isp a ra te  g e o g ra p h ie s , fu n c tio n a l d o m a in s , p ro g ra m s, a n d  a s se t ty p es , 
a n d  a llo w  fo r  c o n tin u o u s  in n o v a tio n  as th re a ts  a n d  v u ln e ra b il i t ie s  c h a n g e ” (D e p a r tm e n t o f  
D e fe n se  2 0 1 8 a ). T h e  re su lts  o f  th is  d is se r ta tio n , w h ic h  a re  b u i l t  fo r  a  s p e c if ic  in s ta lla tio n , 
a re  b ro a d ly  a p p lic a b le  a n d  c a n  s u p p o rt e n g in e e rs  in  th e  d e s ig n  a n d /o r  m a n a g e m e n t o f  
in f ra s tru c tu re  sy s te m s  to  im p ro v e  re s i l ie n c e  in  an  e f f ic ie n t  m a n n e r . T h is  re se a rc h  
w a rra n ts  fu r th e r  d e v e lo p m e n t to  e x te n d  a n d  e x p a n d  th e  M A R M  to  e n c o m p a ss  th e  e n tire  
D o D  M is s io n  A s s u ra n c e  A s s e s s m e n t f ra m e w o rk  a n d  a p p lic a t io n  a t a ll le v e ls  o f  
in f ra s tru c tu re  a s se s s m e n t th ro u g h o u t  th e  D o D .
2.3. FUTURE WORK
T h e re  a re  se v e ra l o p p o r tu n itie s  to  c o n tin u e  a n d  e x p a n d  a n d  e x te n d  th is  re s e a rc h  
o n  in f ra s tru c tu re  a s se s s m e n t a n d  re s i lie n c e  as b o th  a re  e n d u rin g  a n d  v ita l  e ffo r ts  fo r  th e  
D o D  to  in c o rp o ra te  r e s i l ie n c e  in to  its  in f ra s tru c tu re  e d u c a tio n , a s se s sm e n t, a n d  d e c is io n ­
m a k in g  p ro c e sse s .
2.3.1. Expanding the Resilience Education Study. O n e  a re a  fo r  c o n tin u e d  
re s e a rc h  is  to  e x p a n d  th e  s tu d y  o f  re s i lie n c e  a n d  in f ra s tru c tu re  a s se s s m e n t e d u c a tio n  
b e y o n d  ju s t  A S E M  a n d  A B E T  a c c re d ite d  e n g in e e r in g  m a n a g e m e n t p ro g ra m s. T h e re  a re  a 
s ig n if ic a n t  n u m b e r  o f  a d d itio n a l e n g in e e r in g  p ro g ra m s  a c ro ss  th e  c o u n try  th a t  sh o u ld  b e
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a s se s s e d  u s in g  th e  f ra m e w o rk  d e v e lo p e d  in  th is  re s e a rc h  to  d e te rm in e  a d d itio n a l b e s t  
p ra c tic e s  to  in c o rp o ra te  a c ro ss  th e  e n g in e e r in g  m a n a g e m e n t e d u c a tio n  f ie ld . A d d itio n a lly , 
se v e ra l p ro fe s s io n a l so c ie tie s , F e d e ra l a g e n c ie s , a n d  c o o p e ra tiv e  p ro g ra m s  o ffe r  
p ro fe s s io n a l e d u c a tio n  c o u rse s  o r  p ro g ra m s  in  in f ra s tru c tu re  re s i l ie n c e  w h ic h  o u g h t to  b e  
in c lu d e d  in  th e  e x p a n d e d  a s se s s m e n t o f  in f ra s tru c tu re  re s i lie n c e  e d u c a tio n . C o n d u c tin g  a 
su rv e y  o f  p ra c tic in g  e n g in e e r in g  m a n a g e rs  in  th e  f ie ld  o f  in f ra s tru c tu re  re s i l ie n c e  w ill 
id e n tify  g a p s  in  re s i lie n c e  e d u c a tio n  th a t  n e e d  to  b e  f i l le d  to  a s s is t  th e m  in  th e ir  w o rk , 
su c h  a s  c o n d u c tin g  M is s io n  A s s u ra n c e  A s s e s sm e n ts . I t  is  l ik e ly  th a t  a  la c k  o f  c o n s is te n t  
re s i lie n c e  e d u c a tio n  a n d  t ra in in g  c o n tr ib u te d  to  th e  S M E s  im p le m e n tin g  d iffe rin g  
h e u ris tic s  th ro u g h o u t  th e  M o d if ie d  D e lp h i  M e th o d  p o r tio n  o f  th is  re se a rc h . T h is  w a s  
d e m o n s tra te d  in  th e  v a r ia tio n  o f  th e  a s se s s m e n t o f  b e n c h m a rk  c a te g o ry  ra tin g s , p r io r ity  
w e ig h ts , a n d  le v e l o f  a g re e m e n t.
E x p a n d in g  th e  re s e a rc h  o f  re s i lie n c e  e d u c a tio n  a n d  t ra in in g  w ill  n o t  o n ly  p ro v id e  
a  la rg e r  m e n u  o f  b e s t  p ra c tic e s  f ro m  w h ic h  p ro g ra m s  c a n  in c o rp o ra te  in fra s tru c tu re  
re s ilie n c e , b u t  a lso  p ro v id e  a  m o re  h o lis t ic  lo o k  a t in f ra s tru c tu re  e d u c a tio n  to  id e n tify  
sy s te m  g a p s  a n d  o p p o r tu n itie s  fo r  im p ro v e m e n t a c ro ss  th e  sp e c tru m  o f  e n g in e e r in g  
e d u c a tio n ;  u n d e rg ra d u a te , g ra d u a te , a n d  p ro fe s s io n a l. T h is  w ill  h e lp  im p ro v e  th e  
c o n s is te n c y  o f  im p le m e n ta t io n  o f  re s i l ie n c e  to o ls  a n d  te c h n iq u e s  b y  in fra s tru c tu re  
m a n a g e rs  a n d  d e c is io n m a k e rs .
2.3.2. Validation of an Expanded Mission Assurance Resilience Matrix. T h e
v e r if ic a tio n  o f  th e  u s a b il i ty  o f  th e  M A R M  as a  d e c is io n  s u p p o rt to o l b y  th is  re s e a rc h  
p re s e n ts  th e  o p p o r tu n ity  to  e x p a n d  th e  M A R M  to  a c c o u n t fo r  th e  fu ll c o m p le m e n t o f  
D o D  M A A  fu n c tio n s  c o n s is tin g  o f  o v e r  2 0 0  b e n c h m a rk  c a te g o rie s . T h is  w ill  in v o lv e  f ir s t
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d e te rm in in g  w h ic h  b e n c h m a rk s  a re  th e  m o s t  a p p ro p r ia te  fo r  th e  m e a s u re m e n t an d  
a s se s s m e n t o f  re s ilie n c e . S e c o n d ly , a s  th is  re s e a rc h  d e te rm in e d , i t  m u s t  b e  e n s u re d  th a t  
th e  m a tr ix  is  c o n s tru c te d  so  th a t  i t  is  b a la n c e d  w ith  a n  e q u a l n u m b e r  o f  c a te g o r ie s  p la c e d  
in  e a c h  cell. B a s e d  o n  th e  re su lts  f ro m  o th e r  re se a rc h , th is  c a n  b e  a  c h a lle n g e , w ill  re q u ire  
s ig n if ic a n t  s ta k e h o ld e r  in v o lv e m e n t, a n d  m a y  in v o lv e  th e  c o m b in a tio n  o f  fu n c tio n a l 
a s se s s m e n ts  (F o x - le n t  a n d  L in k o v  2 0 1 8 ; M u s ta jo k i  a n d  M a rttu n e n  2 0 1 9 ). R e p re se n ta t iv e s  
f ro m  th e  D e fe n s e  T h re a t  R e d u c tio n  A g e n c y , w h ic h  h a s  th e  le a d  fo r  th e  J o in t  M is s io n  
A s s u ra n c e  A s s e s s m e n t p ro g ra m , h a v e  e x p re s s e d  in te re s t  in  th e  o u tc o m e s  o f  th is  re se a rc h , 
w h ic h  in d ic a te s  th e re  w ill  b e  s u p p o rt a n d  in p u t a v a ila b le  to  w o rk  th ro u g h  th e  c h a lle n g e s  
o f  e x p a n d in g  th e  M A R M  to  in c o rp o ra te  th e  o th e r  M A A  fu n c tio n s .
O n e  o f  th e  b ig g e s t  c h a lle n g e s  to  e ffe c tiv e  r is k  a s se s s m e n t a n d  m a n a g e m e n t is  th e  
c o s t  to  re p la c e  p ro d u c ts , h a rd e n  th e  sy s te m , o r  c h a n g e  o p e ra tio n a l p ro c e d u re  (L in k o v  e t 
al. 2 0 1 8 ) . T h is  m o d e l in te g ra te s  re s i l ie n c e  a s se s s m e n t a n d  p ro je c t  c o s t  so  th a t  p o te n tia l  
in f ra s tru c tu re  im p ro v e m e n t p ro je c ts  c a n  b e  e v a lu a te d  in  a  tra d e s p a c e  so  p ro je c t  se le c tio n  
c a n  h a v e  th e  g re a te s t  im p a c t  to  m a n a g e  re s i l ie n c e  re s id u a l risk . F u r th e r  w o rk  an d  
a d d itio n a l d a ta  w ill  b e  re q u ire d  to  in c o rp o ra te  n o t  j u s t  th e  im m e d ia te  p ro je c t  co st, b u t  
c o m p le te  l ife  c y c le  c o s t  e s tim a tio n  fa c to rs  in to  th e  M A R M  to  a d d re s s  th e  c h a llen g e .
A n a ly s is  o f  th e  p e rfo rm a n c e  o f  th e  e x p a n d e d  M A R M , in c lu d in g  th e  a d d itio n a l 
p ro je c t  l ife  c y c le  c o s t c o m p o n e n t, m u s t  b e  c o m p le te d  to  v a lid a te  i t  a s  a n  e ffe c tiv e  
d e c is io n  s u p p o rt to o l. I t  w ill b e  e s se n tia l  to  in v e s t ig a te  th e  im p a c t  o f  u n c e r ta in ty  w ith in  
th e  e x p a n d e d  M A R M  th ro u g h  a d d itio n a l se n s it iv ity  a n a ly s is  o r  p o te n tia l ly  th ro u g h  th e  
a p p lic a t io n  o f  c o rre la t io n -b a se d  se n s it iv ity  a n a ly s is  o f  r a n k  tra n s fo rm e d  d a ta  (M a n a c h e  
a n d  M e lc h in g  2 0 0 8 ). P re v io u s  re s e a rc h  sh o w s  th a t  th e  v a lid a tio n  p ro c e s s  m a y  e m p lo y
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e m p ir ic a l v a lid a tio n , c o rre la t io n  a n a ly s is , o r  re g re s s io n  a n a ly s is  to  c o m p a re  re s u lts  f ro m  
th e  M A R M  to  a c tu a l a s se s s m e n t a n d  d e c is io n -m a k in g  re su lts . T h e  c h a lle n g e  w ill b e  
o b ta in in g  su ff ic ie n t  d a ta  to  p e rfo rm  a  q u a n ti ta t iv e  a n a ly s is  to  d e te rm in e  i f  th e  m o d e l is  
j u s t  p ic k in g  u p  d if fe re n t  fa c e ts  o f  re s i l ie n c e  o r  i f  i t  is  in d e e d  p e rfo rm in g  b e tte r  th a n  th e  
c u rre n t  re s i lie n c e  a s se s s m e n t te c h n iq u e s  (B a k k e n se n  e t al. 2 0 1 7 ) . Q u a n tita tiv e  a n a ly s is  is  
c r itic a l to  v a lid a te  th a t  th e  M A R M  p e rfo rm s  b e tte r  th a n  c u rre n t h e u r is tic  p ro je c t  se le c tio n  
m e th o d s . F in a lly , a  c le a r  a n d  c o n c ise  u s e r  m a n u a l w ith  e d u c a tio n , tra in in g , a n d  g u id a n c e  
im p le m e n tin g  th e  M A R M , c a te g o r iz in g  b e n c h m a rk  c a te g o rie s , a n d  c o n d u c tin g  t ra d e s p a c e  
a n a ly s is  sh o u ld  b e  c re a te d . T h e  u s e r  m a n u a l w ill  a d d re s s  th e  u s a b il i ty  is su e s  re v e a le d  
th ro u g h  th is  re s e a rc h  to  e n su re  c o n s is te n t  a p p lic a t io n  o f  th e  M A R M  to  a sse s  
in f ra s tru c tu re  re s i lie n c e  a n d  s u p p o r t  im p ro v e m e n t p ro je c t  d e c is io n  m a k in g  a c ro s s  th e  
D o D  M is s io n  A s s u ra n c e  A s s e s s m e n t C o m m u n ity .
2.3.3. Risk and Resilience. A  th ird  a re a  in  w h ic h  to  e x te n d  th is  re s e a rc h  re g a rd s  
th e  re la tio n s h ip  b e tw e e n  re s i l ie n c e  a n d  risk . T h is  r e la tio n s h ip  h a s  b e e n  a  to p ic  o f  m u c h  
d isc u s s io n  in  lite ra tu re . D e s p ite  m u ltip le  v ie w s  o f  th e  d iffe re n c e s  b e tw e e n  r is k  a n d  
re s ilie n c e , th e  b o tto m  lin e  is  th a t  c o n c e p ts  a n d  p ra c tic e  o f  r is k  a n d  re s i l ie n c e  b o th  
a d v a n c e  h o w  u n c e r ta in t ie s  sh o u ld  b e  c o n fro n te d  (A v e n  a n d  T h e k d i 2 0 1 8 )  a n d  a re  an  
e ffo r t  to  a d d re s s  re m a in in g  k n o w n , b u t  u n m itig a te d , r isk  a n d  e n h a n c e  th e  o v e ra ll a b ility  
o f  th e  sy s te m  to  re s p o n d  to  u n k n o w n  o r  e m e rg in g  th re a ts  (L in k o v  e t al. 2 0 1 8 ). R e s il ie n c e  
a s se s s m e n t sh o u ld  b u ild  u p o n  th e  m o re  q u a li ta t iv e  m e th o d s  o f  r is k  a s se s s m e n t to  in c lu d e  
c o n s id e ra t io n  o f  th e  in te ra c tio n  b e tw e e n  p h y s ic a l, in fo rm a tio n , a n d  so c ia l sy s te m s, 
re c o v e ry  an d  a d a p ta tio n  a f te r  th e  in it ia l  e m e rg e n c y  re s p o n se , a n d  o f fe r  an  a p p ro a c h  th a t  
a c k n o w le d g e s  th e  u n c e r ta in ty  a ro u n d  e m e rg in g  th re a ts  a n d  g u id e s  d e te rm in in g  a c c e p ta b le
t ra d e o ffs  in  p e rfo rm a n c e  (B o s tic k  e t  al. 2 0 1 8 ) . T o  a c h ie v e  th e  D o D  m is s io n  a s su ra n c e  
v is io n , c a p a b ili t ie s  d e v e lo p m e n t, re s o u rc e  p r io r it iz a tio n , a n d  fu tu re  p ro te c tio n  
in v e s tm e n ts  m u s t  a ll b e  in te g ra te d  a n d  r is k  in fo rm e d . A t th e  in s ta lla tio n  lev e l, th is  
f ra m e w o rk  w ill e n su re  th a t  in fo rm a tio n  g a th e re d  f ro m  th e i r  m is s io n  a n d  a s se t 
d e c o m p o s itio n  a n d  r is k  a s se s s m e n t p ro c e s s e s  g u id e  th e ir  r is k  m it ig a tio n  d e c is io n s  an d  
re s o u rc e  in v e s tm e n ts  (D e p a r tm e n t o f  D e fe n s e  2 0 1 8 a ).
A  w e a k n e s s  o f  r is k -m a n a g e m e n t a p p ro a c h e s  is  th a t  th e y  c a n  o n ly  d ea l w ith  r isk  
w h e re  p ro b a b ility  o r  im p a c t  c a n  b e  e s tim a te d . H o w e v e r , th e re  a re  a lso  m a n y  th re a ts  
w h ic h  a re  u n k n o w n  b e fo re  th e ir  o c c u rre n c e , a n d  w h ic h  c a n  b e  re a l iz e d  e ith e r  a s  su d d e n  
sh o c k s  o r  as in c re a s in g  s tre s se s  th a t  s lo w ly  b u ild  u p . S o  a  m o re  c o m p re h e n s iv e  
( re s il ie n c e )  a p p ro a c h  n e e d s  to  b e  ta k e n  d u e  to  th e  c o m p le x  in te r fe re n c e s  o f  th e  sy s te m  
(M u s ta jo k i a n d  M a r ttu n e n  2 0 1 9 ).
T h e  M A R M  a d d re s se s  th e s e  c o n s id e ra t io n s  b y  in c o rp o ra tin g  th e  in te ra c tio n  o f  th e  
fo u r  m a n a g e m e n t d o m a in s  (p h y s ic a l, in fo rm a tio n , c o g n itiv e , a n d  so c ia l sy s te m s) , all fo u r  
s ta g e s  o f  re s i lie n c e  (p re p a re , a b so rb , re c o v e r , a n d  a d a p t) , a n d  a llo w s  fo r  t r a d e o f f  a n a ly s is  
w ith in  th e  m o d e l. T h is  su p p o rts  a  b ro a d e r  a n d  m o re  ro b u s t  r is k -b a s e d  d e c is io n -m a k in g  
m e th o d o lo g y  a n d  sa tis f ie s  th e  re q u ire m e n t th a t  r isk  m a n a g e m e n t sh o u ld  w e ig h  th e  
p o te n tia l  b e n e f i t  o f  in v e s t in g  in  a d d itio n a l p ro te c tiv e  m e a s u re s  v e rs u s  fo c u s in g  o n  
a d d itio n a l c a p a c ity  fo r  re s ilie n c e .
T h e  D o D  M is s io n  A s s u ra n c e  S tra te g y  id e n tif ie s  th a t  a  c o m p re h e n s iv e , in te g ra te d , 
a n d  w e ll-u n d e rs to o d  r is k  a s se s s m e n t m e th o d o lo g y  a n d  p ro c e s s  is  a t th e  h e a r t  o f  th e  
m is s io n  a s su ra n c e  c o n c e p t (D e p a r tm e n t o f  D e fe n s e  2 0 1 8 a ). V u ln e ra b ili ty  is  a  c o m p o n e n t 
o f  th e  r is k  fo rm u la : r is k  =  h a z a rd  x  v u ln e ra b il i ty  x  c o n s e q u e n c e  (B a k k e n se n  e t  al. 2 0 1 7 ).
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L in k o v  e t al. fu r th e r  d is t in g u is h e s  r is k  a n d  re s i lie n c e  b y  c o n c e p tu a liz in g  v u ln e ra b il i ty  as 
a  f a c to r  in  sy s te m  r is k  o r  th e  m a x im u m  lo ss e s  a t o n e  p o in t  in  t im e , w h e re a s  re s ilie n c e  
re p re s e n ts  th e  in te g ra l a c ro s s  a ll d is a s te r  t im e  s tep s , in c lu d in g  re c o v e ry  a n d  a d a p ta tio n  
(B a k k e n se n  e t al. 2 0 1 7 ). T h is  c o n te x tu a liz e s  v u ln e ra b il i ty  in to  th e  s ta g e s  o f  re s ilie n c e , 
le n d in g  to  i ts  a p p lic a t io n  in to  th e  M A R M  f ra m e w o rk  to  c lo se  th e  g a p  th a t  e x is ts  in  th e  
D o D  M is s io n  A s s u ra n c e  fra m e w o rk . T h is  g a p  is  d u e  to  th e  la c k  o f  a  c o n s is te n t, 
s ta n d a rd iz e d , a n d  c o m m o n ly  a c c e p te d  m e th o d o lo g y  to  sy n th e s iz e , a n a ly z e , a n d  in te g ra te  
D o D -w id e  m is s io n  a s su ra n c e - fo c u s e d  th re a t, v u ln e ra b il i ty , a n d  c o n s e q u e n c e  in fo rm a tio n  
(D e p a r tm e n t o f  D e fe n s e  2 0 1 8 c ), w h ic h  a re  u s e d  to  c a lc u la te  a  r is k  sc o re  fo r  e a c h  asse t. 
T h e re  c u rre n tly  is  n o  c a p a b ili ty  to  d ire c tly  c o n n e c t  r is k  c a lc u la t io n  to  re s i lie n c e  
m e a s u re m e n t a n d  a sse ssm e n t. T h e  M A R M , as in it ia l ly  d e v e lo p e d , d o e s  n o t  d ire c tly  
in c o rp o ra te  q u a n ti ta t iv e  u n c e r ta in ty  d u e  to  th re a ts . T h e re  is  th e  o p p o r tu n ity  to  e x te n d  th is  
re s e a rc h  to  in te g ra t in g  th e  v u ln e ra b il i ty  c o m p o n e n t o f  th e  D o D  R is k  S c o re  m e th o d o lo g y  
in to  th e  M A R M  b e n c h m a rk  p r io r it iz a t io n  w e ig h tin g  p ro c e s s . A d d itio n a lly , o n e  o f  th e  
b ig g e s t  c h a lle n g e s  to  e ffe c tiv e  r is k  a s se s s m e n t a n d  m a n a g e m e n t is  cost, so  fu r th e r  
in te g ra t io n  o f  L ife  C y c le  C o s t  a n a ly s is  w ill  le a d  to  im p ro v e m e n ts  in  th e  c o n n e c tio n  
b e tw e e n  r is k  a n d  re s ilie n c e . In c o rp o ra tio n  o f  th e  c a p a b ili ty  to  d ire c tly  in te g ra te  c u rre n t 
D o D  r is k  c a lc u la t io n  a n d  m a n a g e m e n t in to  th e  M A R M  w ill  b r id g e  th e  g a p  b e tw e e n  r isk  
m a n a g e m e n t a n d  re l ia n c e  a sse ssm e n t.
T h e  b e n e f i ts  o f  c o n tin u in g  to  e x p a n d  th is  re s e a rc h  in  th e s e  th re e  l in e s  o f  e ffo r t  
w ill  im p ro v e  m ili ta ry  in f ra s tru c tu re  a s se s s m e n t a n d  d e c is io n -m a k in g  le a d in g  to  m o re  
re s i l ie n t  in f ra s tru c tu re  p re p a re d  to  a b so rb , re sp o n d , a n d  a d a p t  to  th e  in c re a s in g  f re q u e n c y  
a n d  se v e rity  o f  d is a s te rs  a ro u n d  th e  w o rld .
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VITA
L ie u te n a n t  C o lo n e l Jo h n  P a u l R ic h a rd s  g ra d u a te d  f ro m  B u c k n e ll  U n iv e rs i ty  w ith  
a  b a c h e lo r ’s d e g re e  in  C iv il E n g in e e r in g  in  1995 a n d  se rv e d  in  th e  U n ite d  S ta te s  A rm y  
fo r  25  y e a rs . A s  a  c a re e r  A rm y  E n g in e e r  O ff ic e r , h e  le d  e n g in e e r in g  p ro je c ts  a ro u n d  th e  
w o r ld  in  su p p o rt o f  m il i ta ry  o p e ra tio n s . H e  e a rn e d  m a s te r ’s d e g re e s  in  b o th  E n g in e e r in g  
M a n a g e m e n t f ro m  th e  U n iv e rs i ty  o f  M is s o u r i-R o lla  in  1999  a n d  C iv il E n g in e e r in g  fro m  
th e  U n iv e rs i ty  o f  C o lo ra d o -B o u ld e r  in  2 0 0 4  in  a d d it io n  to  h is  P ro fe s s io n a l  E n g in e e r  
re g is tra tio n  f ro m  th e  s ta te  o f  C o lo ra d o  in  2 0 0 5 . H is  a c a d e m ic  p o s it io n s  in c lu d e d  se rv in g  
as a n  A s s is ta n t  P ro fe s s o r  a t th e  U n ite d  S ta te s  M ili ta ry  A c a d e m y  in  b o th  th e  D e p a r tm e n t 
o f  C iv il &  M e c h a n ic a l  E n g in e e r in g  a n d  th e  D e p a r tm e n t  o f  S y s te m s  E n g in e e r in g . H e  
re c e iv e d  h is  P h D  in  E n g in e e r in g  M a n a g e m e n t f ro m  th e  M is s o u r i  U n iv e rs i ty  o f  S c ien c e  
a n d  T e c h n o lo g y  in  E n g in e e r in g  M a n a g e m e n t in  D e c e m b e r  2 0 2 0 .
